| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The ACSE layer contains a flaw in the processing of AARQ PDUs during MMS
connection establishment. When parsing certain fields within the
calling AP title, an attacker controlled length value of zero or one may
cause the parser to read past the end of a heap buffer. |
| The MMS server connection handler contains a flaw in its processing of
BER-encoded request data. When an MMS confirmed request PDU containing
an extended BER tag is received over an established session, the decoder
may advance its internal buffer incorrectly due to a missing bounds
check. This results in a one byte heap out-of-bounds read and causes the
MMS service process to terminate, leading to a denial-of-service
condition. |
| FreeRDP before 3.29.0 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the TSMF FFmpeg decoder when parsing AVC1 MPEG2VIDEOINFO media types with insufficient ExtraData. Attackers can send malformed media format data from a server to trigger a crash by reading fixed offsets without validating source buffer length. |
| A vulnerability has been found in Wavlink WL-NU516U1 708c073-mt7628. This affects the function fgets of the file nas.cgi. The manipulation of the argument CONTENT_LENGTH leads to stack-based buffer overflow. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. You should upgrade the affected component. The vendor was contacted early, responded in a very professional manner and quickly released a fixed version of the affected product. |
| FreeRDP before 3.29.0 (affected versions <= 3.28.0) contains a heap out-of-bounds read in update_process_glyph_fragments()/glyph_cache_fragment_put() in libfreerdp/cache/glyph.c. When handling a GLYPH_FRAGMENT_ADD update, the code reads a one-byte server-controlled declared fragment size but does not verify it fits within the remaining received buffer before allocating and copying that many bytes. A malicious RDP server can send a short fragment with an oversized declared size, causing the client to read beyond the allocated buffer, resulting in an out-of-bounds read and client crash. |
| The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp parsed inbound WAMP RPC frames in parse_rpc_msg() (subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c) using a hand-rolled helper, extract_string_field(), that copied the message's uid and action fields with strncpy(out_buf, token + 1, outlen - 1) and then scanned the result with strchr(out_buf, '"'). Because strncpy does not NUL-terminate the destination when the source is at least outlen - 1 (127) bytes long, the subsequent strchr reads past the 128-byte destination buffer into adjacent stack memory; if a " byte is found beyond the buffer, a one-byte out-of-bounds NUL write also occurs. A related defect in extract_payload() runs strchr/strrchr over the receive buffer, which may not be NUL-terminated when a maximal-length frame fills it.
The parsed bytes come directly from the OCPP central-system server over a websocket: the reader thread fills recv_buf via websocket_recv_msg() and calls parse_rpc_msg() on each inbound DATA frame (subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c). A malicious or compromised central server, or an on-path attacker (OCPP is commonly deployed over plain ws://), can send an RPC frame whose uid or action field is 127+ bytes with no closing quote, triggering the out-of-bounds access.
The primary impact is a remotely triggerable denial of service: the unbounded scan can fault on an unmapped page, and the stray NUL write can corrupt adjacent stack state. The over-read data is not reflected to the peer, so disclosure is limited. The feature is EXPERIMENTAL and must be explicitly enabled (CONFIG_OCPP). The fix replaces the manual parser with the bounds-respecting json_mixed_arr_parse() and copies the extracted uid with an explicitly NUL-terminated buffer, eliminating both over-reads. |
| pglogical's apply worker does not sufficiently validate the length of certain fields in incoming replication protocol messages before copying them, resulting in an out-of-bounds read. A party acting as the publisher for a subscription, for example a non-PostgreSQL endpoint that speaks the pglogical replication protocol, can return crafted messages that cause the subscriber's apply worker to read beyond the bounds of an allocated buffer, disclosing adjacent process memory or crashing the worker. To exploit the issue an attacker must be able to direct a subscription at an endpoint they control. In default installations this requires privileges normally reserved for a superuser, so the issue is most relevant to managed deployments where the ability to create subscriptions has been delegated to non-superuser roles. |
| A flaw in Node.js Permission Model enforcement allows `trace_events.createTracing().enable()` Writes Trace Logs Outside `--allow-fs-write`.
