| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: set the cipher for secured NDP ranging
The cipher pointer is not set, but is derefereced trying to set its
content, which leads to a NULL pointer dereference.
Fix it by pointing to the cipher parameter before dereferencing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/tracing: Fix a potential TP_printk UAF
The commit
afd2627f727b ("tracing: Check "%s" dereference via the field and not the TP_printk format")
exposes potential UAFs in the xe_bo_move trace event.
Fix those by avoiding dereferencing the
xe_mem_type_to_name[] array at TP_printk time.
Since some code refactoring has taken place, explicit backporting may
be needed for kernels older than 6.10. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mediatek: vcodec: Fix H264 stateless decoder smatch warning
Fix a smatch static checker warning on vdec_h264_req_if.c.
Which leads to a kernel crash when fb is NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: use exclusive lock when FUSE_I_CACHE_IO_MODE is set
This may be a typo. The comment has said shared locks are
not allowed when this bit is set. If using shared lock, the
wait in `fuse_file_cached_io_open` may be forever. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Use dedicated mutex to protect kvm_usage_count to avoid deadlock
Use a dedicated mutex to guard kvm_usage_count to fix a potential deadlock
on x86 due to a chain of locks and SRCU synchronizations. Translating the
below lockdep splat, CPU1 #6 will wait on CPU0 #1, CPU0 #8 will wait on
CPU2 #3, and CPU2 #7 will wait on CPU1 #4 (if there's a writer, due to the
fairness of r/w semaphores).
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
1 lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
2 lock(&vcpu->mutex);
3 lock(&kvm->srcu);
4 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
5 lock(kvm_lock);
6 lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
7 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
8 sync(&kvm->srcu);
Note, there are likely more potential deadlocks in KVM x86, e.g. the same
pattern of taking cpu_hotplug_lock outside of kvm_lock likely exists with
__kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier():
cpuhp_cpufreq_online()
|
-> cpufreq_online()
|
-> cpufreq_gov_performance_limits()
|
-> __cpufreq_driver_target()
|
-> __target_index()
|
-> cpufreq_freq_transition_begin()
|
-> cpufreq_notify_transition()
|
-> ... __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier()
But, actually triggering such deadlocks is beyond rare due to the
combination of dependencies and timings involved. E.g. the cpufreq
notifier is only used on older CPUs without a constant TSC, mucking with
the NX hugepage mitigation while VMs are running is very uncommon, and
doing so while also onlining/offlining a CPU (necessary to generate
contention on cpu_hotplug_lock) would be even more unusual.
The most robust solution to the general cpu_hotplug_lock issue is likely
to switch vm_list to be an RCU-protected list, e.g. so that x86's cpufreq
notifier doesn't to take kvm_lock. For now, settle for fixing the most
blatant deadlock, as switching to an RCU-protected list is a much more
involved change, but add a comment in locking.rst to call out that care
needs to be taken when walking holding kvm_lock and walking vm_list.
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.10.0-smp--c257535a0c9d-pip #330 Tainted: G S O
------------------------------------------------------
tee/35048 is trying to acquire lock:
ff6a80eced71e0a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm]
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffffc07abb08 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x14a/0x1e0 [kvm]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40
mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4fb/0xe50 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
-> #2 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
cpus_read_lock+0x2e/0xb0
static_key_slow_inc+0x16/0x30
kvm_lapic_set_base+0x6a/0x1c0 [kvm]
kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xe0 [kvm]
kvm_set_msr_common+0x9ae/0xf80 [kvm]
vmx_set_msr+0xa54/0xbe0 [kvm_intel]
__kvm_set_msr+0xb6/0x1a0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xeca/0x10c0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x485/0x5b0 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
-> #1 (&kvm->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}:
__synchronize_srcu+0x44/0x1a0
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix race setting file private on concurrent lseek using same fd
When doing concurrent lseek(2) system calls against the same file
descriptor, using multiple threads belonging to the same process, we have
a short time window where a race happens and can result in a memory leak.
