| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Revise lpfc_prep_embed_io routine with proper endian macro usages
On big endian architectures, it is possible to run into a memory out of
bounds pointer dereference when FCP targets are zoned.
In lpfc_prep_embed_io, the memcpy(ptr, fcp_cmnd, sgl->sge_len) is
referencing a little endian formatted sgl->sge_len value. So, the memcpy
can cause big endian systems to crash.
Redefine the *sgl ptr as a struct sli4_sge_le to make it clear that we are
referring to a little endian formatted data structure. And, update the
routine with proper le32_to_cpu macro usages. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: mm: Fix lockless walks with static and dynamic page-table folding
Lina reports random oopsen originating from the fast GUP code when
16K pages are used with 4-level page-tables, the fourth level being
folded at runtime due to lack of LPA2.
In this configuration, the generic implementation of
p4d_offset_lockless() will return a 'p4d_t *' corresponding to the
'pgd_t' allocated on the stack of the caller, gup_fast_pgd_range().
This is normally fine, but when the fourth level of page-table is folded
at runtime, pud_offset_lockless() will offset from the address of the
'p4d_t' to calculate the address of the PUD in the same page-table page.
This results in a stray stack read when the 'p4d_t' has been allocated
on the stack and can send the walker into the weeds.
Fix the problem by providing our own definition of p4d_offset_lockless()
when CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4 which returns the real page-table
pointer rather than the address of the local stack variable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Prevent out of bounds access in performance query extensions
Check that the number of perfmons userspace is passing in the copy and
reset extensions is not greater than the internal kernel storage where
the ids will be copied into.
(cherry picked from commit f32b5128d2c440368b5bf3a7a356823e235caabb) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: Account for stopped queues when reading NIC stats
We now account for the fact that the NIC might send us stats for a
subset of queues. Without this change, gve_get_ethtool_stats might make
an invalid access on the priv->stats_report->stats array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: always do the basic checks for btrfs_qgroup_inherit structure
[BUG]
Syzbot reports the following regression detected by KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x42e/0x2e20 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:3277
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88814628ca50 by task syz-executor318/5171
CPU: 0 PID: 5171 Comm: syz-executor318 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00010-g2ab795141095 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x42e/0x2e20 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:3277
create_pending_snapshot+0x1359/0x29b0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1854
create_pending_snapshots+0x195/0x1d0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1922
btrfs_commit_transaction+0xf20/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2382
create_snapshot+0x6a1/0x9e0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:875
btrfs_mksubvol+0x58f/0x710 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1029
btrfs_mksnapshot+0xb5/0xf0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1075
__btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x387/0x4b0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1340
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1f2/0x3a0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1422
btrfs_ioctl+0x99e/0xc60
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fcbf1992509
RSP: 002b:00007fcbf1928218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fcbf1a1f618 RCX: 00007fcbf1992509
RDX: 0000000020000280 RSI: 0000000050009417 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fcbf1a1f610 R08: 00007ffea1298e97 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fcbf19eb660
R13: 00000000200002b8 R14: 00007fcbf19e60c0 R15: 0030656c69662f2e
</TASK>
And it also pinned it down to commit b5357cb268c4 ("btrfs: qgroup: do not
check qgroup inherit if qgroup is disabled").
[CAUSE]
That offending commit skips the whole qgroup inherit check if qgroup is
not enabled.
But that also skips the very basic checks like
num_ref_copies/num_excl_copies and the structure size checks.
Meaning if a qgroup enable/disable race is happening at the background,
and we pass a btrfs_qgroup_inherit structure when the qgroup is
disabled, the check would be completely skipped.
Then at the time of transaction commitment, qgroup is re-enabled and
btrfs_qgroup_inherit() is going to use the incorrect structure and
causing the above KASAN error.
[FIX]
Make btrfs_qgroup_check_inherit() only skip the source qgroup checks.
So that even if invalid btrfs_qgroup_inherit structure is passed in, we
can still reject invalid ones no matter if qgroup is enabled or not.
Furthermore we do already have an extra safety inside
btrfs_qgroup_inherit(), which would just ignore invalid qgroup sources,
so even if we only skip the qgroup source check we're still safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tun: add missing verification for short frame
The cited commit missed to check against the validity of the frame length
in the tun_xdp_one() path, which could cause a corrupted skb to be sent
downstack. Even before the skb is transmitted, the
tun_xdp_one-->eth_type_trans() may access the Ethernet header although it
can be less than ETH_HLEN. Once transmitted, this could either cause
out-of-bound access beyond the actual length, or confuse the underlayer
with incorrect or inconsistent header length in the skb metadata.
