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CVSS v3.1 |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fgraph: Add READ_ONCE() when accessing fgraph_array[]
In __ftrace_return_to_handler(), a loop iterates over the fgraph_array[]
elements, which are fgraph_ops. The loop checks if an element is a
fgraph_stub to prevent using a fgraph_stub afterward.
However, if the compiler reloads fgraph_array[] after this check, it might
race with an update to fgraph_array[] that introduces a fgraph_stub. This
could result in the stub being processed, but the stub contains a null
"func_hash" field, leading to a NULL pointer dereference.
To ensure that the gops compared against the fgraph_stub matches the gops
processed later, add a READ_ONCE(). A similar patch appears in commit
63a8dfb ("function_graph: Add READ_ONCE() when accessing fgraph_array[]"). |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: guard XSK operations on the existence of queues
This patch predicates the enabling and disabling of XSK pools on the
existence of queues. As it stands, if the interface is down, disabling
or enabling XSK pools would result in a crash, as the RX queue pointer
would be NULL. XSK pool registration will occur as part of the next
interface up.
Similarly, xsk_wakeup needs be guarded against queues disappearing
while the function is executing, so a check against the
GVE_PRIV_FLAGS_NAPI_ENABLED flag is added to synchronize with the
disabling of the bit and the synchronize_net() in gve_turndown. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfs: Fix oops in nfs_netfs_init_request() when copying to cache
When netfslib wants to copy some data that has just been read on behalf of
nfs, it creates a new write request and calls nfs_netfs_init_request() to
initialise it, but with a NULL file pointer. This causes
nfs_file_open_context() to oops - however, we don't actually need the nfs
context as we're only going to write to the cache.
Fix this by just returning if we aren't given a file pointer and emit a
warning if the request was for something other than copy-to-cache.
Further, fix nfs_netfs_free_request() so that it doesn't try to free the
context if the pointer is NULL. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix a missing return value check bug
In the smb2_send_interim_resp(), if ksmbd_alloc_work_struct()
fails to allocate a node, it returns a NULL pointer to the
in_work pointer. This can lead to an illegal memory write of
in_work->response_buf when allocate_interim_rsp_buf() attempts
to perform a kzalloc() on it.
To address this issue, incorporating a check for the return
value of ksmbd_alloc_work_struct() ensures that the function
returns immediately upon allocation failure, thereby preventing
the aforementioned illegal memory access. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Add check for granularity in dml ceil/floor helpers
[Why]
Wrapper functions for dcn_bw_ceil2() and dcn_bw_floor2()
should check for granularity is non zero to avoid assert and
divide-by-zero error in dcn_bw_ functions.
[How]
Add check for granularity 0.
(cherry picked from commit f6e09701c3eb2ccb8cb0518e0b67f1c69742a4ec) |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: fix divide error in DM plane scale calcs
dm_get_plane_scale doesn't take into account plane scaled size equal to
zero, leading to a kernel oops due to division by zero. Fix by setting
out-scale size as zero when the dst size is zero, similar to what is
done by drm_calc_scale(). This issue started with the introduction of
cursor ovelay mode that uses this function to assess cursor mode changes
via dm_crtc_get_cursor_mode() before checking plane state.
