CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
Xenstore: Guests can create arbitrary number of nodes via transactions T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] In case a node has been created in a transaction and it is later deleted in the same transaction, the transaction will be terminated with an error. As this error is encountered only when handling the deleted node at transaction finalization, the transaction will have been performed partially and without updating the accounting information. This will enable a malicious guest to create arbitrary number of nodes. |
A maliciously crafted HTTP/2 stream could cause excessive CPU consumption in the HPACK decoder, sufficient to cause a denial of service from a small number of small requests. |
A vulnerability named 'Non-Responsive Delegation Attack' (NRDelegation Attack) has been discovered in various DNS resolving software. The NRDelegation Attack works by having a malicious delegation with a considerable number of non responsive nameservers. The attack starts by querying a resolver for a record that relies on those unresponsive nameservers. The attack can cause a resolver to spend a lot of time/resources resolving records under a malicious delegation point where a considerable number of unresponsive NS records reside. It can trigger high CPU usage in some resolver implementations that continually look in the cache for resolved NS records in that delegation. This can lead to degraded performance and eventually denial of service in orchestrated attacks. Unbound does not suffer from high CPU usage, but resources are still needed for resolving the malicious delegation. Unbound will keep trying to resolve the record until hard limits are reached. Based on the nature of the attack and the replies, different limits could be reached. From version 1.16.3 on, Unbound introduces fixes for better performance when under load, by cutting opportunistic queries for nameserver discovery and DNSKEY prefetching and limiting the number of times a delegation point can issue a cache lookup for missing records. |
A flaw was found in the src/list.c of tar 1.33 and earlier. This flaw allows an attacker who can submit a crafted input file to tar to cause uncontrolled consumption of memory. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system availability. |
A memory leak in the fsl_lpspi_probe() function in drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c in the Linux kernel through 5.3.11 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by triggering pm_runtime_get_sync() failures, aka CID-057b8945f78f. NOTE: third parties dispute the relevance of this because an attacker cannot realistically control these failures at probe time |
drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c in the Linux kernel before 5.16.3 has a memory leak (socket buffers have memory allocated but not freed). |
The denial-of-service can be triggered by transmitting a carefully crafted CAN frame on the same CAN network as the vulnerable node. The frame must have a CAN ID matching an installed filter in the vulnerable node (this can easily be guessed based on CAN traffic analyses). The frame must contain the opposite RTR bit as what the filter installed in the vulnerable node contains (if the filter matches RTR frames, the frame must be a data frame or vice versa). |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ax25: Fix refcount leak caused by setting SO_BINDTODEVICE sockopt
If an AX25 device is bound to a socket by setting the SO_BINDTODEVICE
socket option, a refcount leak will occur in ax25_release().
Commit 9fd75b66b8f6 ("ax25: Fix refcount leaks caused by ax25_cb_del()")
added decrement of device refcounts in ax25_release(). In order for that
to work correctly the refcounts must already be incremented when the
device is bound to the socket. An AX25 device can be bound to a socket
by either calling ax25_bind() or setting SO_BINDTODEVICE socket option.
In both cases the refcounts should be incremented, but in fact it is done
only in ax25_bind().
This bug leads to the following issue reported by Syzkaller:
================================================================
refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5932 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x1ed/0x210 lib/refcount.c:31
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5932 Comm: syz-executor424 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00110-g4099a71718b0 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x1ed/0x210 lib/refcount.c:31
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:336 [inline]
refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:351 [inline]
ref_tracker_free+0x710/0x820 lib/ref_tracker.c:236
netdev_tracker_free include/linux/netdevice.h:4156 [inline]
netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4173 [inline]
netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4169 [inline]
ax25_release+0x33f/0xa10 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:1069
__sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:640
sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1408
...
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
...
</TASK>
================================================================
Fix the implementation of ax25_setsockopt() by adding increment of
refcounts for the new device bound, and decrement of refcounts for
the old unbound device. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: iso: Always release hdev at the end of iso_listen_bis
Since hci_get_route holds the device before returning, the hdev
should be released with hci_dev_put at the end of iso_listen_bis
even if the function returns with an error. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix memory leak in tcp_conn_request()
If inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add() return false, tcp_conn_request() will
return without free the dst memory, which allocated in af_ops->route_req.
Here is the kmemleak stack:
unreferenced object 0xffff8881198631c0 (size 240):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4299266571 (age 1802.392s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 10 9b 03 81 88 ff ff 80 98 da bc ff ff ff ff ................
