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CVSS v3.1 |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Fix panic caused by NULL-PMD in huge_pte_offset()
ERROR INFO:
CPU 25 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0x0
...
Call Trace:
[<900000000023c30c>] huge_pte_offset+0x3c/0x58
[<900000000057fd4c>] hugetlb_follow_page_mask+0x74/0x438
[<900000000051fee8>] __get_user_pages+0xe0/0x4c8
[<9000000000522414>] faultin_page_range+0x84/0x380
[<9000000000564e8c>] madvise_vma_behavior+0x534/0xa48
[<900000000056689c>] do_madvise+0x1bc/0x3e8
[<9000000000566df4>] sys_madvise+0x24/0x38
[<90000000015b9e88>] do_syscall+0x78/0x98
[<9000000000221f18>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158
In some cases, pmd may be NULL and rely on NULL as the return value for
processing, so it is necessary to determine this situation here. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jffs2: check that raw node were preallocated before writing summary
Syzkaller detected a kernel bug in jffs2_link_node_ref, caused by fault
injection in jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs. jffs2_sum_write_sumnode doesn't
check return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs and simply lets any
error propagate into jffs2_sum_write_data, which eventually calls
jffs2_link_node_ref in order to link the summary to an expectedly allocated
node.
kernel BUG at fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 31277 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.1.128-syzkaller-00139-ge10f83ca10a1 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:jffs2_link_node_ref+0x570/0x690 fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592
Call Trace:
<TASK>
jffs2_sum_write_data fs/jffs2/summary.c:841 [inline]
jffs2_sum_write_sumnode+0xd1a/0x1da0 fs/jffs2/summary.c:874
jffs2_do_reserve_space+0xa18/0xd60 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:388
jffs2_reserve_space+0x55f/0xaa0 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:197
jffs2_write_inode_range+0x246/0xb50 fs/jffs2/write.c:362
jffs2_write_end+0x726/0x15d0 fs/jffs2/file.c:301
generic_perform_write+0x314/0x5d0 mm/filemap.c:3856
__generic_file_write_iter+0x2ae/0x4d0 mm/filemap.c:3973
generic_file_write_iter+0xe3/0x350 mm/filemap.c:4005
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2265 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x20f/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:735
do_iter_write+0x186/0x710 fs/read_write.c:861
vfs_iter_write+0x70/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902
iter_file_splice_write+0x73b/0xc90 fs/splice.c:685
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:763 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0x10c/0x170 fs/splice.c:950
splice_direct_to_actor+0x337/0xa10 fs/splice.c:896
do_splice_direct+0x1a9/0x280 fs/splice.c:1002
do_sendfile+0xb13/0x12c0 fs/read_write.c:1255
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cf/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1309
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
Fix this issue by checking return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs
before calling jffs2_sum_write_data.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: clear the dst when changing skb protocol
A not-so-careful NAT46 BPF program can crash the kernel
if it indiscriminately flips ingress packets from v4 to v6:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
ip6_rcv_core (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:190:20)
ipv6_rcv (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:306:8)
process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6186:4)
napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6906:9)
net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7028:13)
do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:462:3)
netif_rx (net/core/dev.c:5326:3)
dev_loopback_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4015:2)
ip_mc_finish_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:363:8)
NF_HOOK (./include/linux/netfilter.h:314:9)
ip_mc_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:400:5)
dst_output (./include/net/dst.h:459:9)
ip_local_out (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:130:9)
ip_send_skb (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1496:8)
udp_send_skb (net/ipv4/udp.c:1040:8)
udp_sendmsg (net/ipv4/udp.c:1328:10)
The output interface has a 4->6 program attached at ingress.
We try to loop the multicast skb back to the sending socket.
Ingress BPF runs as part of netif_rx(), pushes a valid v6 hdr
and changes skb->protocol to v6. We enter ip6_rcv_core which
tries to use skb_dst(). But the dst is still an IPv4 one left
after IPv4 mcast output.
Clear the dst in all BPF helpers which change the protocol.
