| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: oa_tc6: fix tx skb race condition between reference pointers
There are two skb pointers to manage tx skb's enqueued from n/w stack.
waiting_tx_skb pointer points to the tx skb which needs to be processed
and ongoing_tx_skb pointer points to the tx skb which is being processed.
SPI thread prepares the tx data chunks from the tx skb pointed by the
ongoing_tx_skb pointer. When the tx skb pointed by the ongoing_tx_skb is
processed, the tx skb pointed by the waiting_tx_skb is assigned to
ongoing_tx_skb and the waiting_tx_skb pointer is assigned with NULL.
Whenever there is a new tx skb from n/w stack, it will be assigned to
waiting_tx_skb pointer if it is NULL. Enqueuing and processing of a tx skb
handled in two different threads.
Consider a scenario where the SPI thread processed an ongoing_tx_skb and
it moves next tx skb from waiting_tx_skb pointer to ongoing_tx_skb pointer
without doing any NULL check. At this time, if the waiting_tx_skb pointer
is NULL then ongoing_tx_skb pointer is also assigned with NULL. After
that, if a new tx skb is assigned to waiting_tx_skb pointer by the n/w
stack and there is a chance to overwrite the tx skb pointer with NULL in
the SPI thread. Finally one of the tx skb will be left as unhandled,
resulting packet missing and memory leak.
- Consider the below scenario where the TXC reported from the previous
transfer is 10 and ongoing_tx_skb holds an tx ethernet frame which can be
transported in 20 TXCs and waiting_tx_skb is still NULL.
tx_credits = 10; /* 21 are filled in the previous transfer */
ongoing_tx_skb = 20;
waiting_tx_skb = NULL; /* Still NULL */
- So, (tc6->ongoing_tx_skb || tc6->waiting_tx_skb) becomes true.
- After oa_tc6_prepare_spi_tx_buf_for_tx_skbs()
ongoing_tx_skb = 10;
waiting_tx_skb = NULL; /* Still NULL */
- Perform SPI transfer.
- Process SPI rx buffer to get the TXC from footers.
- Now let's assume previously filled 21 TXCs are freed so we are good to
transport the next remaining 10 tx chunks from ongoing_tx_skb.
tx_credits = 21;
ongoing_tx_skb = 10;
waiting_tx_skb = NULL;
- So, (tc6->ongoing_tx_skb || tc6->waiting_tx_skb) becomes true again.
- In the oa_tc6_prepare_spi_tx_buf_for_tx_skbs()
ongoing_tx_skb = NULL;
waiting_tx_skb = NULL;
- Now the below bad case might happen,
Thread1 (oa_tc6_start_xmit) Thread2 (oa_tc6_spi_thread_handler)
--------------------------- -----------------------------------
- if waiting_tx_skb is NULL
- if ongoing_tx_skb is NULL
- ongoing_tx_skb = waiting_tx_skb
- waiting_tx_skb = skb
- waiting_tx_skb = NULL
...
- ongoing_tx_skb = NULL
- if waiting_tx_skb is NULL
- waiting_tx_skb = skb
To overcome the above issue, protect the moving of tx skb reference from
waiting_tx_skb pointer to ongoing_tx_skb pointer and assigning new tx skb
to waiting_tx_skb pointer, so that the other thread can't access the
waiting_tx_skb pointer until the current thread completes moving the tx
skb reference safely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: imx8mp-blk-ctrl: imx8mp_blk: Add fdcc clock to hdmimix domain
According to i.MX8MP RM and HDMI ADD, the fdcc clock is part of
hdmi rx verification IP that should not enable for HDMI TX.