81 55 18 bb ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .U..............
backtrace:
[<ffffffffb93e8d4c>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x60c/0xa80
[<ffffffffba11b4c5>] dst_alloc+0x55/0x250
[<ffffffffba227bf6>] rt_dst_alloc+0x46/0x1d0
[<ffffffffba23050a>] __mkroute_output+0x29a/0xa50
[<ffffffffba23456b>] ip_route_output_key_hash+0x10b/0x240
[<ffffffffba2346bd>] ip_route_output_flow+0x1d/0x90
[<ffffffffba254855>] inet_csk_route_req+0x2c5/0x500
[<ffffffffba26b331>] tcp_conn_request+0x691/0x12c0
[<ffffffffba27bd08>] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x3c8/0x11b0
[<ffffffffba2965c6>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x156/0x3b0
[<ffffffffba299c98>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x1cf8/0x1d80
[<ffffffffba239656>] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xf6/0x360
[<ffffffffba2399a6>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xe6/0x1e0
[<ffffffffba239b8e>] ip_local_deliver+0xee/0x360
[<ffffffffba239ead>] ip_rcv+0xad/0x2f0
[<ffffffffba110943>] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x123/0x140
Call dst_release() to free the dst memory when
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add() return false in tcp_conn_request(). |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio/vsock: Fix accept_queue memory leak
As the final stages of socket destruction may be delayed, it is possible
that virtio_transport_recv_listen() will be called after the accept_queue
has been flushed, but before the SOCK_DONE flag has been set. As a result,
sockets enqueued after the flush would remain unremoved, leading to a
memory leak.
vsock_release
__vsock_release
lock
virtio_transport_release
virtio_transport_close
schedule_delayed_work(close_work)
sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK
(!) flush accept_queue
release
virtio_transport_recv_pkt
vsock_find_bound_socket
lock
if flag(SOCK_DONE) return
virtio_transport_recv_listen
child = vsock_create_connected
(!) vsock_enqueue_accept(child)
release
close_work
lock
virtio_transport_do_close
set_flag(SOCK_DONE)
virtio_transport_remove_sock
vsock_remove_sock
vsock_remove_bound
release
Introduce a sk_shutdown check to disallow vsock_enqueue_accept() during
socket destruction.
unreferenced object 0xffff888109e3f800 (size 2040):
comm "kworker/5:2", pid 371, jiffies 4294940105
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
28 00 0b 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 (..@............
backtrace (crc 9e5f4e84):
[<ffffffff81418ff1>] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x2c1/0x360
[<ffffffff81d27aa0>] sk_prot_alloc+0x30/0x120
[<ffffffff81d2b54c>] sk_alloc+0x2c/0x4b0
[<ffffffff81fe049a>] __vsock_create.constprop.0+0x2a/0x310
[<ffffffff81fe6d6c>] virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x4dc/0x9a0
[<ffffffff81fe745d>] vsock_loopback_work+0xfd/0x140
[<ffffffff810fc6ac>] process_one_work+0x20c/0x570
[<ffffffff810fce3f>] worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3a0
[<ffffffff811070dd>] kthread+0xdd/0x110
[<ffffffff81044fdd>] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[<ffffffff8100785a>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: microchip: vcap api: Fix memory leaks in vcap_api_encode_rule_test()
Commit a3c1e45156ad ("net: microchip: vcap: Fix use-after-free error in
kunit test") fixed the use-after-free error, but introduced below
memory leaks by removing necessary vcap_free_rule(), add it to fix it.
unreferenced object 0xffffff80ca58b700 (size 192):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1215, jiffies 4294898264
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 12 7a 00 05 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 64 00 00 00 ..z.........d...
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 0b cc 80 ff ff ff ................
backtrace (crc 9c09c3fe):
[<0000000052a0be73>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<0000000043605459>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x26c/0x2f4
[<0000000040a01b8d>] vcap_alloc_rule+0x3cc/0x9c4
[<000000003fe86110>] vcap_api_encode_rule_test+0x1ac/0x16b0
[<00000000b3595fc4>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<0000000010f5d2bf>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000c5d82c9a>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<00000000f4287308>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
unreferenced object 0xffffff80cc0b0400 (size 64):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1215, jiffies 4294898265
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
80 04 0b cc 80 ff ff ff 18 b7 58 ca 80 ff ff ff ..........X.....