Try to preserve metadata dsts, those may carry non-routing
metadata. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm: Revert atm_account_tx() if copy_from_iter_full() fails.
In vcc_sendmsg(), we account skb->truesize to sk->sk_wmem_alloc by
atm_account_tx().
It is expected to be reverted by atm_pop_raw() later called by
vcc->dev->ops->send(vcc, skb).
However, vcc_sendmsg() misses the same revert when copy_from_iter_full()
fails, and then we will leak a socket.
Let's factorise the revert part as atm_return_tx() and call it in
the failure path.
Note that the corresponding sk_wmem_alloc operation can be found in
alloc_tx() as of the blamed commit.
$ git blame -L:alloc_tx net/atm/common.c c55fa3cccbc2c~ |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Avoid NULL pointer dereference in `v3d_job_update_stats()`
The following kernel Oops was recently reported by Mesa CI:
[ 800.139824] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000588
[ 800.148619] Mem abort info:
[ 800.151402] ESR = 0x0000000096000005
[ 800.155141] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 800.160444] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 800.163488] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 800.166619] FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
[ 800.171487] Data abort info:
[ 800.174357] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 800.179832] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 800.184873] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 800.190176] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001014c2000
[ 800.196607] [0000000000000588] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
[ 800.205305] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 800.211564] Modules linked in: vc4 snd_soc_hdmi_codec drm_display_helper v3d cec gpu_sched drm_dma_helper drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks snd_soc_core snd_compress snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm i2c_brcmstb snd_timer snd backlight
[ 800.234448] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.25+rpt-rpi-v8 #1 Debian 1:6.12.25-1+rpt1
[ 800.244182] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.4 (DT)
[ 800.250005] pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 800.256959] pc : v3d_job_update_stats+0x60/0x130 [v3d]
[ 800.262112] lr : v3d_job_update_stats+0x48/0x130 [v3d]
[ 800.267251] sp : ffffffc080003e60
[ 800.270555] x29: ffffffc080003e60 x28: ffffffd842784980 x27: 0224012000000000
[ 800.277687] x26: ffffffd84277f630 x25: ffffff81012fd800 x24: 0000000000000020
[ 800.284818] x23: ffffff8040238b08 x22: 0000000000000570 x21: 0000000000000158
[ 800.291948] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff8040238000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 800.299078] x17: ffffffa8c1bd2000 x16: ffffffc080000000 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 800.306208] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 800.313338] x11: 0000000000000040 x10: 0000000000001a40 x9 : ffffffd83b39757c
[ 800.320468] x8 : ffffffd842786420 x7 : 7fffffffffffffff x6 : 0000000000ef32b0
[ 800.327598] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 0000000000000015 x3 : ffffffd842784980
[ 800.334728] x2 : 0000000000000004 x1 : 0000000000010002 x0 : 000000ba4c0ca382
[ 800.341859] Call trace:
[ 800.344294] v3d_job_update_stats+0x60/0x130 [v3d]
[ 800.349086] v3d_irq+0x124/0x2e0 [v3d]
[ 800.352835] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x58/0x218
[ 800.357539] handle_irq_event+0x54/0xb8
[ 800.361369] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xac/0x240
[ 800.365458] handle_irq_desc+0x48/0x68
[ 800.369200] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x24/0x38
[ 800.373810] gic_handle_irq+0x48/0xd8
[ 800.377464] call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x58
[ 800.381379] do_interrupt_handler+0x88/0x98
[ 800.385554] el1_interrupt+0x34/0x68
[ 800.389123] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x28
[ 800.393211] el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68
[ 800.396603] default_idle_call+0x3c/0x168
[ 800.400606] do_idle+0x1fc/0x230
[ 800.403827] cpu_startup_entry+0x40/0x50
[ 800.407742] rest_init+0xe4/0xf0
[ 800.410962] start_kernel+0x5e8/0x790
[ 800.414616] __primary_switched+0x80/0x90
[ 800.418622] Code: 8b170277 8b160296 11000421 b9000861 (b9401ac1)
[ 800.424707] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 800.457313] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---
This issue happens when the file descriptor is closed before the jobs
submitted by it are completed. When the job completes, we update the
global GPU stats and the per-fd GPU stats, which are exposed through
fdinfo. If the file descriptor was closed, then the struct `v3d_file_priv`
and its stats were already freed and we can't update the per-fd stats.