This can lead to confidentiality impact or bypass of the intended security boundary under affected configurations.
This vulnerability affects Node.js **22.x**, **24.x**, and **26.x**. |
| Circular symbolic links in phar archives could lead to unbounded recursion, exhausting the C stack and crashing the PHP process, in PHP versions from 8.2.* before 8.2.33, from 8.3.* before 8.3.33, from 8.4.* before 8.4.24, and from 8.5.* before 8.5.9. |
| Date::Manip versions through 6.99 for Perl return corrupted dates via non-ASCII decimal digits that pass the numeric range tests in check.
The parse regexes capture year, month and day with the `\d` shorthand, which on a character string matches the whole Unicode decimal digit property `\p{Nd}` and not just `[0-9]`. Date::Manip::Base::check then validates the captured fields with numeric comparisons alone (`$y<1 || $y>9999`, `$m<1 || $m>12`, `$d<1 || $d>$days`), and _parse_check stores the numified fields (`$y+0`). Perl truncates a string at the first character that is not an ASCII digit, so a field whose leading characters are ASCII digits numifies to an in-range prefix and satisfies every test: a year field of three ASCII digits followed by U+0664 ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT FOUR numifies to 202, giving the year 0202, and one non-ASCII digit in the month or day field shifts those fields the same way. The hour, minute and second fields match explicit ASCII character classes (`0?[0-9]`, `[0-5][0-9]`) and do not shift, though a non-ASCII digit in a fractional hour or minute field truncates the fraction.
Any caller that passes an untrusted character string to ParseDate() or Date::Manip::Date->parse() can get back a date that differs from the string it parsed, with no parse error. Where the parsed date gates logic such as an expiry check or a retention window, the shift goes unnoticed. |
| The Windows interactive service in OpenVPN 2.7_alpha1 through 2.7.4 allows remote attackers to cause persistent DNS state pollution or a service crash via a crafted search domain during the disconnection process |
| Tenda W6-S 1.0.0.4(510) contains a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the /goform/wifiSSIDset endpoint. The function formwrlSSIDset uses sprintf to copy user-controlled 'GO' and 'index' parameters into a 64-byte stack buffer without length restriction, leading to stack overflow. |
| Buffer overflow in NTPsec's Zyfer refclock allows local attacker to crash ntpd |
| A heap buffer overflow vulnerability was found in GStreamer's librfb (RFB/VNC client). The rectangle bounds check incorrectly validates area rather than individual dimensions, allowing a malicious VNC server to send a rectangle that extends beyond the framebuffer. A remote attacker could set up a malicious VNC server and trick a user into connecting, resulting in an out-of-bounds heap write that could lead to code execution or a crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix same-register dst/src OOB read and pointer leak in sock_ops
When a BPF sock_ops program accesses ctx fields with dst_reg == src_reg,
the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK() and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() macros fail to zero the
destination register in the !fullsock / !locked_tcp_sock path.
Both macros borrow a temporary register to check is_fullsock /
is_locked_tcp_sock when dst_reg == src_reg, because dst_reg holds the
ctx pointer. When the check is false (e.g., TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV state with
a request_sock), dst_reg should be zeroed but is not, leaving the stale
ctx pointer:
- SOCK_OPS_GET_SK: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer, passes NULL checks
as PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, and can be used as a bogus socket pointer,
leading to stack-out-of-bounds access in helpers like
bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock().
- SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer which the
verifier believes is a SCALAR_VALUE, leaking a kernel pointer.
Fix both macros by:
- Changing JMP_A(1) to JMP_A(2) in the fullsock path to skip the
added instruction.
- Adding BPF_MOV64_IMM(si->dst_reg, 0) after the temp register
restore in the !fullsock path, placed after the restore because
dst_reg == src_reg means we need src_reg intact to read ctx->temp. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-verity-fec: fix reading parity bytes split across blocks (take 3)
fec_decode_bufs() assumes that the parity bytes of the first RS codeword
it decodes are never split across parity blocks.