But actually if the clock is disabled before HDMI/LCDIF probe,
LCDIF will not get pixel clock from HDMI PHY and print the error
logs:
[CRTC:39:crtc-2] vblank wait timed out
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 9 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:1634 drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x23c/0x260
Add fdcc clock to LCDIF and HDMI TX power domains to fix the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panfrost: Fix the error path in panfrost_mmu_map_fault_addr()
Subject: [PATCH] drm/panfrost: Fix the error path in
panfrost_mmu_map_fault_addr()
If some the pages or sgt allocation failed, we shouldn't release the
pages ref we got earlier, otherwise we will end up with unbalanced
get/put_pages() calls. We should instead leave everything in place
and let the BO release function deal with extra cleanup when the object
is destroyed, or let the fault handler try again next time it's called. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virt: tdx-guest: Just leak decrypted memory on unrecoverable errors
In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an error is returned
and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to take care
to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional
or security issues.
Leak the decrypted memory when set_memory_decrypted() fails,
and don't need to print an error since set_memory_decrypted()
will call WARN_ONCE(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Register devlink first under devlink lock
In case device is having a non fatal FW error during probe, the
driver will report the error to user via devlink. This will trigger
a WARN_ON, since mlx5 is calling devlink_register() last.
In order to avoid the WARN_ON[1], change mlx5 to invoke devl_register()
first under devlink lock.
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 227 at net/devlink/health.c:483 devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0
CPU: 5 PID: 227 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2023_06_12_12_38 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:08:00.0 mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core]
RIP: 0010:devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x79/0x120
? devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0
? report_bug+0x17c/0x190
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x60
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0
devlink_health_report+0x4a/0x1c0
mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work+0xa4/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x1bb/0x3c0
? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3c0
? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
kthread+0xc6/0xf0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: get psock ref after taking rxlock to avoid leak
At the start of tls_sw_recvmsg, we take a reference on the psock, and
then call tls_rx_reader_lock. If that fails, we return directly
without releasing the reference.
Instead of adding a new label, just take the reference after locking
has succeeded, since we don't need it before. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix transaction atomicity bug when enabling simple quotas
Set squota incompat bit before committing the transaction that enables
the feature.
With the config CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT enabled, an assertion
failure occurs regarding the simple quota feature.
[5.596534] assertion failed: btrfs_fs_incompat(fs_info, SIMPLE_QUOTA), in fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:365
[5.597098] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[5.597371] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:365!
[5.597946] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 268 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-00031-gf92f4749861b #146
[5.598450] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
[5.599008] RIP: 0010:btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x74d/0x7a0
[5.604303] <TASK>
[5.605230] ? btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x74d/0x7a0
[5.605538] ? exc_invalid_op+0x56/0x70
[5.605775] ? btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x74d/0x7a0
[5.606066] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
[5.606441] ? btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x74d/0x7a0
[5.606741] ? btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x74d/0x7a0
[5.607038] ? try_to_wake_up+0x317/0x760
[5.607286] open_ctree+0xd9c/0x1710
[5.607509] btrfs_get_tree+0x58a/0x7e0
[5.608002] vfs_get_tree+0x2e/0x100
[5.608224] fc_mount+0x16/0x60
[5.608420] btrfs_get_tree+0x2f8/0x7e0
[5.608897] vfs_get_tree+0x2e/0x100
[5.609121] path_mount+0x4c8/0xbc0
[5.609538] __x64_sys_mount+0x10d/0x150
The issue can be easily reproduced using the following reproducer:
root@q:linux# cat repro.sh
set -e
mkfs.btrfs -q -f /dev/sdb
mount /dev/sdb /mnt/btrfs
btrfs quota enable -s /mnt/btrfs
umount /mnt/btrfs
mount /dev/sdb /mnt/btrfs
The issue is that when enabling quotas, at btrfs_quota_enable(), we set
BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_SIMPLE_MODE at fs_info->qgroup_flags and persist
it in the quota root in the item with the key BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_KEY, but
we only set the incompat bit BTRFS_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SIMPLE_QUOTA after we
commit the transaction used to enable simple quotas.
This means that if after that transaction commit we unmount the filesystem
without starting and committing any other transaction, or we have a power
failure, the next time we mount the filesystem we will find the flag
BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_SIMPLE_MODE set in the item with the key
BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_KEY but we will not find the incompat bit
BTRFS_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SIMPLE_QUOTA set in the superblock, triggering an
assertion failure at:
btrfs_read_qgroup_config() -> qgroup_read_enable_gen()
To fix this issue, set the BTRFS_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SIMPLE_QUOTA flag
immediately after setting the BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_SIMPLE_MODE.