Therefore, if the file descriptor was already closed, don't u
---truncated--- |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/a7xx: Call CP_RESET_CONTEXT_STATE
Calling this packet is necessary when we switch contexts because there
are various pieces of state used by userspace to synchronize between BR
and BV that are persistent across submits and we need to make sure that
they are in a "safe" state when switching contexts. Otherwise a
userspace submission in one context could cause another context to
function incorrectly and hang, effectively a denial of service (although
without leaking data). This was missed during initial a7xx bringup.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/654924/ |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau: fix a use-after-free in r535_gsp_rpc_push()
The RPC container is released after being passed to r535_gsp_rpc_send().
When sending the initial fragment of a large RPC and passing the
caller's RPC container, the container will be freed prematurely. Subsequent
attempts to send remaining fragments will therefore result in a
use-after-free.
Allocate a temporary RPC container for holding the initial fragment of a
large RPC when sending. Free the caller's container when all fragments
are successfully sent.
[ Rebase onto Blackwell changes. - Danilo ] |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Fix double invocation of bnxt_ulp_stop()/bnxt_ulp_start()
Before the commit under the Fixes tag below, bnxt_ulp_stop() and
bnxt_ulp_start() were always invoked in pairs. After that commit,
the new bnxt_ulp_restart() can be invoked after bnxt_ulp_stop()
has been called. This may result in the RoCE driver's aux driver
.suspend() method being invoked twice. The 2nd bnxt_re_suspend()
call will crash when it dereferences a NULL pointer:
(NULL ib_device): Handle device suspend call
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b78
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/u96:5 Tainted: G S 6.15.0-rc1 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
Workqueue: bnxt_pf_wq bnxt_sp_task [bnxt_en]
RIP: 0010:bnxt_re_suspend+0x45/0x1f0 [bnxt_re]
Code: 8b 05 a7 3c 5b f5 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 49 8b 5c 24 08 4d 8b 2c 24 e8 ea 06 0a f4 48 c7 c6 04 60 52 c0 48 89 df e8 1b ce f9 ff <48> 8b 83 78 0b 00 00 48 8b 80 38 03 00 00 a8 40 0f 85 b5 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffa2e84084fd88 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb4b6b934 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffffa1760954c9c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffdfff
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa2e84084fb50 R12: ffffa176031ef070
R13: ffffa17609775000 R14: ffffa17603adc180 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa17daa397000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000b78 CR3: 00000004aaa30003 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bnxt_ulp_stop+0x69/0x90 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_sp_task+0x678/0x920 [bnxt_en]
? __schedule+0x514/0xf50
process_scheduled_works+0x9d/0x400
worker_thread+0x11c/0x260
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xfe/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x40
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Check the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED flag and do not proceed if the flag
is already set. This will preserve the original symmetrical
bnxt_ulp_stop() and bnxt_ulp_start().
Also, inside bnxt_ulp_start(), clear the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED
flag after taking the mutex to avoid any race condition. And for
symmetry, only proceed in bnxt_ulp_start() if the
BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED is set. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm: atmtcp: Free invalid length skb in atmtcp_c_send().
syzbot reported the splat below. [0]
vcc_sendmsg() copies data passed from userspace to skb and passes
it to vcc->dev->ops->send().
atmtcp_c_send() accesses skb->data as struct atmtcp_hdr after
checking if skb->len is 0, but it's not enough.
Also, when skb->len == 0, skb and sk (vcc) were leaked because
dev_kfree_skb() is not called and sk_wmem_alloc adjustment is missing
to revert atm_account_tx() in vcc_sendmsg(), which is expected
to be done in atm_pop_raw().