39 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 06 05 04 03 02 01 ff ff 9...............
backtrace (crc daf014e9):
[<0000000052a0be73>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<0000000043605459>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x26c/0x2f4
[<000000000ff63fd4>] vcap_rule_add_key+0x2cc/0x528
[<00000000dfdb1e81>] vcap_api_encode_rule_test+0x224/0x16b0
[<00000000b3595fc4>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<0000000010f5d2bf>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000c5d82c9a>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<00000000f4287308>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
unreferenced object 0xffffff80cc0b0700 (size 64):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1215, jiffies 4294898265
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
80 07 0b cc 80 ff ff ff 28 b7 58 ca 80 ff ff ff ........(.X.....
3c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 2f 03 b3 ec ff ff ff <......../......
backtrace (crc 8d877792):
[<0000000052a0be73>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<0000000043605459>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x26c/0x2f4
[<000000006eadfab7>] vcap_rule_add_action+0x2d0/0x52c
[<00000000323475d1>] vcap_api_encode_rule_test+0x4d4/0x16b0
[<00000000b3595fc4>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<0000000010f5d2bf>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000c5d82c9a>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<00000000f4287308>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
unreferenced object 0xffffff80cc0b0900 (size 64):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1215, jiffies 4294898266
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
80 09 0b cc 80 ff ff ff 80 06 0b cc 80 ff ff ff ................
7d 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff 00 00 00 }...............
backtrace (crc 34181e56):
[<0000000052a0be73>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<0000000043605459>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x26c/0x2f4
[<000000000ff63fd4>] vcap_rule_add_key+0x2cc/0x528
[<00000000991e3564>] vcap_val_rule+0xcf0/0x13e8
[<00000000fc9868e5>] vcap_api_encode_rule_test+0x678/0x16b0
[<00000000b3595fc4>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<0000000010f5d2bf>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000c5d82c9a>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<00000000f4287308>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
unreferenced object 0xffffff80cc0b0980 (size 64):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1215, jiffies 4294898266
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
18 b7 58 ca 80 ff ff ff 00 09 0b cc 80 ff ff ff ..X.............
67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 74 88 c0 ff ff ff g.........t.....
backtrace (crc 275fd9be):
[<0000000052a0be73>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<0000000043605459>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x26c/0x2f4
[<000000000ff63fd4>] vcap_rule_add_key+0x2cc/0x528
[<000000001396a1a2>] test_add_de
---truncated--- |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: Change to non-blocking allocation in ntfs_d_hash
d_hash is done while under "rcu-walk" and should not sleep.
__get_name() allocates using GFP_KERNEL, having the possibility
to sleep when under memory pressure. Change the allocation to
GFP_NOWAIT. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: Fix macvlan leak by synchronizing access to mac_filter_hash
This patch addresses a macvlan leak issue in the i40e driver caused by
concurrent access to vsi->mac_filter_hash. The leak occurs when multiple
threads attempt to modify the mac_filter_hash simultaneously, leading to
inconsistent state and potential memory leaks.
To fix this, we now wrap the calls to i40e_del_mac_filter() and zeroing
vf->default_lan_addr.addr with spin_lock/unlock_bh(&vsi->mac_filter_hash_lock),
ensuring atomic operations and preventing concurrent access.
Additionally, we add lockdep_assert_held(&vsi->mac_filter_hash_lock) in
i40e_add_mac_filter() to help catch similar issues in the future.
Reproduction steps:
1. Spawn VFs and configure port vlan on them.
2. Trigger concurrent macvlan operations (e.g., adding and deleting
portvlan and/or mac filters).
3. Observe the potential memory leak and inconsistent state in the
mac_filter_hash.
This synchronization ensures the integrity of the mac_filter_hash and prevents
the described leak. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sock_map: Add a cond_resched() in sock_hash_free()
Several syzbot soft lockup reports all have in common sock_hash_free()
If a map with a large number of buckets is destroyed, we need to yield
the cpu when needed. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ctnetlink: use helper function to calculate expect ID
Delete expectation path is missing a call to the nf_expect_get_id()
helper function to calculate the expectation ID, otherwise LSB of the
expectation object address is leaked to userspace. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix event leak upon exit
When a task is scheduled out, pending sigtrap deliveries are deferred
to the target task upon resume to userspace via task_work.
However failures while adding an event's callback to the task_work
engine are ignored. And since the last call for events exit happen
after task work is eventually closed, there is a small window during
which pending sigtrap can be queued though ignored, leaking the event
refcount addition such as in the following scenario:
TASK A
-----
do_exit()
exit_task_work(tsk);
<IRQ>
perf_event_overflow()
event->pending_sigtrap = pending_id;
irq_work_queue(&event->pending_irq);
</IRQ>
=========> PREEMPTION: TASK A -> TASK B
event_sched_out()
event->pending_sigtrap = 0;
atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&event->refcount)
// FAILS: task work has exited
task_work_add(&event->pending_task)
[...]
