| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Firefly III's webhook URL validator (IsValidWebhookUrl.php) filters most private/reserved IPv4 ranges but contains an explicit early-return that allows any resolved address in 127.0.0.0/8, permitting an authenticated user (with webhooks enabled, which is off by default) to configure a webhook targeting loopback services on the server. Additionally, the validator resolves the target hostname once via gethostbyname() at validation time, but the actual outbound request (StandardWebhookSender.php, via Guzzle) re-resolves the hostname independently at send time, allowing a DNS-rebinding attacker to pass validation against a public IP and have the real request delivered to a private or internal address. The webhook response body is only written to a server-side debug log, not returned to the triggering user, so this is a blind SSRF primitive rather than one with direct response read-back. |
| toner-management's admin state-changing handlers (add.php, edit.php, delete.php under admin/toners, admin/toner-brands, admin/printers, and related admin subdirectories) executed INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE database operations with no authentication or authorization check, while access control was enforced only in listing views. An unauthenticated remote attacker could invoke these handlers directly to create, modify, or destroy application data. The vendor has since merged a fix requiring an authenticated admin session before any such handler proceeds. |
| Mautic's getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction (LeadBundle/Controller/AjaxController.php) reads a field parameter from the request, sanitizes it only with InputHelper::clean() (which HTML-entity-encodes quotes and angle brackets but does not restrict other characters), and passes it into LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue() where it is concatenated directly as a raw SQL column identifier ($col = 'l.'.$field) rather than being validated against a whitelist of real column names or passed as a bound parameter. Since Doctrine cannot parameterize identifiers, and the sanitizer does not block spaces, parentheses, or other SQL-relevant characters, an attacker can inject SQL via the field name itself. The action requires only a valid session (any authenticated user), unlike sibling actions in the same controller that carry additional permission checks. |
| Documenso's sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. The handler upserts a Signature record tied to the target field's recipientId with no check that field.type is SIGNATURE and the acting recipient owns it. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project's own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here. In a sequential-signing document, an assistant recipient can therefore forge another signer's signature field. |
| The wp-downloadmanager WordPress plugin, in version 1.68.11 (also affecting the 6.9.4 release line), allows an admin-privileged user (current_user_can('manage_downloads')) to upload arbitrary files via download-add.php with no extension or MIME-type validation of any kind - no wp_check_filetype_and_ext(), no validate_file(), and no extension blocklist exist anywhere in the upload handler. The destination path is additionally built by concatenating the raw, unsanitized $_POST['file_upload_to'] value with no traversal check (no ../ filtering, no basename()/realpath() applied). Since the base download path is required to live under WP_CONTENT_DIR (a web-accessible location), an uploaded PHP file lands in a web-servable path and can be directly executed, resulting in remote code execution. The plugin's own later changelog confirms these protections were absent in this version: v1.69 added file-type validation via wp_check_filetype_and_ext(), and v1.69.1 added directory-traversal protection - neither existed in 1.68.11. |
| In nr modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with System execution privileges needed. |
| In modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed |
| In modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed |
| In modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed |
| In modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed |
| In modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed |
| In modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed |
| In modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed |
| NeuVector through 5.4.9 is can potentially leak information from manager /network/graph API due to missing authentication and cached data containing sensitive information. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: bpf_local_storage: Always use bpf_mem_alloc in PREEMPT_RT
In PREEMPT_RT, kmalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) is still not safe in non preemptible
context. bpf_mem_alloc must be used in PREEMPT_RT. This patch is
to enforce bpf_mem_alloc in the bpf_local_storage when CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
is enabled.
[ 35.118559] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
[ 35.118566] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1832, name: test_progs
[ 35.118569] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[ 35.118571] RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 1
[ 35.118577] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
...
[ 35.118647] __might_resched+0x433/0x5b0
[ 35.118677] rt_spin_lock+0xc3/0x290
[ 35.118700] ___slab_alloc+0x72/0xc40
[ 35.118723] __kmalloc_noprof+0x13f/0x4e0
[ 35.118732] bpf_map_kzalloc+0xe5/0x220
[ 35.118740] bpf_selem_alloc+0x1d2/0x7b0
[ 35.118755] bpf_local_storage_update+0x2fa/0x8b0
[ 35.118784] bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x15a/0x1d0
[ 35.118791] bpf_prog_9a118d86fca78ebb_trace_inet_sock_set_state+0x44/0x66
[ 35.118795] bpf_trace_run3+0x222/0x400
[ 35.118820] __bpf_trace_inet_sock_set_state+0x11/0x20
[ 35.118824] trace_inet_sock_set_state+0x112/0x130
[ 35.118830] inet_sk_state_store+0x41/0x90
[ 35.118836] tcp_set_state+0x3b3/0x640
There is no need to adjust the gfp_flags passing to the
bpf_mem_cache_alloc_flags() which only honors the GFP_KERNEL.
The verifier has ensured GFP_KERNEL is passed only in sleepable context.
It has been an old issue since the first introduction of the
bpf_local_storage ~5 years ago, so this patch targets the bpf-next.
bpf_mem_alloc is needed to solve it, so the Fixes tag is set
to the commit when bpf_mem_alloc was first used in the bpf_local_storage. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate compound request size before reading StructureSize2
When ksmbd validates a compound (chained) SMB2 request,
ksmbd_smb2_check_message() reads pdu->StructureSize2 without first
checking that the compound element is large enough to contain it.
StructureSize2 is a 2-byte field at offset 64
(__SMB2_HEADER_STRUCTURE_SIZE) from the start of each element.
