| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uvc: Initialize frame-based format color matching descriptor
Fix NULL pointer crash in uvcg_framebased_make due to uninitialized color
matching descriptor for frame-based format which was added in
commit f5e7bdd34aca ("usb: gadget: uvc: Allow creating new color matching
descriptors") that added handling for uncompressed and mjpeg format.
Crash is seen when userspace configuration (via configfs) does not
explicitly define the color matching descriptor. If color_matching is not
found, config_group_find_item() returns NULL. The code then jumps to
out_put_cm, where it calls config_item_put(color_matching);. If
color_matching is NULL, this will dereference a null pointer, leading to a
crash.
[ 2.746440] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000008c
[ 2.756273] Mem abort info:
[ 2.760080] ESR = 0x0000000096000005
[ 2.764872] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 2.771068] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 2.771069] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 2.771070] FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
[ 2.771071] Data abort info:
[ 2.771072] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 2.771073] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 2.771074] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 2.771075] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000a3e59000
[ 2.771077] [000000000000008c] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
[ 2.771081] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 2.771084] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 2.771085] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 2.771138] CPU: 7 PID: 486 Comm: ln Tainted: G W E 6.6.58-android15
[ 2.771139] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SunP QRD HDK (DT)
[ 2.771140] pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 2.771141] pc : __uvcg_fill_strm+0x198/0x2cc
[ 2.771145] lr : __uvcg_iter_strm_cls+0xc8/0x17c
[ 2.771146] sp : ffffffc08140bbb0
[ 2.771146] x29: ffffffc08140bbb0 x28: ffffff803bc81380 x27: ffffff8023bbd250
[ 2.771147] x26: ffffff8023bbd250 x25: ffffff803c361348 x24: ffffff803d8e6768
[ 2.771148] x23: 0000000000000004 x22: 0000000000000003 x21: ffffffc08140bc48
[ 2.771149] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffffc08140bc48 x18: ffffffe9f8cf4a00
[ 2.771150] x17: 000000001bf64ec3 x16: 000000001bf64ec3 x15: ffffff8023bbd250
[ 2.771151] x14: 000000000000000f x13: 004c4b40000f4240 x12: 000a2c2a00051615
[ 2.771152] x11: 000000000000004f x10: ffffffe9f76b40ec x9 : ffffffe9f7e389d0
[ 2.771153] x8 : ffffff803d0d31ce x7 : 000f4240000a2c2a x6 : 0005161500028b0a
[ 2.771154] x5 : ffffff803d0d31ce x4 : 0000000000000003 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 2.771155] x2 : ffffffc08140bc50 x1 : ffffffc08140bc48 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 2.771156] Call trace:
[ 2.771157] __uvcg_fill_strm+0x198/0x2cc
[ 2.771157] __uvcg_iter_strm_cls+0xc8/0x17c
[ 2.771158] uvcg_streaming_class_allow_link+0x240/0x290
[ 2.771159] configfs_symlink+0x1f8/0x630
[ 2.771161] vfs_symlink+0x114/0x1a0
[ 2.771163] do_symlinkat+0x94/0x28c
[ 2.771164] __arm64_sys_symlinkat+0x54/0x70
[ 2.771164] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x114
[ 2.771166] el0_svc_common+0x80/0xe0
[ 2.771168] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[ 2.771169] el0_svc+0x3c/0x70
[ 2.771172] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xbc
[ 2.771173] el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac
Initialize color matching descriptor for frame-based format to prevent
NULL pointer crash by mirroring the handling done for uncompressed and
mjpeg formats. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hns: Fix double destruction of rsv_qp
rsv_qp may be double destroyed in error flow, first in free_mr_init(),
and then in hns_roce_exit(). Fix it by moving the free_mr_init() call
into hns_roce_v2_init().
list_del corruption, ffff589732eb9b50->next is LIST_POISON1 (dead000000000100)
WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 1047115 at lib/list_debug.c:53 __list_del_entry_valid+0x148/0x240
...
Call trace:
__list_del_entry_valid+0x148/0x240
hns_roce_qp_remove+0x4c/0x3f0 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_v2_destroy_qp_common+0x1dc/0x5f4 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_v2_destroy_qp+0x22c/0x46c [hns_roce_hw_v2]
free_mr_exit+0x6c/0x120 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_v2_exit+0x170/0x200 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_exit+0x118/0x350 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
__hns_roce_hw_v2_init_instance+0x1c8/0x304 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify_init+0x170/0x21c [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify+0x6c/0x190 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hclge_notify_roce_client+0x6c/0x160 [hclge]
hclge_reset_rebuild+0x150/0x5c0 [hclge]
hclge_reset+0x10c/0x140 [hclge]
hclge_reset_subtask+0x80/0x104 [hclge]
hclge_reset_service_task+0x168/0x3ac [hclge]
hclge_service_task+0x50/0x100 [hclge]
process_one_work+0x250/0x9a0
worker_thread+0x324/0x990
kthread+0x190/0x210
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
neighbour: Fix null-ptr-deref in neigh_flush_dev().
kernel test robot reported null-ptr-deref in neigh_flush_dev(). [0]
The cited commit introduced per-netdev neighbour list and converted
neigh_flush_dev() to use it instead of the global hash table.