The race happens like this:
1) A program opens a file descriptor for a file and then spawns two
threads (with the pthreads library for example), lets call them
task A and task B;
2) Task A calls lseek with SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE and ends up at
file.c:find_desired_extent() while holding a read lock on the inode;
3) At the start of find_desired_extent(), it extracts the file's
private_data pointer into a local variable named 'private', which has
a value of NULL;
4) Task B also calls lseek with SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE, locks the inode
in shared mode and enters file.c:find_desired_extent(), where it also
extracts file->private_data into its local variable 'private', which
has a NULL value;
5) Because it saw a NULL file private, task A allocates a private
structure and assigns to the file structure;
6) Task B also saw a NULL file private so it also allocates its own file
private and then assigns it to the same file structure, since both
tasks are using the same file descriptor.
At this point we leak the private structure allocated by task A.
Besides the memory leak, there's also the detail that both tasks end up
using the same cached state record in the private structure (struct
btrfs_file_private::llseek_cached_state), which can result in a
use-after-free problem since one task can free it while the other is
still using it (only one task took a reference count on it). Also, sharing
the cached state is not a good idea since it could result in incorrect
results in the future - right now it should not be a problem because it
end ups being used only in extent-io-tree.c:count_range_bits() where we do
range validation before using the cached state.
Fix this by protecting the private assignment and check of a file while
holding the inode's spinlock and keep track of the task that allocated
the private, so that it's used only by that task in order to prevent
user-after-free issues with the cached state record as well as potentially
using it incorrectly in the future. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: handle overlapped pclusters out of crafted images properly
syzbot reported a task hang issue due to a deadlock case where it is
waiting for the folio lock of a cached folio that will be used for
cache I/Os.
After looking into the crafted fuzzed image, I found it's formed with
several overlapped big pclusters as below:
Ext: logical offset | length : physical offset | length
0: 0.. 16384 | 16384 : 151552.. 167936 | 16384
1: 16384.. 32768 | 16384 : 155648.. 172032 | 16384
2: 32768.. 49152 | 16384 : 537223168.. 537239552 | 16384
...
Here, extent 0/1 are physically overlapped although it's entirely
_impossible_ for normal filesystem images generated by mkfs.
First, managed folios containing compressed data will be marked as
up-to-date and then unlocked immediately (unlike in-place folios) when
compressed I/Os are complete. If physical blocks are not submitted in
the incremental order, there should be separate BIOs to avoid dependency
issues. However, the current code mis-arranges z_erofs_fill_bio_vec()
and BIO submission which causes unexpected BIO waits.
Second, managed folios will be connected to their own pclusters for
efficient inter-queries. However, this is somewhat hard to implement
easily if overlapped big pclusters exist. Again, these only appear in
fuzzed images so let's simply fall back to temporary short-lived pages
for correctness.
Additionally, it justifies that referenced managed folios cannot be
truncated for now and reverts part of commit 2080ca1ed3e4 ("erofs: tidy
up `struct z_erofs_bvec`") for simplicity although it shouldn't be any
difference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Delete subtree of 'fs/netfs' when netfs module exits
In netfs_init() or fscache_proc_init(), we create dentry under 'fs/netfs',
but in netfs_exit(), we only delete the proc entry of 'fs/netfs' without
deleting its subtree. This triggers the following WARNING:
==================================================================
remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'fs/netfs', leaking at least 'requests'
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 566 at fs/proc/generic.c:717 remove_proc_entry+0x160/0x1c0
Modules linked in: netfs(-)
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 566 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3 #860
RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x160/0x1c0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
netfs_exit+0x12/0x620 [netfs]
__do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x14c/0x2e0
do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
==================================================================
Therefore use remove_proc_subtree() instead of remove_proc_entry() to
fix the above problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: iaa - Fix potential use after free bug
The free_device_compression_mode(iaa_device, device_mode) function frees
"device_mode" but it iss passed to iaa_compression_modes[i]->free() a few
lines later resulting in a use after free.
The good news is that, so far as I can tell, nothing implements the
->free() function and the use after free happens in dead code. But, with
this fix, when something does implement it, we'll be ready. :) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Use reserved copy engine for user binds on faulting devices
User binds map to engines with can fault, faults depend on user binds
completion, thus we can deadlock. Avoid this by using reserved copy
engine for user binds on faulting devices.
