| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: pci-epf: Do not complete commands twice if nvmet_req_init() fails
Have nvmet_req_init() and req->execute() complete failed commands.
Description of the problem:
nvmet_req_init() calls __nvmet_req_complete() internally upon failure,
e.g., unsupported opcode, which calls the "queue_response" callback,
this results in nvmet_pci_epf_queue_response() being called, which will
call nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() if data_len is 0 or if dma_dir is
different from DMA_TO_DEVICE. This results in a double completion as
nvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() also calls nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod()
when nvmet_req_init() fails.
Steps to reproduce:
On the host send a command with an unsupported opcode with nvme-cli,
For example the admin command "security receive"
$ sudo nvme security-recv /dev/nvme0n1 -n1 -x4096
This triggers a double completion as nvmet_req_init() fails and
nvmet_pci_epf_queue_response() is called, here iod->dma_dir is still
in the default state of "DMA_NONE" as set by default in
nvmet_pci_epf_alloc_iod(), so nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() is called.
Because nvmet_req_init() failed nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() is also
called in nvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() leading to a double completion.
This not only sends two completions to the host but also corrupts the
state of the PCI NVMe target leading to kernel oops.
This patch lets nvmet_req_init() and req->execute() complete all failed
commands, and removes the double completion case in
nvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() therefore fixing the edge cases where
double completions occurred. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, ktls: Fix data corruption when using bpf_msg_pop_data() in ktls
When sending plaintext data, we initially calculated the corresponding
ciphertext length. However, if we later reduced the plaintext data length
via socket policy, we failed to recalculate the ciphertext length.
This results in transmitting buffers containing uninitialized data during
ciphertext transmission.
This causes uninitialized bytes to be appended after a complete
"Application Data" packet, leading to errors on the receiving end when
parsing TLS record. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: clear initialized flag for deinit-ed srng lists
In a number of cases we see kernel panics on resume due
to ath11k kernel page fault, which happens under the
following circumstances:
1) First ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats() call
Last interrupt received for each group:
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 0 22511ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 1 14440788ms before
[..]
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to receive control response completion, polling..
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: Service connect timeout
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to connect to HTT: -110
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to start core: -110
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: firmware crashed: MHI_CB_EE_RDDM
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: already resetting count 2
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to wait wlan mode request (mode 4): -110
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: qmi failed to send wlan mode off: -110
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to reconfigure driver on crash recovery
[..]
2) At this point reconfiguration fails (we have 2 resets) and
ath11k_core_reconfigure_on_crash() calls ath11k_hal_srng_deinit()
which destroys srng lists. However, it does not reset per-list
->initialized flag.
3) Second ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats() call sees stale ->initialized
flag and attempts to dump srng stats:
Last interrupt received for each group:
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 0 66785ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 1 14485062ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 2 14485062ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 3 14485062ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 4 14780845ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 5 14780845ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 6 14485062ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 7 66814ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 8 68997ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 9 67588ms before
ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 10 69511ms before
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa007404eb010
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10022d067 PMD 100b01067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats+0x2b4/0x3b0 [ath11k]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0xae/0xb0
? page_fault_oops+0x381/0x3e0
? exc_page_fault+0x69/0xa0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats+0x2b4/0x3b0 [ath11k (HASH:6cea 4)]
ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work+0xbd/0x1050 [ath11k (HASH:6cea 4)]
worker_thread+0x389/0x930
kthread+0x149/0x170
Clear per-list ->initialized flag in ath11k_hal_srng_deinit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pptp: ensure minimal skb length in pptp_xmit()
Commit aabc6596ffb3 ("net: ppp: Add bound checking for skb data
on ppp_sync_txmung") fixed ppp_sync_txmunge()
We need a similar fix in pptp_xmit(), otherwise we might
read uninit data as reported by syzbot.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193
pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193
ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2290 [inline]
ppp_input+0x1d6/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2314
pppoe_rcv_core+0x1e8/0x760 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379
sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148
__release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213
release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767
pppoe_sendmsg+0x15d/0xcb0 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:904
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:727
____sys_sendmsg+0x893/0xd80 net/socket.c:2566
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2620
__sys_sendmmsg+0x2d9/0x7c0 net/socket.c:2709 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: libwx: properly reset Rx ring descriptor
When device reset is triggered by feature changes such as toggling Rx
VLAN offload, wx->do_reset() is called to reinitialize Rx rings. The
hardware descriptor ring may retain stale values from previous sessions.