[Dec17 17:14] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ +0.000018] CPU: 5 PID: 1660 Comm: surface-DP-1 Not tainted 6.10.0+ #231
[ +0.000007] Hardware name: Valve Jupiter/Jupiter, BIOS F7A0131 01/30/2024
[ +0.000004] RIP: 0010:dm_get_plane_scale+0x3f/0x60 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000553] Code: 44 0f b7 41 3a 44 0f b7 49 3e 83 e0 0f 48 0f a3 c2 73 21 69 41 28 e8 03 00 00 31 d2 41 f7 f1 31 d2 89 06 69 41 2c e8 03 00 00 <41> f7 f0 89 07 e9 d7 d8 7e e9 44 89 c8 45 89 c1 41 89 c0 eb d4 66
[ +0.000005] RSP: 0018:ffffa8df0de6b8a0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ +0.000006] RAX: 00000000000003e8 RBX: ffff9ac65c1f6e00 RCX: ffff9ac65d055500
[ +0.000003] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffa8df0de6b8b0 RDI: ffffa8df0de6b8b4
[ +0.000004] RBP: ffff9ac64e7a5800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000a00
[ +0.000003] R10: 00000000000000ff R11: 0000000000000054 R12: ffff9ac6d0700010
[ +0.000003] R13: ffff9ac65d054f00 R14: ffff9ac65d055500 R15: ffff9ac64e7a60a0
[ +0.000004] FS: 00007f869ea00640(0000) GS:ffff9ac970080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000004] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000003] CR2: 000055ca701becd0 CR3: 000000010e7f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ +0.000004] Call Trace:
[ +0.000007] <TASK>
[ +0.000006] ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
[ +0.000009] ? die+0x2e/0x50
[ +0.000007] ? do_trap+0xca/0x110
[ +0.000007] ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90
[ +0.000006] ? dm_get_plane_scale+0x3f/0x60 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000504] ? exc_divide_error+0x38/0x50
[ +0.000005] ? dm_get_plane_scale+0x3f/0x60 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000488] ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x1a/0x20
[ +0.000011] ? dm_get_plane_scale+0x3f/0x60 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000593] dm_crtc_get_cursor_mode+0x33f/0x430 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000562] amdgpu_dm_atomic_check+0x2ef/0x1770 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000501] drm_atomic_check_only+0x5e1/0xa30 [drm]
[ +0.000047] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x832/0xcb0 [drm]
[ +0.000050] ? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm]
[ +0.000047] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb3/0x100 [drm]
[ +0.000062] drm_ioctl+0x27a/0x4f0 [drm]
[ +0.000049] ? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm]
[ +0.000055] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4e/0x90 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000360] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0
[ +0.000010] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190
[ +0.000008] ? __pfx_drm_mode_createblob_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm]
[ +0.000044] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000006] ? drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb3/0x100 [drm]
[ +0.000040] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? __check_object_size+0x50/0x220
[ +0.000007] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? drm_ioctl+0x2a4/0x4f0 [drm]
[ +0.000039] ? __pfx_drm_mode_createblob_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm]
[ +0.000043] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? __pm_runtime_suspend+0x69/0xc0
[ +0.000006] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x71/0x90 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000366] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000006] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x77/0x210
[ +0.000007] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x190
[ +0.000006] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000006] ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x190
[ +0.000006] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000007] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ +0.000008] RIP: 0033:0x55bb7cd962bc
[ +0.000007] Code: 4c 89 6c 24 18 4c 89 64 24 20 4c 89 74 24 28 0f 57 c0 0f 11 44 24 30 89 c7 48 8d 54 24 08 b8 10 00 00 00 be bc 64
---truncated--- |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: microchip: pci1xxxx: Resolve kernel panic during GPIO IRQ handling
Resolve kernel panic caused by improper handling of IRQs while
accessing GPIO values. This is done by replacing generic_handle_irq with
handle_nested_irq. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpci: fix NULL pointer issue on shared irq case
The tcpci_irq() may meet below NULL pointer dereference issue:
[ 2.641851] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010
[ 2.641951] status 0x1, 0x37f