One thing we missed is that neigh_table_clear() calls neigh_ifdown()
with NULL dev.
Let's restore the hash table iteration.
Note that IPv6 module is no longer unloadable, so neigh_table_clear()
is called only when IPv6 fails to initialise, which is unlikely to
happen.
[0]:
IPv6: Attempt to unregister permanent protocol 136
IPv6: Attempt to unregister permanent protocol 17
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000001a0: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000d00-0x0000000000000d07]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G T 6.12.0-rc6-01246-gf7f52738637f #1
Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:neigh_flush_dev.llvm.6395807810224103582+0x52/0x570
Code: c1 e8 03 42 8a 04 38 84 c0 0f 85 15 05 00 00 31 c0 41 83 3e 0a 0f 94 c0 48 8d 1c c3 48 81 c3 f8 0c 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 38 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 f7 49 93 fe 4c 8b 3b 4d 85 ff 0f
RSP: 0000:ffff88810026f408 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 00000000000001a0 RBX: 0000000000000d00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffc0631640
RBP: ffff88810026f470 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc0625250 R14: ffffffffc0631640 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f575cb83940(0000) GS:ffff8883aee00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f575db40008 CR3: 00000002bf936000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__neigh_ifdown.llvm.6395807810224103582+0x44/0x390
neigh_table_clear+0xb1/0x268
ndisc_cleanup+0x21/0x38 [ipv6]
init_module+0x2f5/0x468 [ipv6]
do_one_initcall+0x1ba/0x628
do_init_module+0x21a/0x530
load_module+0x2550/0x2ea0
__se_sys_finit_module+0x3d2/0x620
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x76/0x88
x64_sys_call+0x7ff/0xde8
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x1e8
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
RIP: 0033:0x7f575d6f2719
Code: 08 89 e8 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d b7 06 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff82a2a268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557827b45310 RCX: 00007f575d6f2719
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f575d584efd RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f575d584efd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000557827b47b00
R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000557827b470e0 R15: 00007f575dbb4270
</TASK>
Modules linked in: ipv6(+) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: ti: j721e-csi2rx: fix list_del corruption
If ti_csi2rx_start_dma() fails in ti_csi2rx_dma_callback(), the buffer is
marked done with VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR but is not removed from the DMA queue.
This causes the same buffer to be retried in the next iteration, resulting
in a double list_del() and eventual list corruption.
Fix this by removing the buffer from the queue before calling
vb2_buffer_done() on error.
This resolves a crash due to list_del corruption:
[ 37.811243] j721e-csi2rx 30102000.ticsi2rx: Failed to queue the next buffer for DMA
[ 37.832187] slab kmalloc-2k start ffff00000255b000 pointer offset 1064 size 2048
[ 37.839761] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ffff00000255bc28, but was ffff00000255d428. (next=ffff00000255b428)
[ 37.850799] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 37.855424] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:65!