And only set the length to 0 in rx_desc[0] would result in building
malformed SKBs. Fix it to ensure a clean slate after device reset.
[ 549.186435] [ C16] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 549.186457] [ C16] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2814!
[ 549.186468] [ C16] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 549.186472] [ C16] CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/16 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4+ #23 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 549.186476] [ C16] Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7E16/X670E GAMING PLUS WIFI (MS-7E16), BIOS 1.90 12/31/2024
[ 549.186478] [ C16] RIP: 0010:__pskb_pull_tail+0x3ff/0x510
[ 549.186484] [ C16] Code: 06 f0 ff 4f 34 74 7b 4d 8b 8c 24 c8 00 00 00 45 8b 84 24 c0 00 00 00 e9 c8 fd ff ff 48 c7 44 24 08 00 00 00 00 e9 5e fe ff ff <0f> 0b 31 c0 e9 23 90 5b ff 41 f7 c6 ff 0f 00 00 75 bf 49 8b 06 a8
[ 549.186487] [ C16] RSP: 0018:ffffb391c0640d70 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 549.186490] [ C16] RAX: 00000000fffffff2 RBX: ffff8fe7e4d40200 RCX: 00000000fffffff2
[ 549.186492] [ C16] RDX: ffff8fe7c3a4bf8e RSI: 0000000000000180 RDI: ffff8fe7c3a4bf40
[ 549.186494] [ C16] RBP: ffffb391c0640da8 R08: ffff8fe7c3a4c0c0 R09: 000000000000000e
[ 549.186496] [ C16] R10: ffffb391c0640d88 R11: 000000000000000e R12: ffff8fe7e4d40200
[ 549.186497] [ C16] R13: 00000000fffffff2 R14: ffff8fe7fa01a000 R15: 00000000fffffff2
[ 549.186499] [ C16] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8fef5ae40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 549.186502] [ C16] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 549.186503] [ C16] CR2: 00007f77d81d6000 CR3: 000000051a032000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[ 549.186505] [ C16] PKRU: 55555554
[ 549.186507] [ C16] Call Trace:
[ 549.186510] [ C16] <IRQ>
[ 549.186513] [ C16] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 549.186517] [ C16] __skb_pad+0xc7/0xf0
[ 549.186523] [ C16] wx_clean_rx_irq+0x355/0x3b0 [libwx]
[ 549.186533] [ C16] wx_poll+0x92/0x120 [libwx]
[ 549.186540] [ C16] __napi_poll+0x28/0x190
[ 549.186544] [ C16] net_rx_action+0x301/0x3f0
[ 549.186548] [ C16] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 549.186551] [ C16] ? __raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1e/0x50
[ 549.186554] [ C16] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 549.186557] [ C16] ? wake_up_nohz_cpu+0x35/0x160
[ 549.186559] [ C16] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 549.186563] [ C16] handle_softirqs+0xf9/0x2c0
[ 549.186568] [ C16] __irq_exit_rcu+0xc7/0x130
[ 549.186572] [ C16] common_interrupt+0xb8/0xd0
[ 549.186576] [ C16] </IRQ>
[ 549.186577] [ C16] <TASK>
[ 549.186579] [ C16] asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
[ 549.186582] [ C16] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xc2/0x420
[ 549.186585] [ C16] Code: 00 00 e8 11 0e 5e ff e8 ac f0 ff ff 49 89 c5 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 0d ed 5c ff 45 84 ff 0f 85 40 02 00 00 fb 0f 1f 44 00 00 <45> 85 f6 0f 88 84 01 00 00 49 63 d6 48 8d 04 52 48 8d 04 82 49 8d
[ 549.186587] [ C16] RSP: 0018:ffffb391c0277e78 EFLAGS: 00000246
[ 549.186590] [ C16] RAX: ffff8fef5ae40000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 549.186591] [ C16] RDX: 0000007fde0faac5 RSI: ffffffff826e53f6 RDI: ffffffff826fa9b3
[ 549.186593] [ C16] RBP: ffff8fe7c3a20800 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 549.186595] [ C16] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000ffff R12: ffffffff82ed7a40
[ 549.186596] [ C16] R13: 0000007fde0faac5 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 549.186601] [ C16] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xb3/0x420
[ 549.186605] [ C16] cpuidle_en
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: Fix initialization of data for instructions that write to subdevice
Some Comedi subdevice instruction handlers are known to access
instruction data elements beyond the first `insn->n` elements in some
cases. The `do_insn_ioctl()` and `do_insnlist_ioctl()` functions
allocate at least `MIN_SAMPLES` (16) data elements to deal with this,
but they do not initialize all of that. For Comedi instruction codes
that write to the subdevice, the first `insn->n` data elements are
copied from user-space, but the remaining elements are left
uninitialized. That could be a problem if the subdevice instruction
handler reads the uninitialized data. Ensure that the first
`MIN_SAMPLES` elements are initialized before calling these instruction
handlers, filling the uncopied elements with 0. For
`do_insnlist_ioctl()`, the same data buffer elements are used for
handling a list of instructions, so ensure the first `MIN_SAMPLES`
elements are initialized for each instruction that writes to the
subdevice. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix crash due to removal of uninitialised entry
A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack
entry from the hash bucket list:
[exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172]
[..]