[ 2.650659] Mem abort info:
[ 2.656490] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 2.660230] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 2.665532] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 2.668579] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 2.671715] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 2.676584] Data abort info:
[ 2.679459] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 2.684936] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 2.689980] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 2.695284] [0000000000000010] user address but active_mm is swapper
[ 2.701632] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 2.707883] Modules linked in:
[ 2.710936] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 87 Comm: irq/111-2-0051 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-06316-g7f63786ad3d1-dirty #4
[ 2.720570] Hardware name: NXP i.MX93 11X11 EVK board (DT)
[ 2.726040] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 2.732989] pc : tcpci_irq+0x38/0x318
[ 2.736647] lr : _tcpci_irq+0x14/0x20
[ 2.740295] sp : ffff80008324bd30
[ 2.743597] x29: ffff80008324bd70 x28: ffff800080107894 x27: ffff800082198f70
[ 2.750721] x26: ffff0000050e6680 x25: ffff000004d172ac x24: ffff0000050f0000
[ 2.757845] x23: ffff000004d17200 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: ffff0000050f0000
[ 2.764969] x20: ffff000004d17200 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000001
[ 2.772093] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80008183d8a0 x15: ffff00007fbab040
[ 2.779217] x14: ffff00007fb918c0 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 000000000000017a
[ 2.786341] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000a90 x9 : ffff80008324bd00
[ 2.793465] x8 : ffff0000050f0af0 x7 : ffff00007fbaa840 x6 : 0000000000000031
[ 2.800589] x5 : 000000000000017a x4 : 0000000000000002 x3 : 0000000000000002
[ 2.807713] x2 : ffff80008324bd3a x1 : 0000000000000010 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 2.814838] Call trace:
[ 2.817273] tcpci_irq+0x38/0x318
[ 2.820583] _tcpci_irq+0x14/0x20
[ 2.823885] irq_thread_fn+0x2c/0xa8
[ 2.827456] irq_thread+0x16c/0x2f4
[ 2.830940] kthread+0x110/0x114
[ 2.834164] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 2.837738] Code: f9426420 f9001fe0 d2800000 52800201 (f9400a60)
This may happen on shared irq case. Such as two Type-C ports share one
irq. After the first port finished tcpci_register_port(), it may trigger
interrupt. However, if the interrupt comes by chance the 2nd port finishes
devm_request_threaded_irq(), the 2nd port interrupt handler will run at
first. Then the above issue happens due to tcpci is still a NULL pointer
in tcpci_irq() when dereference to regmap.
devm_request_threaded_irq()
<-- port1 irq comes
disable_irq(client->irq);
tcpci_register_port()
This will restore the logic to the state before commit (77e85107a771 "usb:
typec: tcpci: support edge irq").
However, moving tcpci_register_port() earlier creates a problem when use
edge irq because tcpci_init() will be called before
devm_request_threaded_irq(). The tcpci_init() writes the ALERT_MASK to
the hardware to tell it to start generating interrupts but we're not ready
to deal with them yet, then the ALERT events may be missed and ALERT line
will not recover to high level forever. To avoid the issue, this will also
set ALERT_MASK register after devm_request_threaded_irq() return. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: Remove WARN_ON in functionfs_bind
This commit addresses an issue related to below kernel panic where
panic_on_warn is enabled. It is caused by the unnecessary use of WARN_ON
in functionsfs_bind, which easily leads to the following scenarios.
1.adb_write in adbd 2. UDC write via configfs
================= =====================
->usb_ffs_open_thread() ->UDC write
->open_functionfs() ->configfs_write_iter()
->adb_open() ->gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store()
->adb_write() ->usb_gadget_register_driver_owner
->driver_register()
->StartMonitor() ->bus_add_driver()
->adb_read() ->gadget_bind_driver()
<times-out without BIND event> ->configfs_composite_bind()
->usb_add_function()
->open_functionfs() ->ffs_func_bind()
->adb_open() ->functionfs_bind()
<ffs->state !=FFS_ACTIVE>
The adb_open, adb_read, and adb_write operations are invoked from the
daemon, but trying to bind the function is a process that is invoked by
UDC write through configfs, which opens up the possibility of a race
condition between the two paths. In this race scenario, the kernel panic
occurs due to the WARN_ON from functionfs_bind when panic_on_warn is
enabled. This commit fixes the kernel panic by removing the unnecessary
WARN_ON.