This ensures that both flags are flushed to disk within the same
transaction. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: vmk80xx: fix bulk-buffer overflow
The driver is using endpoint-sized buffers but must not assume that the
tx and rx buffers are of equal size or a malicious device could overflow
the slab-allocated receive buffer when doing bulk transfers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/entry: Mark IRQ entries to fix stack depot warnings
The stack depot filters out everything outside of the top interrupt
context as an uninteresting or irrelevant part of the stack traces. This
helps with stack trace de-duplication, avoiding an explosion of saved
stack traces that share the same IRQ context code path but originate
from different randomly interrupted points, eventually exhausting the
stack depot.
Filtering uses in_irqentry_text() to identify functions within the
.irqentry.text and .softirqentry.text sections, which then become the
last stack trace entries being saved.
While __do_softirq() is placed into the .softirqentry.text section by
common code, populating .irqentry.text is architecture-specific.
Currently, the .irqentry.text section on s390 is empty, which prevents
stack depot filtering and de-duplication and could result in warnings
like:
Stack depot reached limit capacity
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 286113 at lib/stackdepot.c:252 depot_alloc_stack+0x39a/0x3c8
with PREEMPT and KASAN enabled.
Fix this by moving the IO/EXT interrupt handlers from .kprobes.text into
the .irqentry.text section and updating the kprobes blacklist to include
the .irqentry.text section.
This is done only for asynchronous interrupts and explicitly not for
program checks, which are synchronous and where the context beyond the
program check is important to preserve. Despite machine checks being
somewhat in between, they are extremely rare, and preserving context
when possible is also of value.
SVCs and Restart Interrupts are not relevant, one being always at the
boundary to user space and the other being a one-time thing.
IRQ entries filtering is also optionally used in ftrace function graph,
where the same logic applies. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: Split 64bit accesses to fix alignment issues
Some of the registers are aligned on a 32bit boundary, causing
alignment faults on 64bit platforms.
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc084a1d004
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000061
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000061, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000046ad6000
[ffffffc084a1d004] pgd=100000013ffff003, p4d=100000013ffff003, pud=100000013ffff003, pmd=0068000020a00711
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000061 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: mtk_t7xx(+) qcserial pppoe ppp_async option nft_fib_inet nf_flow_table_inet mt7921u(O) mt7921s(O) mt7921e(O) mt7921_common(O) iwlmvm(O) iwldvm(O) usb_wwan rndis_host qmi_wwan pppox ppp_generic nft_reject_ipv6 nft_reject_ipv4 nft_reject_inet nft_reject nft_redir nft_quota nft_numgen nft_nat nft_masq nft_log nft_limit nft_hash nft_flow_offload nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_tables nf_nat nf_flow_table nf_conntrack mt7996e(O) mt792x_usb(O) mt792x_lib(O) mt7915e(O) mt76_usb(O) mt76_sdio(O) mt76_connac_lib(O) mt76(O) mac80211(O) iwlwifi(O) huawei_cdc_ncm cfg80211(O) cdc_ncm cdc_ether wwan usbserial usbnet slhc sfp rtc_pcf8563 nfnetlink nf_reject_ipv6 nf_reject_ipv4 nf_log_syslog nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 mt6577_auxadc mdio_i2c libcrc32c compat(O) cdc_wdm cdc_acm at24 crypto_safexcel pwm_fan i2c_gpio i2c_smbus industrialio i2c_algo_bit i2c_mux_reg i2c_mux_pca954x i2c_mux_pca9541 i2c_mux_gpio i2c_mux dummy oid_registry tun sha512_arm64 sha1_ce sha1_generic seqiv