While we are here, normalize bind queue creation with a helper.
v2:
- Pass in extensions to bind queue creation (CI)
v3:
- s/resevered/reserved (Lucas)
- Fix NULL hwe check (Jonathan) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: use work queue to process beacon tx event
Commit 3a415daa3e8b ("wifi: ath11k: add P2P IE in beacon template")
from Feb 28, 2024 (linux-next), leads to the following Smatch static
checker warning:
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/wmi.c:1742 ath11k_wmi_p2p_go_bcn_ie()
warn: sleeping in atomic context
The reason is that ath11k_bcn_tx_status_event() will directly call might
sleep function ath11k_wmi_cmd_send() during RCU read-side critical
sections. The call trace is like:
ath11k_bcn_tx_status_event()
-> rcu_read_lock()
-> ath11k_mac_bcn_tx_event()
-> ath11k_mac_setup_bcn_tmpl()
……
-> ath11k_wmi_bcn_tmpl()
-> ath11k_wmi_cmd_send()
-> rcu_read_unlock()
Commit 886433a98425 ("ath11k: add support for BSS color change") added the
ath11k_mac_bcn_tx_event(), commit 01e782c89108 ("ath11k: fix warning
of RCU usage for ath11k_mac_get_arvif_by_vdev_id()") added the RCU lock
to avoid warning but also introduced this BUG.
Use work queue to avoid directly calling ath11k_mac_bcn_tx_event()
during RCU critical sections. No need to worry about the deletion of vif
because cancel_work_sync() will drop the work if it doesn't start or
block vif deletion until the running work is done.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: remove unused C2H event ID RTW89_MAC_C2H_FUNC_READ_WOW_CAM to prevent out-of-bounds reading
The handler of firmware C2H event RTW89_MAC_C2H_FUNC_READ_WOW_CAM isn't
implemented, but driver expects number of handlers is
NUM_OF_RTW89_MAC_C2H_FUNC_WOW causing out-of-bounds access. Fix it by
removing ID.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1598775 ("Out-of-bounds read") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Protect against overflow of ALIGN() during iova allocation
Userspace can supply an iova and uptr such that the target iova alignment
becomes really big and ALIGN() overflows which corrupts the selected area
range during allocation. CONFIG_IOMMUFD_TEST can detect this:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5092 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 iopt_alloc_area_pages drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5092 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 iopt_map_pages+0xf95/0x1050 drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:352
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5092 Comm: syz-executor294 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5-syzkaller-00294-g3ffea9a7a6f7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024
RIP: 0010:iopt_alloc_area_pages drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:268 [inline]
RIP: 0010:iopt_map_pages+0xf95/0x1050 drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:352
Code: fc e9 a4 f3 ff ff e8 1a 8b 4c fc 41 be e4 ff ff ff e9 8a f3 ff ff e8 0a 8b 4c fc 90 0f 0b 90 e9 37 f5 ff ff e8 fc 8a 4c fc 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 68 f3 ff ff 48 c7 c1 ec 82 ad 8f 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ebf9e0 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff85499fa4 RBX: 00000000ffffffef RCX: ffff888079b49e00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffffef RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90003ebfc50 R08: ffffffff85499b30 R09: ffffffff85499942
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff888079b49e00 R12: ffff8880228e0010
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 1ffff920007d7f68 R15: ffffc90003ebfd00
FS: 000055557d760380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000005fdeb8 CR3: 000000007404a000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
iommufd_ioas_copy+0x610/0x7b0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/ioas.c:274
iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x4d9/0x5a0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c:421
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Cap the automatic alignment to the huge page size, which is probably a
better idea overall. Huge automatic alignments can fragment and chew up
the available IOVA space without any reason. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RISC-V: KVM: Don't zero-out PMU snapshot area before freeing data
With the latest Linux-6.11-rc3, the below NULL pointer crash is observed
when SBI PMU snapshot is enabled for the guest and the guest is forcefully
powered-off.