In the alternative path, tun_get_user() already prohibits short frame which
has the length less than Ethernet header size from being transmitted for
IFF_TAP.
This is to drop any frame shorter than the Ethernet header size just like
how tun_get_user() does.
CVE: CVE-2024-41091 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tap: add missing verification for short frame
The cited commit missed to check against the validity of the frame length
in the tap_get_user_xdp() path, which could cause a corrupted skb to be
sent downstack. Even before the skb is transmitted, the
tap_get_user_xdp()-->skb_set_network_header() may assume the size is more
than ETH_HLEN. Once transmitted, this could either cause out-of-bound
access beyond the actual length, or confuse the underlayer with incorrect
or inconsistent header length in the skb metadata.
In the alternative path, tap_get_user() already prohibits short frame which
has the length less than Ethernet header size from being transmitted.
This is to drop any frame shorter than the Ethernet header size just like
how tap_get_user() does.
CVE: CVE-2024-41090 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bcachefs: Fix sb_field_downgrade validation
- bch2_sb_downgrade_validate() wasn't checking for a downgrade entry
extending past the end of the superblock section
- for_each_downgrade_entry() is used in to_text() and needs to work on
malformed input; it also was missing a check for a field extending
past the end of the section |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: toshiba_acpi: Fix array out-of-bounds access
In order to use toshiba_dmi_quirks[] together with the standard DMI
matching functions, it must be terminated by a empty entry.
Since this entry is missing, an array out-of-bounds access occurs
every time the quirk list is processed.
Fix this by adding the terminating empty entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Validate ff offset
This adds sanity checks for ff offset. There is a check
on rt->first_free at first, but walking through by ff
without any check. If the second ff is a large offset.
We may encounter an out-of-bound read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Add a check for attr_names and oatbl
Added out-of-bound checking for *ane (ATTR_NAME_ENTRY). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: add bounds checking to xlog_recover_process_data
There is a lack of verification of the space occupied by fixed members
of xlog_op_header in the xlog_recover_process_data.
We can create a crafted image to trigger an out of bounds read by
following these steps:
1) Mount an image of xfs, and do some file operations to leave records
2) Before umounting, copy the image for subsequent steps to simulate
abnormal exit. Because umount will ensure that tail_blk and
head_blk are the same, which will result in the inability to enter
xlog_recover_process_data
3) Write a tool to parse and modify the copied image in step 2
4) Make the end of the xlog_op_header entries only 1 byte away from
xlog_rec_header->h_size
5) xlog_rec_header->h_num_logops++
6) Modify xlog_rec_header->h_crc
Fix:
Add a check to make sure there is sufficient space to access fixed members
of xlog_op_header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don't read past the mfuart notifcation
In case the firmware sends a notification that claims it has more data
than it has, we will read past that was allocated for the notification.
Remove the print of the buffer, we won't see it by default. If needed,
we can see the content with tracing.
This was reported by KFENCE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: check n_ssids before accessing the ssids
In some versions of cfg80211, the ssids poinet might be a valid one even
though n_ssids is 0. Accessing the pointer in this case will cuase an
out-of-bound access. Fix this by checking n_ssids first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: add error handle to avoid out-of-bounds
if the sdma_v4_0_irq_id_to_seq return -EINVAL, the process should
be stop to avoid out-of-bounds read, so directly return -EINVAL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid in sanity_check_inode()
syzbot reports a kernel bug as below:
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807a58c76c by task syz-executor280/5076
CPU: 1 PID: 5076 Comm: syz-executor280 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline]
current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline]
f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600
f2fs_xattr_fiemap fs/f2fs/data.c:1848 [inline]
f2fs_fiemap+0x55d/0x1ee0 fs/f2fs/data.c:1925
ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:220 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x1c07/0x2e50 fs/ioctl.c:838
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:902 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x81/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The root cause is we missed to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid during
f2fs_iget(), so that in fiemap() path, current_nat_addr() will access
nat_bitmap w/ offset from invalid i_xattr_nid, result in triggering
kasan bug report, fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
enic: Validate length of nl attributes in enic_set_vf_port
enic_set_vf_port assumes that the nl attribute IFLA_PORT_PROFILE
is of length PORT_PROFILE_MAX and that the nl attributes
IFLA_PORT_INSTANCE_UUID, IFLA_PORT_HOST_UUID are of length PORT_UUID_MAX.