[ 37.859876] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
[ 37.866061] Modules linked in: i2c_dev usb_f_rndis u_ether libcomposite dwc3 udc_core usb_common aes_ce_blk aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul sha1_ce cpufreq_dt dwc3_am62 phy_gmii_sel sa2ul
[ 37.882830] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3+ #28 VOLUNTARY
[ 37.890851] Hardware name: Bosch STLA-GSRV2-B0 (DT)
[ 37.895737] pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 37.902703] pc : __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xdc/0x114
[ 37.908390] lr : __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xdc/0x114
[ 37.914059] sp : ffff800080003db0
[ 37.917375] x29: ffff800080003db0 x28: 0000000000000007 x27: ffff800080e50000
[ 37.924521] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000016abb50 x24: dead000000000122
[ 37.931666] x23: ffff0000016abb78 x22: ffff0000016ab080 x21: ffff800080003de0
[ 37.938810] x20: ffff00000255bc00 x19: ffff00000255b800 x18: 000000000000000a
[ 37.945956] x17: 20747562202c3832 x16: 6362353532303030 x15: 0720072007200720
[ 37.953101] x14: 0720072007200720 x13: 0720072007200720 x12: 00000000ffffffea
[ 37.960248] x11: ffff800080003b18 x10: 00000000ffffefff x9 : ffff800080f5b568
[ 37.967396] x8 : ffff800080f5b5c0 x7 : 0000000000017fe8 x6 : c0000000ffffefff
[ 37.974542] x5 : ffff00000fea6688 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 37.981686] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff800080ef2b40 x0 : 000000000000006d
[ 37.988832] Call trace:
[ 37.991281] __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xdc/0x114 (P)
[ 37.996959] ti_csi2rx_dma_callback+0x84/0x1c4
[ 38.001419] udma_vchan_complete+0x1e0/0x344
[ 38.005705] tasklet_action_common+0x118/0x310
[ 38.010163] tasklet_action+0x30/0x3c
[ 38.013832] handle_softirqs+0x10c/0x2e0
[ 38.017761] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20
[ 38.021256] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x20
[ 38.024931] call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x60
[ 38.028873] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 38.033064] __irq_exit_rcu+0x130/0x15c
[ 38.036909] irq_exit_rcu+0x10/0x20
[ 38.040403] el1_interrupt+0x38/0x60
[ 38.043987] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
[ 38.048091] el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
[ 38.051501] default_idle_call+0x34/0xe0 (P)
[ 38.055783] do_idle+0x1f8/0x250
[ 38.059021] cpu_startup_entry+0x34/0x3c
[ 38.062951] rest_init+0xb4/0xc0
[ 38.066186] console_on_rootfs+0x0/0x6c
[ 38.070031] __primary_switched+0x88/0x90
[ 38.074059] Code: b00037e0 91378000 f9400462 97e9bf49 (d4210000)
[ 38.080168] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 38.084795] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 38.092197] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 38.096139] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 38.099631] CPU features: 0x0000,00002000,02000801,0400420b
[ 38.105202] Memory Limit: none
[ 38.108260] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: avoid NULL dereference when RX problematic packet on unsupported 6 GHz band
With a quite rare chance, RX report might be problematic to make SW think
a packet is received on 6 GHz band even if the chip does not support 6 GHz
band actually. Since SW won't initialize stuffs for unsupported bands, NULL
dereference will happen then in the sequence, rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter() ->
rtw89_core_cancel_6ghz_probe_tx(). So, add a check to avoid it.
The following is a crash log for this case.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000032
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 1907 Comm: irq/131-rtw89_p Tainted: G U 6.6.56-05896-g89f5fb0eb30b #1 (HASH:1400 4)
Hardware name: Google Telith/Telith, BIOS Google_Telith.15217.747.0 11/12/2024
RIP: 0010:rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter+0xd2/0x310 [rtw89_core]
Code: 4c 89 7d c8 48 89 55 c0 49 8d 44 24 02 48 89 45 b8 45 31 ff eb 11
41 c6 45 3a 01 41 b7 01 4d 8b 6d 00 4d 39 f5 74 42 8b 43 10 <41> 33 45
32 0f b7 4b 14 66 41 33 4d 36 0f b7 c9 09 c1 74 d8 4d 85
RSP: 0018:ffff9f3080138ca0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000b8bf5770 RBX: ffff91b5e8c639c0 RCX: 0000000000000011
RDX: ffff91b582de1be8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff91b5e8c639e6
RBP: ffff9f3080138d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff91b59de70000 R11: ffffffffc069be50 R12: ffff91b5e8c639e4
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff91b5828020b8 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff91b8efa40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000032 CR3: 00000002bf838000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? __die_body+0x68/0xb0
? page_fault_oops+0x379/0x3e0
? exc_page_fault+0x4f/0xa0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? __pfx_rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)]
? rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter+0xd2/0x310 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)]
__iterate_interfaces+0x59/0x110 [mac80211 (HASH:1400 6)]
? __pfx_rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)]
? __pfx_rtw89_vif_rx_stats_iter+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)]
ieee80211_iterate_active_interfaces_atomic+0x36/0x50 [mac80211 (HASH:1400 6)]
rtw89_core_rx_to_mac80211+0xfd/0x1b0 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)]
rtw89_core_rx+0x43a/0x980 [rtw89_core (HASH:1400 5)] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: add a retry logic in net6_rt_notify()
inet6_rt_notify() can be called under RCU protection only.
This means the route could be changed concurrently
and rt6_fill_node() could return -EMSGSIZE.