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000508
Oops [#1]
Modules linked in: kvm
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 61 Comm: term-poll Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-00018-g44d7178dd77a #3
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
epc : __kvm_write_guest_page+0x94/0xa6 [kvm]
ra : __kvm_write_guest_page+0x54/0xa6 [kvm]
epc : ffffffff01590e98 ra : ffffffff01590e58 sp : ffff8f80001f39b0
gp : ffffffff81512a60 tp : ffffaf80024872c0 t0 : ffffaf800247e000
t1 : 00000000000007e0 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffff8f80001f39f0
s1 : 00007fff89ac4000 a0 : ffffffff015dd7e8 a1 : 0000000000000086
a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : ffffaf8000000000 a4 : ffffaf80024882c0
a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffaf800328d780 a7 : 00000000000001cc
s2 : ffffaf800197bd00 s3 : 00000000000828c4 s4 : ffffaf800248c000
s5 : ffffaf800247d000 s6 : 0000000000001000 s7 : 0000000000001000
s8 : 0000000000000000 s9 : 00007fff861fd500 s10: 0000000000000001
s11: 0000000000800000 t3 : 00000000000004d3 t4 : 00000000000004d3
t5 : ffffffff814126e0 t6 : ffffffff81412700
status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000000000508 cause: 000000000000000d
[<ffffffff01590e98>] __kvm_write_guest_page+0x94/0xa6 [kvm]
[<ffffffff015943a6>] kvm_vcpu_write_guest+0x56/0x90 [kvm]
[<ffffffff015a175c>] kvm_pmu_clear_snapshot_area+0x42/0x7e [kvm]
[<ffffffff015a1972>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_deinit.part.0+0xe0/0x14e [kvm]
[<ffffffff015a2ad0>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_deinit+0x1a/0x24 [kvm]
[<ffffffff0159b344>] kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x28/0x4c [kvm]
[<ffffffff0158e420>] kvm_destroy_vcpus+0x5a/0xda [kvm]
[<ffffffff0159930c>] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x14/0x28 [kvm]
[<ffffffff01593260>] kvm_destroy_vm+0x168/0x2a0 [kvm]
[<ffffffff015933d4>] kvm_put_kvm+0x3c/0x58 [kvm]
[<ffffffff01593412>] kvm_vm_release+0x22/0x2e [kvm]
Clearly, the kvm_vcpu_write_guest() function is crashing because it is
being called from kvm_pmu_clear_snapshot_area() upon guest tear down.
To address the above issue, simplify the kvm_pmu_clear_snapshot_area() to
not zero-out PMU snapshot area from kvm_pmu_clear_snapshot_area() because
the guest is anyway being tore down.
The kvm_pmu_clear_snapshot_area() is also called when guest changes
PMU snapshot area of a VCPU but even in this case the previous PMU
snaphsot area must not be zeroed-out because the guest might have
reclaimed the pervious PMU snapshot area for some other purpose. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: 9410/1: vfp: Use asm volatile in fmrx/fmxr macros
Floating point instructions in userspace can crash some arm kernels
built with clang/LLD 17.0.6:
BUG: unsupported FP instruction in kernel mode
FPEXC == 0xc0000780
Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 196 Comm: vfp-reproducer Not tainted 6.10.0 #1
Hardware name: BCM2835
PC is at vfp_support_entry+0xc8/0x2cc
LR is at do_undefinstr+0xa8/0x250
pc : [<c0101d50>] lr : [<c010a80c>] psr: a0000013
sp : dc8d1f68 ip : 60000013 fp : bedea19c
r10: ec532b17 r9 : 00000010 r8 : 0044766c
r7 : c0000780 r6 : ec532b17 r5 : c1c13800 r4 : dc8d1fb0
r3 : c10072c4 r2 : c0101c88 r1 : ec532b17 r0 : 0044766c
Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none
Control: 00c5387d Table: 0251c008 DAC: 00000051
Register r0 information: non-paged memory
Register r1 information: vmalloc memory
Register r2 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory
Register r3 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory
Register r4 information: 2-page vmalloc region
Register r5 information: slab kmalloc-cg-2k
Register r6 information: vmalloc memory
Register r7 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory
Register r8 information: non-paged memory
Register r9 information: zero-size pointer
Register r10 information: vmalloc memory
Register r11 information: non-paged memory
Register r12 information: non-paged memory
Process vfp-reproducer (pid: 196, stack limit = 0x61aaaf8b)
Stack: (0xdc8d1f68 to 0xdc8d2000)
1f60: 0000081f b6f69300 0000000f c10073f4 c10072c4 dc8d1fb0
1f80: ec532b17 0c532b17 0044766c b6f9ccd8 00000000 c010a80c 00447670 60000010
1fa0: ffffffff c1c13800 00c5387d c0100f10 b6f68af8 00448fc0 00000000 bedea188
1fc0: bedea314 00000001 00448ebc b6f9d000 00447608 b6f9ccd8 00000000 bedea19c
1fe0: bede9198 bedea188 b6e1061c 0044766c 60000010 ffffffff 00000000 00000000
Call trace:
[<c0101d50>] (vfp_support_entry) from [<c010a80c>] (do_undefinstr+0xa8/0x250)
[<c010a80c>] (do_undefinstr) from [<c0100f10>] (__und_usr+0x70/0x80)
Exception stack(0xdc8d1fb0 to 0xdc8d1ff8)
1fa0: b6f68af8 00448fc0 00000000 bedea188
1fc0: bedea314 00000001 00448ebc b6f9d000 00447608 b6f9ccd8 00000000 bedea19c
1fe0: bede9198 bedea188 b6e1061c 0044766c 60000010 ffffffff
Code: 0a000061 e3877202 e594003c e3a09010 (eef16a10)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---
This is a minimal userspace reproducer on a Raspberry Pi Zero W:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <math.h>
int main(void)
{
double v = 1.0;
printf("%fn", NAN + *(volatile double *)&v);
return 0;
}
Another way to consistently trigger the oops is:
calvin@raspberry-pi-zero-w ~$ python -c "import json"
The bug reproduces only when the kernel is built with DYNAMIC_DEBUG=n,
because the pr_debug() calls act as barriers even when not activated.
This is the output from the same kernel source built with the same
compiler and DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y, where the userspace reproducer works as
expected:
VFP: bounce: trigger ec532b17 fpexc c0000780
VFP: emulate: INST=0xee377b06 SCR=0x00000000
VFP: bounce: trigger eef1fa10 fpexc c0000780
VFP: emulate: INST=0xeeb40b40 SCR=0x00000000
VFP: raising exceptions 30000000
calvin@raspberry-pi-zero-w ~$ ./vfp-reproducer
nan
Crudely grepping for vmsr/vmrs instructions in the otherwise nearly
idential text for vfp_support_entry() makes the problem obvious:
vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101cb8] <+48>: vmrs r7, fpexc
vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101cd8] <+80>: vmsr fpexc, r0
vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101d20
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7915: fix oops on non-dbdc mt7986
mt7915_band_config() sets band_idx = 1 on the main phy for mt7986
with MT7975_ONE_ADIE or MT7976_ONE_ADIE.
Commit 0335c034e726 ("wifi: mt76: fix race condition related to
checking tx queue fill status") introduced a dereference of the
phys array indirectly indexed by band_idx via wcid->phy_idx in
mt76_wcid_cleanup(). This caused the following Oops on affected
mt7986 devices:
Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000024
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000005
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005
CM = 0, WnR = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000042545000
[0000000000000024] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ... mt7915e mt76_connac_lib mt76 mac80211 cfg80211 ...