The compound-walking logic only guarantees that a full 64-byte SMB2
header is present for the trailing element: when NextCommand is 0, len is
reduced to the number of bytes remaining after next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off. A
remote client can craft a compound request whose last element has exactly
64 bytes, so the 2-byte StructureSize2 read at offset 64 extends one byte
past the receive buffer, producing a slab-out-of-bounds read.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_smb2_check_message (fs/smb/server/smb2misc.c:402)
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888012ae31ac by task kworker/0:1/14
The buggy address is located 172 bytes inside of allocated 173-byte region
Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
Call Trace:
...
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
ksmbd_smb2_check_message (fs/smb/server/smb2misc.c:402)
handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:119)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Reject any compound element that is too small to hold StructureSize2
before dereferencing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mremap: fix address wraparound in move_page_tables()
On 32-bit platforms, it is possible for the expression `len + old_addr <
old_end` to be false-positive if `len + old_addr` wraps around.
`old_addr` is the cursor in the old range up to which page table entries
have been moved; so if the operation succeeded, `old_addr` is the *end* of
the old region, and adding `len` to it can wrap.
The overflow causes mremap() to mistakenly believe that PTEs have been
copied; the consequence is that mremap() bails out, but doesn't move the
PTEs back before the new VMA is unmapped, causing anonymous pages in the
region to be lost. So basically if userspace tries to mremap() a
private-anon region and hits this bug, mremap() will return an error and
the private-anon region's contents appear to have been zeroed.
The idea of this check is that `old_end - len` is the original start
address, and writing the check that way also makes it easier to read; so
fix the check by rearranging the comparison accordingly.
(An alternate fix would be to refactor this function by introducing an
"orig_old_start" variable or such.)
Tested in a VM with a 32-bit X86 kernel; without the patch:
```
user@horn:~/big_mremap$ cat test.c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define ADDR1 ((void*)0x60000000)
#define ADDR2 ((void*)0x10000000)
#define SIZE 0x50000000uL
int main(void) {
unsigned char *p1 = mmap(ADDR1, SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0);
if (p1 == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap 1");
unsigned char *p2 = mmap(ADDR2, SIZE, PROT_NONE,
MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0);
if (p2 == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap 2");
*p1 = 0x41;
printf("first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1);
unsigned char *p3 = mremap(p1, SIZE, SIZE,
MREMAP_MAYMOVE|MREMAP_FIXED, p2);
if (p3 == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mremap() failed; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1);
} else {
printf("mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p3);
}
}
user@horn:~/big_mremap$ gcc -static -o test test.c
user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test
first char is 0x41
mremap() failed; first char is 0x00
```
With the patch:
```
user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test
first char is 0x41
mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x41
``` |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nexthop: initialize extack in nh_res_bucket_migrate()
nh_res_bucket_migrate() passes an uninitialized netlink_ext_ack to
call_nexthop_res_bucket_notifiers(). When
nh_notifier_res_bucket_info_init() fails (e.g. the kzalloc returns
-ENOMEM), the error is propagated back before any notifier sets
extack._msg, and the error path formats the stale pointer with
pr_err_ratelimited("%s\n", extack._msg). With CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE
this dereferences uninitialized stack memory:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [...]
RIP: 0010:string (lib/vsprintf.c:730)
vsnprintf (lib/vsprintf.c:2945)
_printk (kernel/printk/printk.c:2504)
nh_res_bucket_migrate (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1816)
nh_res_table_upkeep (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1866)
rtm_new_nexthop (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3323)
rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7076)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Zero-initialize extack so _msg is NULL on error paths that never set it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: qca: fix NVM tag length underflow in TLV parser
In the TLV_TYPE_NVM branch of qca_tlv_check_data() the tag loop bound is
"while (idx < length - sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm))". "length" is a signed
int from the firmware TLV header and sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm) is a
size_t (12), so "length" is converted to size_t and any firmware-supplied
"length" < 12 makes the subtraction wrap to a huge value. The loop body
then reads a 12-byte struct tlv_type_nvm past the end of the short
vmalloc'd firmware buffer (and the EDL_TAG_ID_* handlers can write past it).
Rewrite the bound as "idx + sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm) <= length"; both
operands are non-negative, so it no longer underflows and a "length" too
small for one record correctly skips the loop.
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in qca_download_firmware.isra.0 (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:421)
Read of size 2 at addr ffffc900000e5004 by task kworker/u9:0/52
Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on
Call Trace:
...
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
qca_download_firmware.isra.0 (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:421 drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:617)
qca_uart_setup (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:948)
qca_setup (drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c:2029)
hci_uart_setup (drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c:438)
hci_dev_open_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5227)
hci_power_on (net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:920)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mpls: fix NULL deref in mpls_valid_fib_dump_req() on CONFIG_INET=n
On CONFIG_INET=n builds, mpls_valid_fib_dump_req() walks the parsed
attribute table itself instead of calling ip_valid_fib_dump_req(). The
RTA_OIF arm passes tb[RTA_OIF] to nla_get_u32() without checking it is
present, so an RTM_GETROUTE dump for AF_MPLS with strict checking and no
RTA_OIF hits a NULL dereference.
RTM_GETROUTE is RTNL_KIND_GET, which rtnetlink_rcv_msg() permits without
CAP_NET_ADMIN, so an unprivileged user can trigger it.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:mpls_valid_fib_dump_req (net/mpls/af_mpls.c:2189)
Call Trace:
mpls_dump_routes (net/mpls/af_mpls.c:2236)
netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2331)
__netlink_dump_start (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2446)
rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7033)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556)
netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900)
__sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:790)
____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2684)
___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2738)
__sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2770)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Skip unset attributes, as ip_valid_fib_dump_req() does. |