Re-size the skb when this happens and retry, removing
one WARN_ON() that syzbot was able to trigger:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 6291 at net/ipv6/route.c:6342 inet6_rt_notify+0x475/0x4b0 net/ipv6/route.c:6342
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 6291 Comm: syz.0.77 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:inet6_rt_notify+0x475/0x4b0 net/ipv6/route.c:6342
Code: fc ff ff e8 6d 52 ea f7 e9 47 fc ff ff 48 8b 7c 24 08 4c 89 04 24 e8 5a 52 ea f7 4c 8b 04 24 e9 94 fd ff ff e8 9c fe 84 f7 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 bd fd ff ff e8 6e 52 ea f7 e9 bb fb ff ff 48 89 df e8
RSP: 0018:ffffc900035cf1d8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc900035cf540 RCX: ffffffff8a36e790
RDX: ffff88802f7e8000 RSI: ffffffff8a36e9d4 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: ffff88803c230f00 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 00000000ffffffa6
R10: 00000000ffffffa6 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 00000000ffffffa6
R13: 0000000000000900 R14: ffff888032ea4100 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fac7b89a6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880d6a20000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fac7b899f98 CR3: 0000000034b3f000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ip6_route_mpath_notify+0xde/0x280 net/ipv6/route.c:5356
ip6_route_multipath_add+0x1181/0x1bd0 net/ipv6/route.c:5536
inet6_rtm_newroute+0xe4/0x1a0 net/ipv6/route.c:5647
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x95e/0xe90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6944
netlink_rcv_skb+0x155/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2552
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1320 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x58d/0x850 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1346
netlink_sendmsg+0x8d1/0xdd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1896
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:727 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0xa95/0xc70 net/socket.c:2566
___sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2620 |
| The YoSmart YoLink API through 2025-10-02 uses an endpoint URL that is derived from a device's MAC address along with an MD5 hash of non-secret information, such as a key that begins with cf50. |
| ESF-IDF is the Espressif Internet of Things (IOT) Development Framework. In versions 5.5.1, 5.4.3, and 5.3.4, when the ESP32-P4 uses its hardware JPEG decoder, the software parser lacks necessary validation checks. A specially crafted (malicious) JPEG image could exploit the parsing routine and trigger an out-of-bounds array access. This issue has been fixed in versions 5.5.2, 5.4.4, and 5.3.5. At time of publication versions 5.5.2, 5.4.4, and 5.3.5 have not been released but are fixed respectively in commits 4b8f585, c79cb4d, and 34e2726. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: Fix link speed calculation on retrain failure
When pcie_failed_link_retrain() fails to retrain, it tries to revert to the
previous link speed. However it calculates that speed from the Link
Control 2 register without masking out non-speed bits first.
PCIE_LNKCTL2_TLS2SPEED() converts such incorrect values to
PCI_SPEED_UNKNOWN (0xff), which in turn causes a WARN splat in
pcie_set_target_speed():
pci 0000:00:01.1: [1022:14ed] type 01 class 0x060400 PCIe Root Port
pci 0000:00:01.1: broken device, retraining non-functional downstream link at 2.5GT/s
pci 0000:00:01.1: retraining failed
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/pcie/bwctrl.c:168 pcie_set_target_speed
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000000000ff RDI: ffff9acd82efa000
pcie_failed_link_retrain
pci_device_add
pci_scan_single_device
Mask out the non-speed bits in PCIE_LNKCTL2_TLS2SPEED() and
PCIE_LNKCAP_SLS2SPEED() so they don't incorrectly return PCI_SPEED_UNKNOWN.
[bhelgaas: commit log, add details from https://lore.kernel.org/r/1c92ef6bcb314ee6977839b46b393282e4f52e74.1750684771.git.lukas@wunner.de] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: caam - Prevent crash on suspend with iMX8QM / iMX8ULP
Since the CAAM on these SoCs is managed by another ARM core, called the
SECO (Security Controller) on iMX8QM and Secure Enclave on iMX8ULP, which
also reserves access to register page 0 suspend operations cannot touch
this page.
This is similar to when running OPTEE, where OPTEE will reserve page 0.
Track this situation using a new state variable no_page0, reflecting if
page 0 is reserved elsewhere, either by other management cores in SoC or
by OPTEE.
Replace the optee_en check in suspend/resume with the new check.
optee_en cannot go away as it's needed elsewhere to gate OPTEE specific
situations.