md5 geniv des_generic libdes cbc authencesn authenc leds_gpio xhci_plat_hcd xhci_pci xhci_mtk_hcd xhci_hcd nvme nvme_core gpio_button_hotplug(O) dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_crypt dm_mod dax usbcore usb_common ptp aquantia pps_core mii tpm encrypted_keys trusted
CPU: 3 PID: 5266 Comm: kworker/u9:1 Tainted: G O 6.6.22 #0
Hardware name: Bananapi BPI-R4 (DT)
Workqueue: md_hk_wq t7xx_fsm_uninit [mtk_t7xx]
pstate: 804000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : t7xx_cldma_hw_set_start_addr+0x1c/0x3c [mtk_t7xx]
lr : t7xx_cldma_start+0xac/0x13c [mtk_t7xx]
sp : ffffffc085d63d30
x29: ffffffc085d63d30 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffff80c804f2c0 x24: ffffff80ca196c05
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffff80c814b9b8 x21: ffffff80c814b128
x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffffff80c814b080 x18: 0000000000000014
x17: 0000000055c9806b x16: 000000007c5296d0 x15: 000000000f6bca68
x14: 00000000dbdbdce4 x13: 000000001aeaf72a x12: 0000000000000001
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : ffffff80ca1ef6b4 x7 : ffffff80c814b818 x6 : 0000000000000018
x5 : 0000000000000870 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 000000010a947000 x1 : ffffffc084a1d004 x0 : ffffffc084a1d004
Call trace:
t7xx_cldma_hw_set_start_addr+0x1c/0x3c [mtk_t7xx]
t7xx_fsm_uninit+0x578/0x5ec [mtk_t7xx]
process_one_work+0x154/0x2a0
worker_thread+0x2ac/0x488
kthread+0xe0/0xec
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Code: f9400800 91001000 8b214001 d50332bf (f9000022)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The inclusion of io-64-nonatomic-lo-hi.h indicates that all 64bit
accesses can be replaced by pairs of nonatomic 32bit access. Fix
alignment by forcing all accesses to be 32bit on 64bit platforms. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: pick the version of SESSION_PROTECTION_NOTIF
When we want to know whether we should look for the mac_id or the
link_id in struct iwl_mvm_session_prot_notif, we should look at the
version of SESSION_PROTECTION_NOTIF.
This causes WARNINGs:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11403 at drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/time-event.c:959 iwl_mvm_rx_session_protect_notif+0x333/0x340 [iwlmvm]
RIP: 0010:iwl_mvm_rx_session_protect_notif+0x333/0x340 [iwlmvm]
Code: 00 49 c7 84 24 48 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 41 c6 84 24 78 07 00 00 ff 4c 89 f7 e8 e9 71 54 d9 e9 7d fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 23 fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 1c fe ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffffb4bb00003d40 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9ae63a361000 RCX: ffff9ae4a98b60d4
RDX: ffff9ae4588499c0 RSI: 0000000000000305 RDI: ffff9ae4a98b6358
RBP: ffffb4bb00003d68 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: ffffb4bb00003d00 R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffff9ae441399050
R13: ffff9ae4761329e8 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ae7af400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055fb75680018 CR3: 00000003dae32006 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? show_regs+0x69/0x80
? __warn+0x8d/0x150
? iwl_mvm_rx_session_protect_notif+0x333/0x340 [iwlmvm]
? report_bug+0x196/0x1c0
? handle_bug+0x45/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x1c/0xb0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? iwl_mvm_rx_session_protect_notif+0x333/0x340 [iwlmvm]
iwl_mvm_rx_common+0x115/0x340 [iwlmvm]
iwl_mvm_rx_mq+0xa6/0x100 [iwlmvm]
iwl_pcie_rx_handle+0x263/0xa10 [iwlwifi]
iwl_pcie_napi_poll_msix+0x32/0xd0 [iwlwifi] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: Limit read size on v1.2
Between UCSI 1.2 and UCSI 2.0, the size of the MESSAGE_IN region was
increased from 16 to 256. In order to avoid overflowing reads for older
systems, add a mechanism to use the read UCSI version to truncate read
sizes on UCSI v1.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: fix overflow inside virtnet_rq_alloc
When the frag just got a page, then may lead to regression on VM.