#7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack]
#8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack]
#9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack]
[..]
The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in
a partially initialised state:
ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value
(hence crash).
ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected
ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected.
Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore
ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly
allocated but not yet inserted into the hash:
- ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash
- ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow
rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value.
If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED,
__nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry.
Theory is that we did hit following race:
cpu x cpu y cpu z
found entry E found entry E
E is expired <preemption>
nf_ct_delete()
return E to rcu slab
init_conntrack
E is re-inited,
ct->status set to 0
reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev
stores hash value.
cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x.
E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before
checking for expiry and/or confirm bit.
->refcnt set to 1
E now owned by skb
->timeout set to 30000
If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as
expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit.
nf_conntrack_confirm gets called
sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED
This is wrong: E is not yet added
to hashtable.
cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED:
<resumes>
nf_ct_expired()
-> yes (ct->timeout is 30s)
confirmed bit set.
cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable:
nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit
__nf_ct_delete_from_lists
Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash:
cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks:
wait for spinlock held by z
CONFIRMED is set but there is no
guarantee ct will be added to hash:
"chaintoolong" or "clash resolution"
logic both skip the insert step.
reply hnnode.pprev still stores the
hash value.
unlocks spinlock
return NF_DROP
<unblocks, then
crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev>
In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink
E again right away but no crash occurs.
Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence:
ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets
destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy.
To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table
insertion but before the unlock.
Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen
before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and
before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this.
It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right
before the CONFIRMED bit was set:
Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation"
case: the entry will be skipped.
Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit.
The gc sequence is:
1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry
2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry.
3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1.
nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an
expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check pas
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: mhi: ep: Update read pointer only after buffer is written
Inside mhi_ep_ring_add_element, the read pointer (rd_offset) is updated
before the buffer is written, potentially causing race conditions where
the host sees an updated read pointer before the buffer is actually
written. Updating rd_offset prematurely can lead to the host accessing
an uninitialized or incomplete element, resulting in data corruption.
Invoke the buffer write before updating rd_offset to ensure the element
is fully written before signaling its availability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix iteration of extrefs during log replay
At __inode_add_ref() when processing extrefs, if we jump into the next
label we have an undefined value of victim_name.len, since we haven't
initialized it before we did the goto. This results in an invalid memory
access in the next iteration of the loop since victim_name.len was not
initialized to the length of the name of the current extref.
Fix this by initializing victim_name.len with the current extref's name
length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: handle SVC_GARBAGE during svc auth processing as auth error
tianshuo han reported a remotely-triggerable crash if the client sends a
kernel RPC server a specially crafted packet. If decoding the RPC reply
fails in such a way that SVC_GARBAGE is returned without setting the
rq_accept_statp pointer, then that pointer can be dereferenced and a
value stored there.
If it's the first time the thread has processed an RPC, then that
pointer will be set to NULL and the kernel will crash. In other cases,
it could create a memory scribble.
The server sunrpc code treats a SVC_GARBAGE return from svc_authenticate
or pg_authenticate as if it should send a GARBAGE_ARGS reply. RFC 5531
says that if authentication fails that the RPC should be rejected
instead with a status of AUTH_ERR.