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
[ 14.542395] Call trace:
[ 14.542464] ffs_func_bind+0x1c8/0x14a8
[ 14.542468] usb_add_function+0xcc/0x1f0
[ 14.542473] configfs_composite_bind+0x468/0x588
[ 14.542478] gadget_bind_driver+0x108/0x27c
[ 14.542483] really_probe+0x190/0x374
[ 14.542488] __driver_probe_device+0xa0/0x12c
[ 14.542492] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x220
[ 14.542498] __driver_attach+0x11c/0x1fc
[ 14.542502] bus_for_each_dev+0x104/0x160
[ 14.542506] driver_attach+0x24/0x34
[ 14.542510] bus_add_driver+0x154/0x270
[ 14.542514] driver_register+0x68/0x104
[ 14.542518] usb_gadget_register_driver_owner+0x48/0xf4
[ 14.542523] gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0xf8/0x144
[ 14.542526] configfs_write_iter+0xf0/0x138 |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: pressure: zpa2326: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'sample' local struct is used to push data to user space from a
triggered buffer, but it has a hole between the temperature and the
timestamp (u32 pressure, u16 temperature, GAP, u64 timestamp).
This hole is never initialized.
Initialize the struct to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: dummy: iio_simply_dummy_buffer: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'data' array is allocated via kmalloc() and it is used to push data
to user space from a triggered buffer, but it does not set values for
inactive channels, as it only uses iio_for_each_active_channel()
to assign new values.
Use kzalloc for the memory allocation to avoid pushing uninitialized
information to userspace. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: light: vcnl4035: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'buffer' local array is used to push data to userspace from a
triggered buffer, but it does not set an initial value for the single
data element, which is an u16 aligned to 8 bytes. That leaves at least
4 bytes uninitialized even after writing an integer value with
regmap_read().
Initialize the array to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: light: bh1745: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'scan' local struct is used to push data to user space from a
triggered buffer, but it does not set values for inactive channels, as
it only uses iio_for_each_active_channel() to assign new values.
Initialize the struct to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: imu: kmx61: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'buffer' local array is used to push data to user space from a
triggered buffer, but it does not set values for inactive channels, as
it only uses iio_for_each_active_channel() to assign new values.
Initialize the array to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: rockchip_saradc: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'data' local struct is used to push data to user space from a
triggered buffer, but it does not set values for inactive channels, as
it only uses iio_for_each_active_channel() to assign new values.
Initialize the struct to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ti-ads8688: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'buffer' local array is used to push data to user space from a
triggered buffer, but it does not set values for inactive channels, as
it only uses iio_for_each_active_channel() to assign new values.
Initialize the array to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ti-ads1119: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'scan' local struct is used to push data to user space from a
triggered buffer, but it has a hole between the sample (unsigned int)
and the timestamp. This hole is never initialized.
Initialize the struct to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix vlan_get_tci() vs MSG_PEEK
Blamed commit forgot MSG_PEEK case, allowing a crash [1] as found
by syzbot.
Rework vlan_get_tci() to not touch skb at all,
so that it can be used from many cpus on the same skb.
Add a const qualifier to skb argument.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a8da482 len:32 put:14 head:ffff88807a1d5800 data:ffff88807a1d5810 tail:0x14 end:0x140 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5880 Comm: syz-executor172 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00762-g9268abe611b0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0b 8d 48 c7 c6 9e 6c 26 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 3a 5a 79 f7 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003baf5b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 8565c1eec37aa000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88802616fb50 R08: ffffffff817f0a4c R09: 1ffff92000775e50
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52000775e51 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88807a1d5800 R14: ffff88807a1d5810 R15: 0000000000000014
FS: 00007fa03261f6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffd65753000 CR3: 0000000031720000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
vlan_get_tci+0x272/0x550 net/packet/af_packet.c:565
packet_recvmsg+0x13c9/0x1ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3616
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1066
____sys_recvmsg+0x1c6/0x480 net/socket.c:2814
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2856 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x426/0xab0 net/socket.c:2951
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3025 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3048 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3041
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix vlan_get_protocol_dgram() vs MSG_PEEK
Blamed commit forgot MSG_PEEK case, allowing a crash [1] as found
by syzbot.
Rework vlan_get_protocol_dgram() to not touch skb at all,
so that it can be used from many cpus on the same skb.