Specially if the sysctl net.core.high_order_alloc_disable value is 1,
then the frag always get a page when do refill.
Which could see reliable crashes or scp failure (scp a file 100M in size
to VM).
The issue is that the virtnet_rq_dma takes up 16 bytes at the beginning
of a new frag. When the frag size is larger than PAGE_SIZE,
everything is fine. However, if the frag is only one page and the
total size of the buffer and virtnet_rq_dma is larger than one page, an
overflow may occur.
The commit f9dac92ba908 ("virtio_ring: enable premapped mode whatever
use_dma_api") introduced this problem. And we reverted some commits to
fix this in last linux version. Now we try to enable it and fix this
bug directly.
Here, when the frag size is not enough, we reduce the buffer len to fix
this problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isdn: mISDN: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context
The driver can call card->isac.release() function from an atomic
context.
Fix this by calling this function after releasing the lock.
The following log reveals it:
[ 44.168226 ] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/workqueue.c:3018
[ 44.168941 ] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 5475, name: modprobe
[ 44.169574 ] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 44.169899 ] irq event stamp: 0
[ 44.170160 ] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[ 44.170627 ] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff814209ed>] copy_process+0x132d/0x3e00
[ 44.171240 ] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff81420a1a>] copy_process+0x135a/0x3e00
[ 44.171852 ] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[ 44.172318 ] Preemption disabled at:
[ 44.172320 ] [<ffffffffa009b0a9>] nj_release+0x69/0x500 [netjet]
[ 44.174441 ] Call Trace:
[ 44.174630 ] dump_stack_lvl+0xa8/0xd1
[ 44.174912 ] dump_stack+0x15/0x17
[ 44.175166 ] ___might_sleep+0x3a2/0x510
[ 44.175459 ] ? nj_release+0x69/0x500 [netjet]
[ 44.175791 ] __might_sleep+0x82/0xe0
[ 44.176063 ] ? start_flush_work+0x20/0x7b0
[ 44.176375 ] start_flush_work+0x33/0x7b0
[ 44.176672 ] ? trace_irq_enable_rcuidle+0x85/0x170
[ 44.177034 ] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0xaa/0x1f0
[ 44.177372 ] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0xaa/0x1f0
[ 44.177711 ] __flush_work+0x11a/0x1a0
[ 44.177991 ] ? flush_work+0x20/0x20
[ 44.178257 ] ? lock_release+0x13c/0x8f0
[ 44.178550 ] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 44.178872 ] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x148/0x360
[ 44.179187 ] ? read_lock_is_recursive+0x20/0x20
[ 44.179530 ] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 44.179846 ] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x55/0x900
[ 44.180168 ] ? ____kasan_slab_free+0x116/0x140
[ 44.180505 ] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x41/0x60
[ 44.180878 ] ? skb_queue_purge+0x1a3/0x1c0
[ 44.181189 ] ? kfree+0x13e/0x290
[ 44.181438 ] flush_work+0x17/0x20
[ 44.181695 ] mISDN_freedchannel+0xe8/0x100
[ 44.182006 ] isac_release+0x210/0x260 [mISDNipac]
[ 44.182366 ] nj_release+0xf6/0x500 [netjet]
[ 44.182685 ] nj_remove+0x48/0x70 [netjet]
[ 44.182989 ] pci_device_remove+0xa9/0x250 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in
C") kvm_start_guest() became idle_kvm_start_guest(). The old code
allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the
frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's
frame.
idle_kvm_start_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C
function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its
callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller
frame on the emergency stack.
The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with:
paca_ptrs[i]->emergency_sp = alloc_stack(limit, i) + THREAD_SIZE;
So emergency_sp actually points to the first address above the emergency
stack allocation for a given CPU, we must not store above it without
first decrementing it to create a frame. This is different to the
regular kernel stack, paca->kstack, which is initialised to point at an
initial frame that is ready to use.
idle_kvm_start_guest() stores the backchain, CR and LR all of which
write outside the allocation for the emergency stack. It then creates a
stack frame and saves the non-volatile registers. Unfortunately the
frame it creates is not large enough to fit the non-volatiles, and so
the saving of the non-volatile registers also writes outside the
emergency stack allocation.