Let's properly free skb with an invalid length in atmtcp_c_send().
[0]:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in atmtcp_c_send+0x255/0xed0 drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:294
atmtcp_c_send+0x255/0xed0 drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:294
vcc_sendmsg+0xd7c/0xff0 net/atm/common.c:644
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:727
____sys_sendmsg+0x7e0/0xd80 net/socket.c:2566
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2620
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2652 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2657 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2655 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x211/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2655
x64_sys_call+0x32fb/0x3db0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x210 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4154 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4197 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x818/0xf00 mm/slub.c:4249
kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4b0 net/core/skbuff.c:579
__alloc_skb+0x347/0x7d0 net/core/skbuff.c:670
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1336 [inline]
vcc_sendmsg+0xb40/0xff0 net/atm/common.c:628
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:727
____sys_sendmsg+0x7e0/0xd80 net/socket.c:2566
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2620
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2652 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2657 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2655 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x211/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2655
x64_sys_call+0x32fb/0x3db0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x210 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5798 Comm: syz-executor192 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-syzkaller-00010-g2c4a1f3fe03e #0 PREEMPT(undef)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025 |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix null-ptr-deref when acquiring remote ip of ethernet bearer
The reproduction steps:
1. create a tun interface
2. enable l2 bearer
3. TIPC_NL_UDP_GET_REMOTEIP with media name set to tun
tipc: Started in network mode
tipc: Node identity 8af312d38a21, cluster identity 4711
tipc: Enabled bearer <eth:syz_tun>, priority 1
Oops: general protection fault
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range
CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 559 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1+ #117 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC
RIP: 0010:tipc_udp_nl_dump_remoteip+0x4a4/0x8f0
the ub was in fact a struct dev.
when bid != 0 && skip_cnt != 0, bearer_list[bid] may be NULL or
other media when other thread changes it.
fix this by checking media_id. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lan743x: fix potential out-of-bounds write in lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get()
Before calling lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(), the 'channel' value
is checked against the maximum value of PCI11X1X_PTP_IO_MAX_CHANNELS(8).
This seems correct and aligns with the PTP interrupt status register
(PTP_INT_STS) specifications.
However, lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get() writes to ptp->extts[] with
only LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS(4) elements, using channel as an index:
lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(..., u8 channel,...)
{
...
/* Update Local timestamp */
extts = &ptp->extts[channel];
extts->ts.tv_sec = sec;
...
}
To avoid an out-of-bounds write and utilize all the supported GPIO
inputs, set LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS to 8.
Detected using the static analysis tool - Svace. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: santizize the arguments from userspace when adding a device
Sanity check the values for queue depth and number of queues
we get from userspace when adding a device. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
calipso: Fix null-ptr-deref in calipso_req_{set,del}attr().
syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in sock_omalloc() while allocating
a CALIPSO option. [0]
The NULL is of struct sock, which was fetched by sk_to_full_sk() in
calipso_req_setattr().
Since commit a1a5344ddbe8 ("tcp: avoid two atomic ops for syncookies"),
reqsk->rsk_listener could be NULL when SYN Cookie is returned to its
client, as hinted by the leading SYN Cookie log.
Here are 3 options to fix the bug:
1) Return 0 in calipso_req_setattr()
2) Return an error in calipso_req_setattr()
3) Alaways set rsk_listener
1) is no go as it bypasses LSM, but 2) effectively disables SYN Cookie
for CALIPSO. 3) is also no go as there have been many efforts to reduce
atomic ops and make TCP robust against DDoS. See also commit 3b24d854cb35
("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood").
As of the blamed commit, SYN Cookie already did not need refcounting,
and no one has stumbled on the bug for 9 years, so no CALIPSO user will
care about SYN Cookie.
Let's return an error in calipso_req_setattr() and calipso_req_delattr()
in the SYN Cookie case.
This can be reproduced by [1] on Fedora and now connect() of nc times out.