Handle a SVC_GARBAGE return as an AUTH_ERROR, with a reason of
AUTH_BADCRED instead of returning GARBAGE_ARGS in that case. This
sidesteps the whole problem of touching the rpc_accept_statp pointer in
this situation and avoids the crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: bpf_iter_scx_dsq_new() should always initialize iterator
BPF programs may call next() and destroy() on BPF iterators even after new()
returns an error value (e.g. bpf_for_each() macro ignores error returns from
new()). bpf_iter_scx_dsq_new() could leave the iterator in an uninitialized
state after an error return causing bpf_iter_scx_dsq_next() to dereference
garbage data. Make bpf_iter_scx_dsq_new() always clear $kit->dsq so that
next() and destroy() become noops. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Fix uninitialized memcache pointer in user_mem_abort()
Commit fce886a60207 ("KVM: arm64: Plumb the pKVM MMU in KVM") made the
initialization of the local memcache variable in user_mem_abort()
conditional, leaving a codepath where it is used uninitialized via
kvm_pgtable_stage2_map().
This can fail on any path that requires a stage-2 allocation
without transition via a permission fault or dirty logging.
Fix this by making sure that memcache is always valid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pds_core: handle unsupported PDS_CORE_CMD_FW_CONTROL result
If the FW doesn't support the PDS_CORE_CMD_FW_CONTROL command
the driver might at the least print garbage and at the worst
crash when the user runs the "devlink dev info" devlink command.
This happens because the stack variable fw_list is not 0
initialized which results in fw_list.num_fw_slots being a
garbage value from the stack. Then the driver tries to access
fw_list.fw_names[i] with i >= ARRAY_SIZE and runs off the end
of the array.
Fix this by initializing the fw_list and by not failing
completely if the devcmd fails because other useful information
is printed via devlink dev info even if the devcmd fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: cmis_cdb: use correct rpl size in ethtool_cmis_module_poll()
rpl is passed as a pointer to ethtool_cmis_module_poll(), so the correct
size of rpl is sizeof(*rpl) which should be just 1 byte. Using the
pointer size instead can cause stack corruption:
Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ethtool_cmis_wait_for_cond+0xf4/0x100
CPU: 72 UID: 0 PID: 4440 Comm: kworker/72:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.11.0 #24
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R760/04GWWM, BIOS 1.6.6 09/20/2023
Workqueue: events module_flash_fw_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
panic+0x339/0x360
? ethtool_cmis_wait_for_cond+0xf4/0x100
? __pfx_status_success+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_status_fail+0x10/0x10
__stack_chk_fail+0x10/0x10
ethtool_cmis_wait_for_cond+0xf4/0x100
ethtool_cmis_cdb_execute_cmd+0x1fc/0x330
? __pfx_status_fail+0x10/0x10
cmis_cdb_module_features_get+0x6d/0xd0
ethtool_cmis_cdb_init+0x8a/0xd0
ethtool_cmis_fw_update+0x46/0x1d0
module_flash_fw_work+0x17/0xa0
process_one_work+0x179/0x390
worker_thread+0x239/0x340
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xcc/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: Initialize ctx to avoid memory allocation error
It is possible that ctx in nfqnl_build_packet_message() could be used
before it is properly initialize, which is only initialized
by nfqnl_get_sk_secctx().
This patch corrects this problem by initializing the lsmctx to a safe
value when it is declared.
This is similar to the commit 35fcac7a7c25
("audit: Initialize lsmctx to avoid memory allocation error"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Unconditionally save+flush host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state
There are several problems with the way hyp code lazily saves the host's
FPSIMD/SVE state, including:
* Host SVE being discarded unexpectedly due to inconsistent
configuration of TIF_SVE and CPACR_ELx.ZEN. This has been seen to
result in QEMU crashes where SVE is used by memmove(), as reported by
Eric Auger:
https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-68997
* Host SVE state is discarded *after* modification by ptrace, which was an
unintentional ptrace ABI change introduced with lazy discarding of SVE state.
* The host FPMR value can be discarded when running a non-protected VM,
where FPMR support is not exposed to a VM, and that VM uses
FPSIMD/SVE. In these cases the hyp code does not save the host's FPMR
before unbinding the host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, leaving a stale
value in memory.
Avoid these by eagerly saving and "flushing" the host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME
state when loading a vCPU such that KVM does not need to save any of the
host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME state. For clarity, fpsimd_kvm_prepare() is
removed and the necessary call to fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state() is
placed in kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(). As 'fpsimd_state' and 'fpmr_ptr'
should not be used, they are set to NULL; all uses of these will be
removed in subsequent patches.