The end result is that we corrupt whatever is at 0-24 bytes, and 112-248
bytes above the emergency stack allocation.
In practice this has gone unnoticed because the memory immediately above
the emergency stack happens to be used for other stack allocations,
either another CPUs mc_emergency_sp or an IRQ stack. See the order of
calls to irqstack_early_init() and emergency_stack_init().
The low addresses of another stack are the top of that stack, and so are
only used if that stack is under extreme pressue, which essentially
never happens in practice - and if it did there's a high likelyhood we'd
crash due to that stack overflowing.
Still, we shouldn't be corrupting someone else's stack, and it is purely
luck that we aren't corrupting something else.
To fix it we save CR/LR into the caller's frame using the existing r1 on
entry, we then create a SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE frame (which has space for
pt_regs) on the emergency stack with the backchain pointing to the
existing stack, and then finally we switch to the new frame on the
emergency stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: Check output polling initialized before disabling
In drm_kms_helper_poll_disable() check if output polling
support is initialized before disabling polling. If not flag
this as a warning.
Additionally in drm_mode_config_helper_suspend() and
drm_mode_config_helper_resume() calls, that re the callers of these
functions, avoid invoking them if polling is not initialized.
For drivers like hyperv-drm, that do not initialize connector
polling, if suspend is called without this check, it leads to
suspend failure with following stack
[ 770.719392] Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done.
[ 770.720592] printk: Suspending console(s) (use no_console_suspend to debug)
[ 770.948823] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 770.948824] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 17197 at kernel/workqueue.c:3162 __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948831] Modules linked in: rfkill nft_counter xt_conntrack xt_owner udf nft_compat crc_itu_t nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables nfnetlink vfat fat mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core mlx5_core intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp mlxfw kvm psample hyperv_drm tls drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper irqbypass pcspkr syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt hv_balloon hv_utils joydev drm fuse xfs libcrc32c pci_hyperv pci_hyperv_intf sr_mod sd_mod cdrom t10_pi sg hv_storvsc scsi_transport_fc hv_netvsc serio_raw hyperv_keyboard hid_hyperv crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel hv_vmbus ghash_clmulni_intel dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[ 770.948863] CPU: 1 PID: 17197 Comm: systemd-sleep Not tainted 5.14.0-362.2.1.el9_3.x86_64 #1
[ 770.948865] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 05/09/2022
[ 770.948866] RIP: 0010:__flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948869] Code: 8b 4d 00 4c 8b 45 08 89 ca 48 c1 e9 04 83 e2 08 83 e1 0f 83 ca 02 89 c8 48 0f ba 6d 00 03 e9 25 ff ff ff 0f 0b e9 4e ff ff ff <0f> 0b 45 31 ed e9 44 ff ff ff e8 8f 89 b2 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
[ 770.948870] RSP: 0018:ffffaf4ac213fb10 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 770.948871] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8c992857
[ 770.948872] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff9aad82b00330
[ 770.948873] RBP: ffff9aad82b00330 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9aad87ee3d10
[ 770.948874] R10: 0000000000000200 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9aad82b00330
[ 770.948874] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 770.948875] FS: 00007ff1b2f6bb40(0000) GS:ffff9aaf37d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 770.948878] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 770.948878] CR2: 0000555f345cb666 CR3: 00000001462dc005 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[ 770.948879] Call Trace:
[ 770.948880] <TASK>
[ 770.948881] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 770.948884] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 770.948886] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x103/0x190
[ 770.948887] ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948889] ? __warn+0x81/0x110
[ 770.948891] ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948892] ? report_bug+0x10a/0x140
[ 770.948895] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[ 770.948898] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 770.948899] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 770.948903] ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948905] __cancel_work_timer+0x103/0x190
[ 770.948907] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa/0x30
[ 770.948910] drm_kms_helper_poll_disable+0x1e/0x40 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 770.948923] drm_mode_config_helper_suspend+0x1c/0x80 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 770.948933] ? __pfx_vmbus_suspend+0x10/0x10 [hv_vmbus]
[ 770.948942] hyperv_vmbus_suspend+0x17/0x40 [hyperv_drm]
[ 770.948944] ? __pfx_vmbus_suspend+0x10/0x10 [hv_vmbus]
[ 770.948951] dpm_run_callback+0x4c/0x140
[ 770.948954] __device_suspend_noir
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Skip do PCI error slot reset during RAS recovery
Why:
The PCI error slot reset maybe triggered after inject ue to UMC multi times, this
caused system hang.