[0]:
TCP: request_sock_TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 12262 Comm: syz.1.2611 Not tainted 6.14.0 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:406 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_kmalloc+0x35/0x170 net/core/sock.c:2806
Code: 89 d5 41 54 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 25 e3 c6 fd e8 f0 91 e3 00 48 8d 7b 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 26 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b
RSP: 0018:ffff88811af89038 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888105266400
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88800c890000 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: 0000000000000050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810526640e
R10: ffffed1020a4cc81 R11: ffff88810526640f R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000820 R14: ffff888105266400 R15: 0000000000000050
FS: 00007f0653a07640(0000) GS:ffff88811af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f863ba096f4 CR3: 00000000163c0005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
ipv6_renew_options+0x279/0x950 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1288
calipso_req_setattr+0x181/0x340 net/ipv6/calipso.c:1204
calipso_req_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:597
netlbl_req_setattr+0x18a/0x440 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1249
selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request+0x1fb/0x320 security/selinux/netlabel.c:342
selinux_inet_conn_request+0x1eb/0x2c0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5551
security_inet_conn_request+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4945
tcp_v6_route_req+0x22c/0x550 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:825
tcp_conn_request+0xec8/0x2b70 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7275
tcp_v6_conn_request+0x1e3/0x440 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1328
tcp_rcv_state_process+0xafa/0x52b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6781
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x8a6/0x1a40 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1667
tcp_v6_rcv+0x505e/0x5b50 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1904
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x17c/0x1da0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:436
ip6_input_finish+0x103/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:480
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
ip6_input+0x13c/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491
dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0xb6/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netf
---truncated--- |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atm: fix /proc/net/atm/lec handling
/proc/net/atm/lec must ensure safety against dev_lec[] changes.
It appears it had dev_put() calls without prior dev_hold(),
leading to imbalance and UAF. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix use-after-free in binderfs_evict_inode()
Running 'stress-ng --binderfs 16 --timeout 300' under KASAN-enabled
kernel, I've noticed the following:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binderfs_evict_inode+0x1de/0x2d0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88807379bc08 by task stress-ng-binde/1699
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1699 Comm: stress-ng-binde Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7-g586de92313fc-dirty #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x1c2/0x2a0
? __pfx_dump_stack_lvl+0x10/0x10
? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
? __virt_addr_valid+0x18c/0x540
? __virt_addr_valid+0x469/0x540
print_report+0x155/0x840
? __virt_addr_valid+0x18c/0x540
? __virt_addr_valid+0x469/0x540
? __phys_addr+0xba/0x170
? binderfs_evict_inode+0x1de/0x2d0
kasan_report+0x147/0x180
? binderfs_evict_inode+0x1de/0x2d0
binderfs_evict_inode+0x1de/0x2d0
? __pfx_binderfs_evict_inode+0x10/0x10
evict+0x524/0x9f0
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_evict+0x10/0x10
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4d/0x210
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x28/0x50
? iput+0x697/0x9b0
__dentry_kill+0x209/0x660
? shrink_kill+0x8d/0x2c0
shrink_kill+0xa9/0x2c0
shrink_dentry_list+0x2e0/0x5e0
shrink_dcache_parent+0xa2/0x2c0
? __pfx_shrink_dcache_parent+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
do_one_tree+0x23/0xe0
shrink_dcache_for_umount+0xa0/0x170
generic_shutdown_super+0x67/0x390
kill_litter_super+0x76/0xb0
binderfs_kill_super+0x44/0x90
deactivate_locked_super+0xb9/0x130
cleanup_mnt+0x422/0x4c0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x9d/0x150
task_work_run+0x1d2/0x260
? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10
resume_user_mode_work+0x52/0x60
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x9a/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x103/0x210
? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0xcac57b
Code: c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 31 f6 e9 05 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8
RSP: 002b:00007ffecf4226a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007ffecf422720 RCX: 0000000000cac57b
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007ffecf422850
RBP: 00007ffecf422850 R08: 0000000028d06ab1 R09: 7fffffffffffffff
R10: 3fffffffffffffff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffecf422718
R13: 00007ffecf422710 R14: 00007f478f87b658 R15: 00007ffecf422830
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1705:
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x213/0x3e0
binderfs_binder_device_create+0x183/0xa80
binder_ctl_ioctl+0x138/0x190
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x120/0x1b0
do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 1705:
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50
__kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70
kfree+0x194/0x440
evict+0x524/0x9f0
do_unlinkat+0x390/0x5b0
__x64_sys_unlink+0x47/0x50
do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
This 'stress-ng' workload causes the concurrent deletions from
'binder_devices' and so requires full-featured synchronization
to prevent list corruption.