Historical problems go back at least as far as v5.17, e.g. erroneous
assumptions about TIF_SVE being clear in commit:
8383741ab2e773a9 ("KVM: arm64: Get rid of host SVE tracking/saving")
... and so this eager save+flush probably needs to be backported to ALL
stable trees. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix incorrect validation for num_aces field of smb_acl
parse_dcal() validate num_aces to allocate posix_ace_state_array.
if (num_aces > ULONG_MAX / sizeof(struct smb_ace *))
It is an incorrect validation that we can create an array of size ULONG_MAX.
smb_acl has ->size field to calculate actual number of aces in request buffer
size. Use this to check invalid num_aces. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/netfs/read_collect: add to next->prev_donated
If multiple subrequests donate data to the same "next" request
(depending on the subrequest completion order), each of them would
overwrite the `prev_donated` field, causing data corruption and a
BUG() crash ("Can't donate prior to front"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conncount: Fully initialize struct nf_conncount_tuple in insert_tree()
Since commit b36e4523d4d5 ("netfilter: nf_conncount: fix garbage
collection confirm race"), `cpu` and `jiffies32` were introduced to
the struct nf_conncount_tuple.
The commit made nf_conncount_add() initialize `conn->cpu` and
`conn->jiffies32` when allocating the struct.
In contrast, count_tree() was not changed to initialize them.
By commit 34848d5c896e ("netfilter: nf_conncount: Split insert and
traversal"), count_tree() was split and the relevant allocation
code now resides in insert_tree().
Initialize `conn->cpu` and `conn->jiffies32` in insert_tree().
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in find_or_evict net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:117 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __nf_conncount_add+0xd9c/0x2850 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:143
find_or_evict net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:117 [inline]
__nf_conncount_add+0xd9c/0x2850 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:143
count_tree net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:438 [inline]
nf_conncount_count+0x82f/0x1e80 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:521
connlimit_mt+0x7f6/0xbd0 net/netfilter/xt_connlimit.c:72
__nft_match_eval net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:403 [inline]
nft_match_eval+0x1a5/0x300 net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:433
expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:240 [inline]
nft_do_chain+0x426/0x2290 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:288
nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x1a5/0x230 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0xf4/0x400 net/netfilter/core.c:626
nf_hook_slow_list+0x24d/0x860 net/netfilter/core.c:663
NF_HOOK_LIST include/linux/netfilter.h:350 [inline]
ip_sublist_rcv+0x17b7/0x17f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:633
ip_list_rcv+0x9ef/0xa40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:669
__netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5936 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x15c5/0x1670 net/core/dev.c:5983
__netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:6035 [inline]
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1085/0x1700 net/core/dev.c:6126
netif_receive_skb_list+0x5a/0x460 net/core/dev.c:6178
xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:280 [inline]
xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:361 [inline]
bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x2e86/0x3480 net/bpf/test_run.c:390
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xf1d/0x1ae0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1316
bpf_prog_test_run+0x5e5/0xa30 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4407
__sys_bpf+0x6aa/0xd90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5813
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5902 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5900 [inline]
__ia32_sys_bpf+0xa0/0xe0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5900
ia32_sys_call+0x394d/0x4180 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_32.h:358
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xb0/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:387
do_fast_syscall_32+0x38/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:412
do_SYSENTER_32+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/common.c:450
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4121 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4164 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x915/0xe10 mm/slub.c:4171
insert_tree net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:372 [inline]
count_tree net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:450 [inline]
nf_conncount_count+0x1415/0x1e80 net/netfilter/nf_conncount.c:521
connlimit_mt+0x7f6/0xbd0 net/netfilter/xt_connlimit.c:72
__nft_match_eval net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:403 [inline]
nft_match_eval+0x1a5/0x300 net/netfilter/nft_compat.c:433
expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:240 [inline]
nft_do_chain+0x426/0x2290 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:288
nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x1a5/0x230 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0xf4/0x400 net/netfilter/core.c:626
nf_hook_slow_list+0x24d/0x860 net/netfilter/core.c:663
NF_HOOK_LIST include/linux/netfilter.h:350 [inline]
ip_sublist_rcv+0x17b7/0x17f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:633
ip_list_rcv+0x9ef/0xa40 net/ip
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
amdkfd: properly free gang_ctx_bo when failed to init user queue
The destructor of a gtt bo is declared as
void amdgpu_amdkfd_free_gtt_mem(struct amdgpu_device *adev, void **mem_obj);
Which takes void** as the second parameter.
GCC allows passing void* to the function because void* can be implicitly
casted to any other types, so it can pass compiling.
However, passing this void* parameter into the function's
execution process(which expects void** and dereferencing void**)
will result in errors. |