Fixes the following splat at suspend:
Internal error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000010 [#1] SMP
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP ACU6C (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : readl+0x0/0x18
lr : rd_reg32+0x18/0x3c
sp : ffffffc08192ba20
x29: ffffffc08192ba20 x28: ffffff8025190000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffffc0808ae808 x25: ffffffc080922338 x24: ffffff8020e89090
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffffc080922000 x21: ffffff8020e89010
x20: ffffffc080387ef8 x19: ffffff8020e89010 x18: 000000005d8000d5
x17: 0000000030f35963 x16: 000000008f785f3f x15: 000000003b8ef57c
x14: 00000000c418aef8 x13: 00000000f5fea526 x12: 0000000000000001
x11: 0000000000000002 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : ffffff8025190870 x7 : ffffff8021726880 x6 : 0000000000000002
x5 : ffffff80217268f0 x4 : ffffff8021726880 x3 : ffffffc081200000
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffffff8020e89010 x0 : ffffffc081200004
Call trace:
readl+0x0/0x18
caam_ctrl_suspend+0x30/0xdc
dpm_run_callback.constprop.0+0x24/0x5c
device_suspend+0x170/0x2e8
dpm_suspend+0xa0/0x104
dpm_suspend_start+0x48/0x50
suspend_devices_and_enter+0x7c/0x45c
pm_suspend+0x148/0x160
state_store+0xb4/0xf8
kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24
sysfs_kf_write+0x38/0x48
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xb4/0x178
vfs_write+0x118/0x178
ksys_write+0x6c/0xd0
__arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x1c
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x64/0xb0
do_el0_svc+0x90/0xb0
el0_svc+0x18/0x44
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0x124
el0t_64_sync+0x150/0x154
Code: 88dffc21 88dffc21 5ac00800 d65f03c0 (b9400000) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: add NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params
Normally, x->replay_esn and x->preplay_esn should be allocated at
xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(...) in xfrm_state_construct(...), hence the
xfrm_update_ae_params(...) is okay to update them. However, the current
implementation of xfrm_new_ae(...) allows a malicious user to directly
dereference a NULL pointer and crash the kernel like below.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 8253067 P4D 8253067 PUD 8e0e067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: poc.npd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1 #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.o4
RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140
Code: e8 4c 89 5f e0 48 8d 7f e0 73 d2 83 c2 20 48 29 d6 48 29 d7 83 fa 10 72 34 4c 8b 06 4c 8b 4e 08 c
RSP: 0018:ffff888008f57658 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888008bd0000 RCX: ffffffff8238e571
RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff888007f64844 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888008f57818
R13: ffff888007f64aa4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00000000014013c0(0000) GS:ffff88806d600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000054d8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x1f/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x1e8/0x500
? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40
? fixup_exception+0x36/0x460
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40
? exc_page_fault+0x5e/0xc0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? xfrm_update_ae_params+0xd1/0x260
? memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10
xfrm_update_ae_params+0xe7/0x260
xfrm_new_ae+0x298/0x4e0
? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x25a/0x410
? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210
? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0
? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70
? __stack_depot_save+0x39/0x4e0
? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190
? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340
? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660
? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0
? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0
? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
? copyout+0x3e/0x50
netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210
? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10
? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50
netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0
? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10
? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660
netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700
This Null-ptr-deref bug is assigned CVE-2023-3772. And this commit
adds additional NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params to fix the NPD. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: fix race in sock_map_free()
sock_map_free() calls release_sock(sk) without owning a reference
on the socket. This can cause use-after-free as syzbot found [1]
Jakub Sitnicki already took care of a similar issue
in sock_hash_free() in commit 75e68e5bf2c7 ("bpf, sockhash:
Synchronize delete from bucket list on map free")
[1]
refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3785 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1a0 lib/refcount.c:31
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3785 Comm: kworker/u4:6 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-syzkaller-00103-gef4d3ea40565 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1a0 lib/refcount.c:31
Code: 68 8b 31 c0 e8 75 71 15 fd 0f 0b e9 64 ff ff ff e8 d9 6e 4e fd c6 05 62 9c 3d 0a 01 48 c7 c7 80 bb 68 8b 31 c0 e8 54 71 15 fd <0f> 0b e9 43 ff ff ff 89 d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 c1 0f 8c a2 fe ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000456fb60 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: eae59bab72dcd700 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: ffff8880207057c0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000201 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: ffffffff816fdabd R09: fffff520008adee5
R10: fffff520008adee5 R11: 1ffff920008adee4 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88807b1c6c00 R15: 1ffff1100f638dcf
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b30c30000 CR3: 000000000d08e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:344 [inline]
refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:359 [inline]
__sock_put include/net/sock.h:779 [inline]
tcp_release_cb+0x2d0/0x360 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1092
release_sock+0xaf/0x1c0 net/core/sock.c:3468
sock_map_free+0x219/0x2c0 net/core/sock_map.c:356
process_one_work+0x81c/0xd10 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0xb14/0x1330 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x266/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential stack-out-of-bounds in brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds()
This patch fixes a stack-out-of-bounds read in brcmfmac that occurs
when 'buf' that is not null-terminated is passed as an argument of
strsep() in brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds(). This buffer is filled with a firmware
version string by memcpy() in brcmf_fil_iovar_data_get().