I've found this issue independently but pretty sure that syzbot did
the same, so Reported-by: and Closes: should be applicable here as well. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix yet another UAF in binder_devices
Commit e77aff5528a18 ("binderfs: fix use-after-free in binder_devices")
addressed a use-after-free where devices could be released without first
being removed from the binder_devices list. However, there is a similar
path in binder_free_proc() that was missed:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_remove_device+0xd4/0x100
Write of size 8 at addr ffff0000c773b900 by task umount/467
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 467 Comm: umount Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-00138-g57483a362741 #9 PREEMPT
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
binder_remove_device+0xd4/0x100
binderfs_evict_inode+0x230/0x2f0
evict+0x25c/0x5dc
iput+0x304/0x480
dentry_unlink_inode+0x208/0x46c
__dentry_kill+0x154/0x530
[...]
Allocated by task 463:
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x13c/0x324
binderfs_binder_device_create.isra.0+0x138/0xa60
binder_ctl_ioctl+0x1ac/0x230
[...]
Freed by task 215:
kfree+0x184/0x31c
binder_proc_dec_tmpref+0x33c/0x4ac
binder_deferred_func+0xc10/0x1108
process_one_work+0x520/0xba4
[...]
==================================================================
Call binder_remove_device() within binder_free_proc() to ensure the
device is removed from the binder_devices list before being kfreed. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Do not double dequeue a configuration request
Some of our devices crash in tb_cfg_request_dequeue():
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000122
CPU: 6 PID: 91007 Comm: kworker/6:2 Tainted: G U W 6.6.65
RIP: 0010:tb_cfg_request_dequeue+0x2d/0xa0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? tb_cfg_request_dequeue+0x2d/0xa0
tb_cfg_request_work+0x33/0x80
worker_thread+0x386/0x8f0
kthread+0xed/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x38/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
The circumstances are unclear, however, the theory is that
tb_cfg_request_work() can be scheduled twice for a request:
first time via frame.callback from ring_work() and second
time from tb_cfg_request(). Both times kworkers will execute
tb_cfg_request_dequeue(), which results in double list_del()
from the ctl->request_queue (the list poison deference hints
at it: 0xdead000000000122).
Do not dequeue requests that don't have TB_CFG_REQUEST_ACTIVE
bit set. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: marvell/cesa - Handle zero-length skcipher requests
Do not access random memory for zero-length skcipher requests.
Just return 0. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: avoid using multiple devices with different type
For multiple devices, both primary and extra devices should be the
same type. `erofs_init_device` has already guaranteed that if the
primary is a file-backed device, extra devices should also be
regular files.
However, if the primary is a block device while the extra device
is a file-backed device, `erofs_init_device` will get an ENOTBLK,
which is not treated as an error in `erofs_fc_get_tree`, and that
leads to an UAF:
erofs_fc_get_tree
get_tree_bdev_flags(erofs_fc_fill_super)
erofs_read_superblock
erofs_init_device // sbi->dif0 is not inited yet,
// return -ENOTBLK
deactivate_locked_super
free(sbi)
if (err is -ENOTBLK)
sbi->dif0.file = filp_open() // sbi UAF
So if -ENOTBLK is hitted in `erofs_init_device`, it means the
primary device must be a block device, and the extra device
is not a block device. The error can be converted to -EINVAL. |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: max77705: Fix workqueue error handling in probe
The create_singlethread_workqueue() doesn't return error pointers, it
returns NULL. Also cleanup the workqueue on the error paths. |