This assumption is false. Consider v->fec->block_size == 4096 &&
v->fec->roots == 17 && fio->nbufs == 1, for example. In that case, each
call to fec_decode_bufs() consumes v->fec->roots * (fio->nbufs <<
DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS) = 272 parity bytes.
Considering that the parity data for each message block starts on a
block boundary, the byte alignment in the parity data will iterate
through 272*i mod 4096 until the 3 parity blocks have been consumed. On
the 16th call (i=15), the alignment will be 4080 bytes into the first
block. Only 16 bytes remain in that block, but 17 parity bytes will be
needed. The code reads out-of-bounds from the parity block buffer.
Fortunately this doesn't normally happen, since it can occur only for
certain non-default values of fec_roots *and* when the maximum number of
buffers couldn't be allocated due to low memory. For example with
block_size=4096 only the following cases are affected:
fec_roots=17: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 15]
fec_roots=19: nbufs in [1, 229]
fec_roots=21: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 13, 15, 39, 65, 195]
fec_roots=23: nbufs in [1, 89]
Regardless, fix it by refactoring how the parity blocks are read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: remove read access to debugfs files
The 'command' and 'netdev_ops' debugfs files are a legacy debugging
interface supported by the i40e driver since its early days by commit
02e9c290814c ("i40e: debugfs interface").
Both of these debugfs files provide a read handler which is mostly useless,
and which is implemented with questionable logic. They both use a static
256 byte buffer which is initialized to the empty string. In the case of
the 'command' file this buffer is literally never used and simply wastes
space. In the case of the 'netdev_ops' file, the last command written is
saved here.
On read, the files contents are presented as the name of the device
followed by a colon and then the contents of their respective static
buffer. For 'command' this will always be "<device>: ". For 'netdev_ops',
this will be "<device>: <last command written>". But note the buffer is
shared between all devices operated by this module. At best, it is mostly
meaningless information, and at worse it could be accessed simultaneously
as there doesn't appear to be any locking mechanism.
We have also recently received multiple reports for both read functions
about their use of snprintf and potential overflow that could result in
reading arbitrary kernel memory. For the 'command' file, this is definitely
impossible, since the static buffer is always zero and never written to.
For the 'netdev_ops' file, it does appear to be possible, if the user
carefully crafts the command input, it will be copied into the buffer,
which could be large enough to cause snprintf to truncate, which then
causes the copy_to_user to read beyond the length of the buffer allocated
by kzalloc.
A minimal fix would be to replace snprintf() with scnprintf() which would
cap the return to the number of bytes written, preventing an overflow. A
more involved fix would be to drop the mostly useless static buffers,
saving 512 bytes and modifying the read functions to stop needing those as
input.
Instead, lets just completely drop the read access to these files. These
are debug interfaces exposed as part of debugfs, and I don't believe that
dropping read access will break any script, as the provided output is
pretty useless. You can find the netdev name through other more standard
interfaces, and the 'netdev_ops' interface can easily result in garbage if
you issue simultaneous writes to multiple devices at once.
In order to properly remove the i40e_dbg_netdev_ops_buf, we need to
refactor its write function to avoid using the static buffer. Instead, use
the same logic as the i40e_dbg_command_write, with an allocated buffer.
Update the code to use this instead of the static buffer, and ensure we
free the buffer on exit. This fixes simultaneous writes to 'netdev_ops' on
multiple devices, and allows us to remove the now unused static buffer
along with removing the read access. |
| The issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2, macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.5.2, tvOS 26.6, visionOS 26.6, watchOS 26.6. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected process crash. |
| An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.5.2, iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2, macOS Tahoe 26.5.2, tvOS 26.6, visionOS 26.6, watchOS 26.6. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected process crash. |
| Buffer Overflow vulnerability in UTT nv518G nv518GV3v3.2.7-210919-161313 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the gohead/sub_416f28 component |
