| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Drop scalar id on sign-extending narrowing stack fills
When a spilled scalar is filled back with a sign-extending narrowing load
(BPF_MEMSX), check_stack_read_fixed_off() copies the spilled register
including its scalar id, but coerce_reg_to_size_sx() then sign-extends the
filled register's value. If the same slot is also filled with a plain
zero-extending load (BPF_MEM), both destination registers share the id yet
hold different values. A later 'if <zext-reg> == const' then refines the
sign-extended register through sync_linked_regs() to a value it does not
have at runtime (e.g. the verifier believes 0x80000000 while the register
is 0xffffffff80000000), which can be turned into an out-of-bounds access.
Drop the shared scalar id at the sign-extension site in check_mem_access()
when sign extension actually changes the value, mirroring the BPF_MOVSX
handling in check_alu_op() (no_sext = reg_umax < 2^(size*8-1)). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject rdonly/rdwr_buf_size kfunc arguments that exceed u32 max
check_kfunc_args() detects a kfunc argument named rdonly_buf_size or
rdwr_buf_size and stores reg->var_off.value into meta->r0_size, a u64,
and does not bound it. check_kfunc_call() later copies that value into
the returned register's mem_size field:
meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value;
...
regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size;
regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size is u32. A constant whose upper 32 bits are set
gets truncated instead of causing a load-time rejection, so the verifier
records a PTR_TO_MEM register with an approximately 4 GiB mem_size for
whatever allocation the kfunc returned. A later access check against
that register uses the truncated, wrong bound.
Reject rdonly_buf_size/rdwr_buf_size values that exceed U32_MAX at the
point meta->r0_size is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uac: validate rate list length before storing
UAC1 and UAC2 configfs rate-list attributes parse a comma-separated
list of sampling rates and store each parsed value in fixed-size arrays.
The arrays have UAC_MAX_RATES entries, but the store paths do not check
that the input contains at most that many tokens before writing through
opts->name##s[i++].
Writing more than ten rates therefore writes past the end of the
p_srates[] or c_srates[] array in struct f_uac1_opts or struct
f_uac2_opts.
With CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS enabled, writing an 11-entry rate list to the
UAC1 p_srate attribute reports:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac1.c:1669:1
index 10 is out of range for type 'int [10]'
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold
f_uac1_opts_p_srate_store
configfs_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
The same reproducer against the UAC2 p_srate attribute reports:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c:2087:1
index 10 is out of range for type 'int [10]'
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold
f_uac2_opts_p_srate_store
configfs_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
Reject additional tokens once UAC_MAX_RATES entries have been parsed.
Also keep the original kstrdup() pointer for kfree(), because strsep()
advances the parsing cursor. Freeing the advanced cursor leaks the
original buffer on successful parses and can free an interior pointer on
some error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix fence cleanup in ffs_dmabuf_transfer() error paths
The error paths for endpoint-disabled (ESHUTDOWN) and request-allocation
failure (ENOMEM) in ffs_dmabuf_transfer() jump to err_fence_put which
calls dma_fence_put() on the fence. However, at that point the fence has
only been kmalloc'd — dma_fence_init() has not been called yet, so the
refcount and the fence ops are uninitialized. Calling dma_fence_put() on
such an object leads to undefined behavior.
Use kfree() instead, since the fence is just a plain allocation at this
stage, and rename the label to err_fence_free to reflect the actual
cleanup action. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: asus-wmi: fix resource leaks on probe failure
During driver initialization in asus_wmi_add(), various subsystems are
registered sequentially. However, the error path labels are out of order
relative to the registration sequence.
Specifically:
1. If asus_wmi_custom_fan_curve_init() fails, the driver jumps to
fail_custom_fan_curve. Because this label is placed below fail_sysfs,
it bypasses the cleanup calls for the input device and sysfs groups,
which were successfully registered before, leaking those resources.
2. If asus_screenpad_init() fails, the driver jumps to fail_screenpad.
Because fail_screenpad is placed below fail_backlight, it bypasses the
cleanup calls for backlight and rfkill, leaking those resources.
Fix these resource leaks by reordering the error path labels in
asus_wmi_add() to match the exact reverse order of the resource
allocations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Require a BPF cpumask for bpf_cpumask_populate()
bpf_cpumask_populate() writes to its destination with bitmap_copy(), but
the destination is typed as struct cpumask *. That allows the verifier to
accept borrowed cpumask pointers returned by read-only kfuncs, such as
scx_bpf_get_online_cpumask(), as a writable destination.
Make the destination a struct bpf_cpumask * so populate follows the same
ownership rule as the other mutating cpumask kfuncs. Query kfuncs continue
to accept const struct cpumask * inputs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark tracing_multi trampolines as ftrace managed
Since tracing_multi link does not set ftrace_managed, it would fail to
release the tracing_multi link when attaching tracing_multi link and
then attaching fentry link.
[ 3.714215] WARNING: kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:1727 at bpf_trampoline_multi_detach+0x20b/0x240, CPU#1: test_progs/97
...