[ 557.371857] amdgpu 0000:af:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset succeeded, trying to resume
[ 557.373718] [drm] PCIE GART of 512M enabled.
[ 557.373722] [drm] PTB located at 0x0000031FED700000
[ 557.373788] [drm] VRAM is lost due to GPU reset!
[ 557.373789] [drm] PSP is resuming...
[ 557.547012] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_err_detected Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Exit, result = 3, need reset
[ 557.547067] [drm] PCI error: detected callback, state(1)!!
[ 557.547069] [drm] No support for XGMI hive yet...
[ 557.548125] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Enter
[ 557.607763] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: wait vital counter value 0x16b5b after 1 iterations
[ 557.607777] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 1. Exit, err = 0, result = 5, recovered
[ 557.610492] [drm] PCI error: slot reset callback!!
...
[ 560.689382] amdgpu 0000:3f:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded!
[ 560.689546] amdgpu 0000:5a:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded!
[ 560.689562] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x5f080b54534f611f: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 560.701008] CPU: 16 PID: 2361 Comm: kworker/u448:9 Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-91-generic #101-Ubuntu
[ 560.712057] Hardware name: Microsoft C278A/C278A, BIOS C2789.5.BS.1C11.AG.1 11/08/2023
[ 560.720959] Workqueue: amdgpu-reset-hive amdgpu_ras_do_recovery [amdgpu]
[ 560.728887] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu]
[ 560.736891] Code: ff 41 89 c6 e9 1b ff ff ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 4f ff ff ff be 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 76 c9 8b ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 3c fd ff ff <48> 83 ba 18 02 00 00 00 0f 84 6a f8 ff ff 48 8d 7a 78 be 01 00 00
[ 560.757967] RSP: 0018:ffa0000032e53d80 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 560.763848] RAX: ffa00000001dfd10 RBX: ffa0000000197090 RCX: ffa0000032e53db0
[ 560.771856] RDX: 5f080b54534f5f07 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff11000128100010
[ 560.779867] RBP: ffa0000032e53df0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffffe77f08
[ 560.787879] R10: 0000000000ffff0a R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 560.795889] R13: ffa0000032e53e00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 560.803889] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff11007e7e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 560.812973] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 560.819422] CR2: 000055a04c118e68 CR3: 0000000007410005 CR4: 0000000000771ee0
[ 560.827433] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 560.835433] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 560.843444] PKRU: 55555554
[ 560.846480] Call Trace:
[ 560.849225] <TASK>
[ 560.851580] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea
[ 560.856488] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea
[ 560.861379] ? amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu]
[ 560.867778] ? show_regs.part.0+0x23/0x29
[ 560.872293] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
[ 560.876502] ? die_addr+0x3e/0x60
[ 560.880238] ? exc_general_protection+0x1c5/0x410
[ 560.885532] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30
[ 560.891025] ? amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu]
[ 560.898323] amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu]
[ 560.904520] process_one_work+0x228/0x3d0
How:
In RAS recovery, mode-1 reset is issued from RAS fatal error handling and expected
all the nodes in a hive to be reset. no need to issue another mode-1 during this procedure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: Fix not validating setsockopt user input
Check user input length before copying data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sock: Fix not validating setsockopt user input
Check user input length before copying data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix not validating setsockopt user input
Check user input length before copying data. |