These attributes are validated (in the function do_setlink in rtnetlink.c)
using the nla_policy ifla_port_policy. The policy defines IFLA_PORT_PROFILE
as NLA_STRING, IFLA_PORT_INSTANCE_UUID as NLA_BINARY and
IFLA_PORT_HOST_UUID as NLA_STRING. That means that the length validation
using the policy is for the max size of the attributes and not on exact
size so the length of these attributes might be less than the sizes that
enic_set_vf_port expects. This might cause an out of bands
read access in the memcpys of the data of these
attributes in enic_set_vf_port. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soundwire: cadence: fix invalid PDI offset
For some reason, we add an offset to the PDI, presumably to skip the
PDI0 and PDI1 which are reserved for BPT.
This code is however completely wrong and leads to an out-of-bounds
access. We were just lucky so far since we used only a couple of PDIs
and remained within the PDI array bounds.
A Fixes: tag is not provided since there are no known platforms where
the out-of-bounds would be accessed, and the initial code had problems
as well.
A follow-up patch completely removes this useless offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jffs2: prevent xattr node from overflowing the eraseblock
Add a check to make sure that the requested xattr node size is no larger
than the eraseblock minus the cleanmarker.
Unlike the usual inode nodes, the xattr nodes aren't split into parts
and spread across multiple eraseblocks, which means that a xattr node
must not occupy more than one eraseblock. If the requested xattr value is
too large, the xattr node can spill onto the next eraseblock, overwriting
the nodes and causing errors such as:
jffs2: argh. node added in wrong place at 0x0000b050(2)
jffs2: nextblock 0x0000a000, expected at 0000b00c
jffs2: error: (823) do_verify_xattr_datum: node CRC failed at 0x01e050,
read=0xfc892c93, calc=0x000000
jffs2: notice: (823) jffs2_get_inode_nodes: Node header CRC failed
at 0x01e00c. {848f,2fc4,0fef511f,59a3d171}
jffs2: Node at 0x0000000c with length 0x00001044 would run over the
end of the erase block
jffs2: Perhaps the file system was created with the wrong erase size?
jffs2: jffs2_scan_eraseblock(): Magic bitmask 0x1985 not found
at 0x00000010: 0x1044 instead
This breaks the filesystem and can lead to KASAN crashes such as:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88802c31e914 by task repro/830
CPU: 0 PID: 830 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0x120
print_report+0xc4/0x620
? __virt_addr_valid+0x308/0x5b0
kasan_report+0xc1/0xf0
? jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
? jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
jffs2_flash_direct_writev+0xa8/0xd0
jffs2_flash_writev+0x9c9/0xef0
? __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc4/0x160
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x140
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[...]
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix out-of-bound access of qmi_invoke_handler()
Currently, there is no terminator entry for ath12k_qmi_msg_handlers hence
facing below KASAN warning,
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in qmi_invoke_handler+0xa4/0x148
Read of size 8 at addr ffffffd00a6428d8 by task kworker/u8:2/1273
CPU: 0 PID: 1273 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 5.4.213 #0
Workqueue: qmi_msg_handler qmi_data_ready_work
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x20c
show_stack+0x14/0x1c
dump_stack+0xe0/0x138
print_address_description.isra.5+0x30/0x330
__kasan_report+0x16c/0x1bc
kasan_report+0xc/0x14
__asan_load8+0xa8/0xb0
qmi_invoke_handler+0xa4/0x148
qmi_handle_message+0x18c/0x1bc
qmi_data_ready_work+0x4ec/0x528
process_one_work+0x2c0/0x440
worker_thread+0x324/0x4b8
kthread+0x210/0x228
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
The address belongs to the variable:
ath12k_mac_mon_status_filter_default+0x4bd8/0xfffffffffffe2300 [ath12k]
[...]
==================================================================
Add a dummy terminator entry at the end to assist the qmi_invoke_handler()
in traversing up to the terminator entry without accessing an
out-of-boundary index.
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.0.1-00029-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