[ 3.733170] bpf_tracing_multi_link_release+0x14/0x30
[ 3.733890] bpf_link_free+0x58/0x130
[ 3.734414] bpf_link_release+0x23/0x30
Fix it by setting 'ftrace_managed = true' in register_fentry_multi(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Avoid reprocessing the current packet after the QP enters the error state
When do_complete() finds the QP in the error state it returns
RESPST_CHK_RESOURCE. Before commit 49dc9c1f0c7e ("RDMA/rxe: Cleanup
reset state handling in rxe_resp.c") this was the flush loop:
check_resource() had an error-state branch that fetched each remaining
recv WQE and completed it with IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR, without touching
the current packet. That commit removed the error-state branch from
check_resource() (draining is now done at rxe_receiver() entry) but
kept the do_complete() error-state return.
As a result, when a QP moves to the error state while a packet is
being completed - e.g. an rdma_cm disconnect racing with receive
processing - the responder state machine loops back into the request
processing chain with the already-completed packet still in hand:
check_resource() fetches a fresh recv WQE, execute()/send_data_in()
copies the same packet payload again, do_complete() posts another
IB_WC_SUCCESS CQE (qp->resp.status is still 0), and control returns
to the error-state check. The loop re-executes the same packet once
per posted recv WQE (observed: ~1000 duplicate IB_WC_SUCCESS
completions of one SEND, one per ~8us, matching the RQ occupancy)
until the RQ is exhausted, after which qp->resp.wqe is NULL and
send_data_in() dereferences it:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014
Workqueue: rxe_wq do_work
RIP: copy_data+0x29/0x1f0
Call Trace:
send_data_in+0x25/0x50
rxe_receiver+0xf36/0x1dd0
The duplicate completions are indistinguishable from real receives to
the ULP. During an rds stress test, the message was accepted as new and
delivered the same datagram to user space hundreds of times, corrupting
the stream; any ULP that relies on RC exactly-once delivery is affected.
A live packet reaching the error-state check in do_complete() has
been executed and completed exactly once and must be consumed, not
re-processed. Return RESPST_CLEANUP for it (dequeue and free); keep
returning RESPST_CHK_RESOURCE for the pkt == NULL case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()
esp_ssg_unref() releases the page references held on the source
scatterlist after the AEAD operation completes. It calls
skb_page_unref() on every frag page for an out-of-place transform
(req->src != req->dst), and in the error path of esp_output_tail()
(already_unref == true) on the request's own scatterlist.
This is wrong when the skb carries managed frags
(SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS). Managed frags are owned by a zerocopy ubuf
and the skb does not hold a per-frag page reference; io_uring SEND_ZC
with a registered buffer attaches the bvec pages this way via
io_sg_from_iter(). The rest of the stack honours this invariant:
skb_release_data() skips the per-frag unref when SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS
is set, and skb_zcopy_managed() is the guard used at the other unref
sites.
esp_ssg_unref() is missing that guard, so for a managed-frag skb it
drops a page reference the skb never acquired. This can underflow the
page reference count and free a page that is still in use.
Guard the function with skb_zcopy_managed() so both unref paths are
skipped for managed-frag skbs, matching skb_release_data(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfsplus: validate thread record before delete key rebuild
hfsplus_delete_cat() is called with str == NULL when the last open
reference to an unlinked HFS+ hardlink backing inode is closed. In that
case, the function finds the catalog thread by CNID and rebuilds the
catalog key from thread.nodeName.
That reconstruction path reads thread.nodeName.length directly from the
catalog B-tree into fd.search_key and then copies length * 2 bytes into
fd.search_key->cat.name.unicode. It does not first check that the found
record is a thread record or that its size matches the thread name.
A corrupted image can therefore provide an oversized thread name length
and make hfs_bnode_read() write past the catalog search-key allocation.
Read the CNID record through hfsplus_brec_read_cat(), which bounds the
record read to sizeof(hfsplus_cat_entry) and verifies that a thread
record's size exactly matches nodeName.length. Together, these checks
ensure an accepted thread name fits HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN. Reject non-thread
records before building the delete key from the validated thread name.
Share the thread-record-type helper between hfsplus_find_cat() and
hfsplus_delete_cat(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer
cxlctl_get_feature() sizes its output buffer from the user's
fwctl_rpc.out_len, but the device is told to write
cxl_mbox_get_feat_in.count bytes into rpc_out->payload, which is a
separate user-controlled value. Nothing bounds count against out_len, so
a small out_len with a large count overflows the kvzalloc()'d buffer.
A heap OOB write reachable from FWCTL_RPC.
Reject requests where count exceeds the available payload room, before
allocating. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dax/fsdev: use __va(phys) for kaddr in direct_access
Use __va(phys) instead of virt_addr + linear_offset for the kaddr
return in __fsdev_dax_direct_access(). The previous code added a
device-linear byte offset to virt_addr (which is __va of ranges[0]),
but for multi-range devices with physical gaps between ranges, this
linear arithmetic crosses the gap and produces a wrong kernel virtual
address. Using __va(phys) where phys comes from dax_pgoff_to_phys()
is correct for any range layout because the direct map translates
each physical address independently.