CPU: 2 PID: 1631 Comm: hostapd Not tainted 5.15.150 #0
Hardware name: ZyXEL EX5700 (Telenor) (DT)
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x84/0x22c [mt76]
lr : mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x64/0x22c [mt76]
sp : ffffffc00a803700
x29: ffffffc00a803700 x28: ffffff80008f7300 x27: ffffff80003f3c00
x26: ffffff80000a7880 x25: ffffffc008c26e00 x24: 0000000000000001
x23: ffffffc000a68114 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff8004172cc8
x20: ffffffc00a803748 x19: ffffff8004152020 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 00000000000017c0 x16: ffffffc008ef5000 x15: 0000000000000be0
x14: ffffff8004172e28 x13: ffffff8004172e28 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffff8004172e30 x9 : ffffff8004172e28
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : ffffff8004156020 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000031 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffffff80008f7300 x0 : 0000000000000024
Call trace:
mt76_wcid_cleanup+0x84/0x22c [mt76]
__mt76_sta_remove+0x70/0xbc [mt76]
mt76_sta_state+0x8c/0x1a4 [mt76]
mt7915_eeprom_get_power_delta+0x11e4/0x23a0 [mt7915e]
drv_sta_state+0x144/0x274 [mac80211]
sta_info_move_state+0x1cc/0x2a4 [mac80211]
sta_set_sinfo+0xaf8/0xc24 [mac80211]
sta_info_destroy_addr_bss+0x4c/0x6c [mac80211]
ieee80211_color_change_finish+0x1c08/0x1e70 [mac80211]
cfg80211_check_station_change+0x1360/0x4710 [cfg80211]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xb4/0x110
genl_rcv_msg+0xd0/0x1bc
netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x120
genl_rcv+0x34/0x50
netlink_unicast+0x1f0/0x2ec
netlink_sendmsg+0x198/0x3d0
____sys_sendmsg+0x1b0/0x210
___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xf0
__sys_sendmsg+0x44/0xa0
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x20/0x30
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x40/0xd0
el0_svc+0x14/0x4c
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x110
el0t_64_sync+0x15c/0x160
Code: d2800002 910092c0 52800023 f9800011 (885f7c01)
---[ end trace 7e42dd9a39ed2281 ]---
Fix by using mt76_dev_phy() which will map band_idx to the correct phy
for all hardware combinations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: use hweight16 to get correct tx antenna
The chainmask is u16 so using hweight8 cannot get correct tx_ant.
Without this patch, the tx_ant of band 2 would be -1 and lead to the
following issue:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in mt7996_mcu_add_sta+0x12e0/0x16e0 [mt7996e] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netkit: Assign missing bpf_net_context
During the introduction of struct bpf_net_context handling for
XDP-redirect, the netkit driver has been missed, which also requires it
because NETKIT_REDIRECT invokes skb_do_redirect() which is accessing the
per-CPU variables. Otherwise we see the following crash:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
bpf_redirect()
netkit_xmit()
dev_hard_start_xmit()
Set the bpf_net_context before invoking netkit_xmit() program within the
netkit driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, lsm: Add check for BPF LSM return value
A bpf prog returning a positive number attached to file_alloc_security
hook makes kernel panic.
This happens because file system can not filter out the positive number
returned by the LSM prog using IS_ERR, and misinterprets this positive
number as a file pointer.
Given that hook file_alloc_security never returned positive number
before the introduction of BPF LSM, and other BPF LSM hooks may
encounter similar issues, this patch adds LSM return value check
in verifier, to ensure no unexpected value is returned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fail verification for sign-extension of packet data/data_end/data_meta
syzbot reported a kernel crash due to
commit 1f1e864b6555 ("bpf: Handle sign-extenstin ctx member accesses").
The reason is due to sign-extension of 32-bit load for
packet data/data_end/data_meta uapi field.
The original code looks like:
r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff->data */
r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) /* load __sk_buff->data_end */
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto +1
...
Note that __sk_buff->data load has 32-bit sign extension.
After verification and convert_ctx_accesses(), the final asm code looks like:
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)
r2 = (s32)r2
r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto pc+1
...
Note that 'r2 = (s32)r2' may make the kernel __sk_buff->data address invalid
which may cause runtime failure.
Currently, in C code, typically we have
void *data = (void *)(long)skb->data;
void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end;
...
and it will generate
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)
r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto pc+1
If we allow sign-extension,
void *data = (void *)(long)(int)skb->data;
void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end;
...
the generated code looks like
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)
r2 <<= 32
r2 s>>= 32
r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto pc+1
and this will cause verification failure since "r2 <<= 32" is not allowed
as "r2" is a packet pointer.
To fix this issue for case
r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff->data */
this patch added additional checking in is_valid_access() callback
function for packet data/data_end/data_meta access. If those accesses
are with sign-extenstion, the verification will fail.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000c90eee061d236d37@google.com/ |