Add a const qualifier to skb argument.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a8ccd05 len:29 put:14 head:ffff88807fc8e400 data:ffff88807fc8e3f4 tail:0x11 end:0x140 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5892 Comm: syz-executor883 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00054-gd6ef8b40d075 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0b 8d 48 c7 c6 86 d5 25 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 5a 69 79 f7 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038d7638 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 609ffd18ea660600
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88802483c8d0 R08: ffffffff817f0a8c R09: 1ffff9200071ae60
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200071ae61 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88807fc8e400 R14: ffff88807fc8e3f4 R15: 0000000000000011
FS: 00007fbac5e006c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fbac5e00d58 CR3: 000000001238e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
vlan_get_protocol_dgram+0x165/0x290 net/packet/af_packet.c:585
packet_recvmsg+0x948/0x1ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3552
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1033 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1055
____sys_recvmsg+0x1c6/0x480 net/socket.c:2803
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x426/0xab0 net/socket.c:2940
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3014 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3037 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3030 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3030
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: set ATTR_CTIME flags when setting mtime
David reported that the new warning from setattr_copy_mgtime is coming
like the following.
[ 113.215316] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 113.215974] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 31 at fs/attr.c:300 setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.219192] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 31 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1+ #234
[ 113.220127] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 113.221530] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd]
[ 113.222220] RIP: 0010:setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.222833] Code: 24 28 49 8b 44 24 30 48 89 53 58 89 43 6c 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 48 89 df e8 77 d6 ff ff e9 cd fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 be fe ff ff 66 0
[ 113.225110] RSP: 0018:ffffaf218010fb68 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 113.225765] RAX: 0000000000000120 RBX: ffffa446815f8568 RCX: 0000000000000003
[ 113.226667] RDX: ffffaf218010fd38 RSI: ffffa446815f8568 RDI: ffffffff94eb03a0
[ 113.227531] RBP: ffffaf218010fb90 R08: 0000001a251e217d R09: 00000000675259fa
[ 113.228426] R10: 0000000002ba8a6d R11: ffffa4468196c7a8 R12: ffffaf218010fd38
[ 113.229304] R13: 0000000000000120 R14: ffffffff94eb03a0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 113.230210] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa44739d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 113.231215] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 113.232055] CR2: 00007efe0053d27e CR3: 000000000331a000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[ 113.232926] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 113.233812] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 113.234797] Call Trace:
[ 113.235116] <TASK>
[ 113.235393] ? __warn+0x73/0xd0
[ 113.235802] ? setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.236299] ? report_bug+0xf3/0x1e0
[ 113.236757] ? handle_bug+0x4d/0x90
[ 113.237202] ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
[ 113.237689] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 113.238185] ? setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.238692] btrfs_setattr+0x80/0x820 [btrfs]
[ 113.239285] ? get_stack_info_noinstr+0x12/0xf0
[ 113.239857] ? __module_address+0x22/0xa0
[ 113.240368] ? handle_ksmbd_work+0x6e/0x460 [ksmbd]
[ 113.240993] ? __module_text_address+0x9/0x50
[ 113.241545] ? __module_address+0x22/0xa0
[ 113.242033] ? unwind_next_frame+0x10e/0x920
[ 113.242600] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
[ 113.243268] notify_change+0x2c2/0x4e0
[ 113.243746] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x27/0x730
[ 113.244339] ? set_file_basic_info+0x130/0x2b0 [ksmbd]
[ 113.244993] set_file_basic_info+0x130/0x2b0 [ksmbd]
[ 113.245613] ? process_scheduled_works+0xbe/0x310
[ 113.246181] ? worker_thread+0x100/0x240
[ 113.246696] ? kthread+0xc8/0x100
[ 113.247126] ? ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x40
[ 113.247606] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 113.248132] smb2_set_info+0x63f/0xa70 [ksmbd]
ksmbd is trying to set the atime and mtime via notify_change without also
setting the ctime. so This patch add ATTR_CTIME flags when setting mtime
to avoid a warning. |