The patch ensures buf is null-terminated.
Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
[ 47.569679][ T1897] brcmfmac: brcmf_fw_alloc_request: using brcm/brcmfmac43236b for chip BCM43236/3
[ 47.582839][ T1897] brcmfmac: brcmf_c_process_clm_blob: no clm_blob available (err=-2), device may have limited channels available
[ 47.601565][ T1897] ==================================================================
[ 47.602574][ T1897] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0
[ 47.603447][ T1897] Read of size 1 at addr ffffc90001f6f000 by task kworker/0:2/1897
[ 47.604336][ T1897]
[ 47.604621][ T1897] CPU: 0 PID: 1897 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G O 5.14.0+ #131
[ 47.605617][ T1897] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 47.606907][ T1897] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
[ 47.607453][ T1897] Call Trace:
[ 47.607801][ T1897] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd1
[ 47.608295][ T1897] print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x334
[ 47.609009][ T1897] ? strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0
[ 47.609434][ T1897] ? strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0
[ 47.609863][ T1897] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
[ 47.610366][ T1897] ? strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0
[ 47.610882][ T1897] strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0
[ 47.611300][ T1897] ? brcmf_fil_iovar_data_get+0x3a/0xf0
[ 47.611883][ T1897] brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds+0x995/0xc40
[ 47.612434][ T1897] ? brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default+0x100/0x100
[ 47.613078][ T1897] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
[ 47.613662][ T1897] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
[ 47.614208][ T1897] ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4e0
[ 47.614704][ T1897] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
[ 47.615236][ T1897] ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1a7/0x260
[ 47.615741][ T1897] ? brcmf_usb_rx_fill_all+0x5a/0xf0
[ 47.616288][ T1897] brcmf_attach+0x246/0xd40
[ 47.616758][ T1897] ? wiphy_new_nm+0x1703/0x1dd0
[ 47.617280][ T1897] ? kmemdup+0x43/0x50
[ 47.617720][ T1897] brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690
[ 47.618244][ T1897] ? brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x470/0x470
[ 47.618901][ T1897] usb_probe_interface+0x2aa/0x760
[ 47.619429][ T1897] ? usb_probe_device+0x250/0x250
[ 47.619950][ T1897] really_probe+0x205/0xb70
[ 47.620435][ T1897] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130
[ 47.621048][ T1897] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0
[ 47.621595][ T1897] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130
[ 47.622209][ T1897] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x150
[ 47.622739][ T1897] __device_attach_driver+0x1cc/0x2a0
[ 47.623287][ T1897] bus_for_each_drv+0x156/0x1d0
[ 47.623796][ T1897] ? bus_rescan_devices+0x30/0x30
[ 47.624309][ T1897] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
[ 47.624907][ T1897] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x46/0x160
[ 47.625437][ T1897] __device_attach+0x23f/0x3a0
[ 47.625924][ T1897] ? device_bind_driver+0xd0/0xd0
[ 47.626433][ T1897] ? kobject_uevent_env+0x287/0x14b0
[ 47.627057][ T1897] bus_probe_device+0x1da/0x290
[ 47.627557][ T1897] device_add+0xb7b/0x1eb0
[ 47.628027][ T1897] ? wait_for_completion+0x290/0x290
[ 47.628593][ T1897] ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x5a0/0x5a0
[ 47.629249][ T1897] usb_set_configuration+0xf59/0x16f0
[ 47.629829][ T1897] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x82/0xa0
[ 47.630385][ T1897] usb_probe_device+0xbb/0x250
[ 47.630927][ T1897] ? usb_suspend+0x590/0x590
[ 47.631397][ T1897] really_probe+0x205/0xb70
[ 47.631855][ T1897] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130
[ 47.632469][ T1897] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0
[ 47.633002][
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix calltrace warning in amddrm_buddy_fini
The following call trace is observed when removing the amdgpu driver, which
is caused by that BOs allocated for psp are not freed until removing.