<IRQ WORK>
perf_pending_irq()
// early return: event->oncpu = -1
</IRQ WORK>
[...]
=========> TASK B -> TASK A
perf_event_exit_task(tsk)
perf_event_exit_event()
free_event()
WARN(atomic_long_cmpxchg(&event->refcount, 1, 0) != 1)
// leak event due to unexpected refcount == 2
As a result the event is never released while the task exits.
Fix this with appropriate task_work_add()'s error handling. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix event leak upon exec and file release
The perf pending task work is never waited upon the matching event
release. In the case of a child event, released via free_event()
directly, this can potentially result in a leaked event, such as in the
following scenario that doesn't even require a weak IRQ work
implementation to trigger:
schedule()
prepare_task_switch()
=======> <NMI>
perf_event_overflow()
event->pending_sigtrap = ...
irq_work_queue(&event->pending_irq)
<======= </NMI>
perf_event_task_sched_out()
event_sched_out()
event->pending_sigtrap = 0;
atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&event->refcount)
task_work_add(&event->pending_task)
finish_lock_switch()
=======> <IRQ>
perf_pending_irq()
//do nothing, rely on pending task work
<======= </IRQ>
begin_new_exec()
perf_event_exit_task()
perf_event_exit_event()
// If is child event
free_event()
WARN(atomic_long_cmpxchg(&event->refcount, 1, 0) != 1)
// event is leaked
Similar scenarios can also happen with perf_event_remove_on_exec() or
simply against concurrent perf_event_release().
Fix this with synchonizing against the possibly remaining pending task
work while freeing the event, just like is done with remaining pending
IRQ work. This means that the pending task callback neither need nor
should hold a reference to the event, preventing it from ever beeing
freed. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/deadline: Fix task_struct reference leak
During the execution of the following stress test with linux-rt:
stress-ng --cyclic 30 --timeout 30 --minimize --quiet
kmemleak frequently reported a memory leak concerning the task_struct:
unreferenced object 0xffff8881305b8000 (size 16136):
comm "stress-ng", pid 614, jiffies 4294883961 (age 286.412s)
object hex dump (first 32 bytes):
02 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .@..............
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
debug hex dump (first 16 bytes):
53 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 S...............
backtrace:
[<00000000046b6790>] dup_task_struct+0x30/0x540
[<00000000c5ca0f0b>] copy_process+0x3d9/0x50e0
[<00000000ced59777>] kernel_clone+0xb0/0x770
[<00000000a50befdc>] __do_sys_clone+0xb6/0xf0
[<000000001dbf2008>] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xf0
[<00000000552900ff>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
The issue occurs in start_dl_timer(), which increments the task_struct
reference count and sets a timer. The timer callback, dl_task_timer,
is supposed to decrement the reference count upon expiration. However,
if enqueue_task_dl() is called before the timer expires and cancels it,
the reference count is not decremented, leading to the leak.
This patch fixes the reference leak by ensuring the task_struct
reference count is properly decremented when the timer is canceled. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netrom: Fix a memory leak in nr_heartbeat_expiry()
syzbot reported a memory leak in nr_create() [0].
Commit 409db27e3a2e ("netrom: Fix use-after-free of a listening socket.")
added sock_hold() to the nr_heartbeat_expiry() function, where
a) a socket has a SOCK_DESTROY flag or
b) a listening socket has a SOCK_DEAD flag.
But in the case "a," when the SOCK_DESTROY flag is set, the file descriptor
has already been closed and the nr_release() function has been called.
So it makes no sense to hold the reference count because no one will
call another nr_destroy_socket() and put it as in the case "b."
nr_connect
nr_establish_data_link
nr_start_heartbeat
nr_release
switch (nr->state)
case NR_STATE_3
nr->state = NR_STATE_2
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DESTROY);
nr_rx_frame
nr_process_rx_frame
switch (nr->state)
case NR_STATE_2
nr_state2_machine()
nr_disconnect()
nr_sk(sk)->state = NR_STATE_0
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)
nr_heartbeat_expiry
switch (nr->state)
case NR_STATE_0
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DESTROY) ||
(sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN
&& sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)))
sock_hold() // ( !!! )
nr_destroy_socket()
To fix the memory leak, let's call sock_hold() only for a listening socket.
Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
[0]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d327a1f3b12e1e206c16 |