This leaves dev_dax->virt_addr write-only, so remove the field
(suggested by Dave Jiang). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: ipu6: Do not free aux device pdata after init
ipu6_bus_initialize_device() stores the isys/psys pdata pointer in
struct ipu6_bus_device and initializes the auxiliary device. After that
point, error unwinding must drop the auxiliary device reference and let
ipu6_bus_release() free both the bus device and adev->pdata.
The isys and psys init paths already call put_device() when MMU
initialization fails, and ipu6_bus_add_device() calls
auxiliary_device_uninit() on auxiliary_device_add() failure. Both paths
therefore run the bus release callback. The extra kfree(pdata) in the
callers can release the same object a second time.
Remove the manual pdata frees after the auxiliary device has been
initialized.
This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by
manual source review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mei: check SAP message length before reading it
Verify the SAP message size is not larger than the local buffer before
reading the message to avoid buffer overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uio: Fix stale info pointer in failed registration path
After device_add(), the UIO device is visible to userspace and /dev/uioX
can be opened. If a later setup step fails, __uio_register_device()
unwinds the device but leaves idev->info pointing at the caller-owned
struct uio_info.
That is unsafe when an opener races with the failed registration path.
The open file keeps a reference to the uio_device, while the caller sees
registration failure and may free its struct uio_info. Later file
operations can then follow idev->info and dereference freed memory.
Handle post-device_add() failures like unregister: remove UIO attributes
while the info pointer is still valid, then clear idev->info under
info_lock and wake existing waiters/async users before removing the
device and minor. This makes already-open file descriptors observe the
same "device gone" state as normal uio_unregister_device(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
software node: Fix software_node_get_reference_args() with index -1
The bounds check for the index passed to
software_node_get_reference_args() was failing when passed UINT_MAX,
this in turn would lead to an out of bound access in the property
array. Fix the bound check to also cover the UINT_MAX case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject arena frees below the arena base
bpf_arena_free_pages() accepts scalar arena addresses. The runtime
masks the address to the low 32 bits and reconstructs a full user
address from the arena base before returning the range to the arena
free tree.
When the scalar value is below the low 32 bits of the arena base,
full_uaddr falls below user_vm_start. The existing upper-end clipping
then turns this into an out-of-range free-tree offset. A later
allocation can reuse that offset and return an address below the arena
mapping.
Reject such frees before computing the clipped range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: dw-edma: Terminate all descriptors without callbacks
The DMA Engine client documentation says in the "Terminate APIs" section
of Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/client.rst:
"No callback functions will be called for any incomplete transfers."
dw-edma instead calls vchan_cookie_complete() when a deferred STOP reaches
the interrupt handler. This schedules a callback for the active descriptor
and leaves other issued or submitted descriptors queued. A late callback
after dmaengine_terminate_sync() can dereference client state that has
already been freed, while leftover descriptors may later restart into
reused buffers or leak.
Move all issued and submitted descriptors to the terminated list whenever
termination completes. For a pending STOP, do this from both the DONE and
ABORT paths. Complete their cookies in order without scheduling callbacks.
A STOP can remain pending until the running transfer raises an
interrupt. Make device_synchronize() wait for such a pending STOP to
complete before releasing terminated descriptors. Reuse it from
free_chan_resources(), then release the remaining virt-dma resources.
Sleep instead of busy-polling while waiting, and warn if the existing
timeout expires. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: meson: Keep link pointers valid on realloc failure
meson_card_reallocate_links() grows the DAI link and private data
arrays with two consecutive krealloc() calls and updates the owner
pointers only after both calls have succeeded.
A successful krealloc() may move the data: it frees the old block and
returns a new one. When that happens for the link array and the second
krealloc() then fails, card->dai_link still points to the block that
krealloc() already freed, and the error path frees the new block too.
The probe error path then calls meson_card_clean_references(), which
dereferences card->dai_link and kfree()s it again, resulting in a
use-after-free and a double free.
Commit card->dai_link and card->num_links right after the first
krealloc() succeeds, so the pointer always refers to a valid allocation
that meson_card_clean_references() can walk and free. krealloc() with
__GFP_ZERO zero-initializes the added entries, so walking them on the
error path is safe. With both failure paths reduced to a plain return,
drop the goto labels and the error message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hfi1: Propagate sdma_txinit_ahg() errors
set_txreq_header_ahg() ignores the return value of sdma_txinit_ahg().
If sdma_txinit_ahg() fails, it returns before initializing tx->txreq.
However, set_txreq_header_ahg() ignores the error and returns the AHG
change count, causing the caller to continue processing the request as
though initialization had succeeded.
Propagate sdma_txinit_ahg() failures to the caller and abort request
processing when initialization fails.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