[61811.450562] RIP: 0010:amddrm_buddy_fini.cold+0x29/0x47 [amddrm_buddy]
[61811.450577] Call Trace:
[61811.450577] <TASK>
[61811.450579] amdgpu_vram_mgr_fini+0x135/0x1c0 [amdgpu]
[61811.450728] amdgpu_ttm_fini+0x207/0x290 [amdgpu]
[61811.450870] amdgpu_bo_fini+0x27/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[61811.451012] gmc_v9_0_sw_fini+0x4a/0x60 [amdgpu]
[61811.451166] amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x117/0x520 [amdgpu]
[61811.451306] amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x16/0x30 [amdgpu]
[61811.451447] devm_drm_dev_init_release+0x4d/0x80 [drm]
[61811.451466] devm_action_release+0x15/0x20
[61811.451469] release_nodes+0x40/0xb0
[61811.451471] devres_release_all+0x9b/0xd0
[61811.451473] __device_release_driver+0x1bb/0x2a0
[61811.451476] driver_detach+0xf3/0x140
[61811.451479] bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xf0
[61811.451481] driver_unregister+0x31/0x60
[61811.451483] pci_unregister_driver+0x40/0x90
[61811.451486] amdgpu_exit+0x15/0x447 [amdgpu]
For smu v13_0_2, if the GPU supports xgmi, refer to
commit f5c7e7797060 ("drm/amdgpu: Adjust removal control flow for smu v13_0_2"),
it will run gpu recover in AMDGPU_RESET_FOR_DEVICE_REMOVE mode when removing,
which makes all devices in hive list have hw reset but no resume except the
basic ip blocks, then other ip blocks will not call .hw_fini according to
ip_block.status.hw.
Since psp_free_shared_bufs just includes some software operations, so move
it to psp_sw_fini. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lapbether: ignore ops-locked netdevs
Syzkaller managed to trigger lock dependency in xsk_notify via
register_netdevice. As discussed in [0], using register_netdevice
in the notifiers is problematic so skip adding lapbeth for ops-locked
devices.
xsk_notifier+0xa4/0x280 net/xdp/xsk.c:1645
notifier_call_chain+0xbc/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:2230
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2268 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2282 [inline]
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xf9d/0x2700 net/core/dev.c:12077
unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:12140 [inline]
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x305/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:11984
register_netdevice+0x18f1/0x2270 net/core/dev.c:11149
lapbeth_new_device drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:420 [inline]
lapbeth_device_event+0x5b1/0xbe0 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:462
notifier_call_chain+0xbc/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:2230
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2268 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2282 [inline]
__dev_notify_flags+0x12c/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:9497
netif_change_flags+0x108/0x160 net/core/dev.c:9526
dev_change_flags+0xba/0x250 net/core/dev_api.c:68
devinet_ioctl+0x11d5/0x1f50 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1200
inet_ioctl+0x3a7/0x3f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1001
0: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250625140357.6203d0af@kernel.org/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: improve shutdown sequence
Alexander Sverdlin presents 2 problems during shutdown with the
lan9303 driver. One is specific to lan9303 and the other just happens
to reproduce there.
The first problem is that lan9303 is unique among DSA drivers in that it
calls dev_get_drvdata() at "arbitrary runtime" (not probe, not shutdown,
not remove):
phy_state_machine()
-> ...
-> dsa_user_phy_read()
-> ds->ops->phy_read()
-> lan9303_phy_read()
-> chip->ops->phy_read()
-> lan9303_mdio_phy_read()
-> dev_get_drvdata()
But we never stop the phy_state_machine(), so it may continue to run
after dsa_switch_shutdown(). Our common pattern in all DSA drivers is
to set drvdata to NULL to suppress the remove() method that may come
afterwards. But in this case it will result in an NPD.
The second problem is that the way in which we set
dp->conduit->dsa_ptr = NULL; is concurrent with receive packet
processing. dsa_switch_rcv() checks once whether dev->dsa_ptr is NULL,
but afterwards, rather than continuing to use that non-NULL value,
dev->dsa_ptr is dereferenced again and again without NULL checks:
dsa_conduit_find_user() and many other places. In between dereferences,
there is no locking to ensure that what was valid once continues to be
valid.
Both problems have the common aspect that closing the conduit interface
solves them.
In the first case, dev_close(conduit) triggers the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN
event in dsa_user_netdevice_event() which closes user ports as well.
dsa_port_disable_rt() calls phylink_stop(), which synchronously stops
the phylink state machine, and ds->ops->phy_read() will thus no longer
call into the driver after this point.
In the second case, dev_close(conduit) should do this, as per
Documentation/networking/driver.rst:
| Quiescence
| ----------
|
| After the ndo_stop routine has been called, the hardware must
| not receive or transmit any data. All in flight packets must
| be aborted. If necessary, poll or wait for completion of
| any reset commands.
So it should be sufficient to ensure that later, when we zeroize
conduit->dsa_ptr, there will be no concurrent dsa_switch_rcv() call
on this conduit.
The addition of the netif_device_detach() function is to ensure that
ioctls, rtnetlinks and ethtool requests on the user ports no longer
propagate down to the driver - we're no longer prepared to handle them.
The race condition actually did not exist when commit 0650bf52b31f
("net: dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown")
first introduced dsa_switch_shutdown(). It was created later, when we
stopped unregistering the user interfaces from a bad spot, and we just
replaced that sequence with a racy zeroization of conduit->dsa_ptr
(one which doesn't ensure that the interfaces aren't up). |
| A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in ActFax Server version 5.01. The server's RAW protocol interface fails to safely process user-supplied data in @F506 fax header fields due to insecure usage of strcpy. Remote attackers can exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted @F506 fields, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. Successful exploitation requires network access to TCP port 4559 and does not require authentication. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: check stream id dml21 wrapper to get plane_id
[Why & How]
Fix a false positive warning which occurs due to lack of correct checks
when querying plane_id in DML21. This fixes the warning when performing a
mode1 reset (cat /sys/kernel/debug/dri/1/amdgpu_gpu_recover):
[ 35.751250] WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 326 at /tmp/amd.PHpyAl7v/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dml2/dml2_dc_resource_mgmt.c:91 dml2_map_dc_pipes+0x243d/0x3f40 [amdgpu]
[ 35.751434] Modules linked in: amdgpu(OE) amddrm_ttm_helper(OE) amdttm(OE) amddrm_buddy(OE) amdxcp(OE) amddrm_exec(OE) amd_sched(OE) amdkcl(OE) drm_suballoc_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_display_helper cec rc_core i2c_algo_bit rfcomm qrtr cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep amd_atl intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel edac_mce_amd snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec kvm_amd snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm kvm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi crct10dif_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic btusb ghash_clmulni_intel sha256_ssse3 btrtl sha1_ssse3 snd_seq btintel aesni_intel btbcm btmtk snd_seq_device crypto_simd sunrpc cryptd bluetooth snd_timer ccp binfmt_misc rapl snd i2c_piix4 wmi_bmof gigabyte_wmi k10temp i2c_smbus soundcore gpio_amdpt mac_hid sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore nfnetlink dmi_sysfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid crc32_pclmul igc ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_pci_renesas video wmi
[ 35.751501] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kworker/u64:9 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0-21-generic #21~24.04.1-Ubuntu
[ 35.751504] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[ 35.751505] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X670E AORUS PRO X/X670E AORUS PRO X, BIOS F30 05/22/2024
[ 35.751506] Workqueue: amdgpu-reset-dev amdgpu_debugfs_reset_work [amdgpu]
[ 35.751638] RIP: 0010:dml2_map_dc_pipes+0x243d/0x3f40 [amdgpu]
[ 35.751794] Code: 6d 0c 00 00 8b 84 24 88 00 00 00 41 3b 44 9c 20 0f 84 fc 07 00 00 48 83 c3 01 48 83 fb 06 75 b3 4c 8b 64 24 68 4c 8b 6c 24 40 <0f> 0b b8 06 00 00 00 49 8b 94 24 a0 49 00 00 89 c3 83 f8 07 0f 87
[ 35.751796] RSP: 0018:ffffbfa3805d7680 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 35.751798] RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 35.751799] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 35.751800] RBP: ffffbfa3805d78f0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 35.751801] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffbfa383249000
[ 35.751802] R13: ffffa0e68f280000 R14: ffffbfa383249658 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 35.751803] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0edbe580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 35.751804] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 35.751805] CR2: 00005d847ef96c58 CR3: 000000041de3e000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
[ 35.751806] PKRU: 55555554
[ 35.751807] Call Trace:
[ 35.751810] <TASK>
[ 35.751816] ? show_regs+0x6c/0x80
[ 35.751820] ? __warn+0x88/0x140
[ 35.751822] ? dml2_map_dc_pipes+0x243d/0x3f40 [amdgpu]
[ 35.751964] ? report_bug+0x182/0x1b0
[ 35.751969] ? handle_bug+0x6e/0xb0
[ 35.751972] ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x80
[ 35.751974] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[ 35.751978] ? dml2_map_dc_pipes+0x243d/0x3f40 [amdgpu]
[ 35.752117] ? math_pow+0x48/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[ 35.752256] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 35.752260] ? math_pow+0x48/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[ 35.752400] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 35.752403] ? math_pow+0x11/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[ 35.752524] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 35.752526] ? core_dcn4_mode_programming+0xe4d/0x20d0 [amdgpu]
[ 35.752663] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 35.752669] dml21_validate+0x3d4/0x980 [amdgpu]
(cherry picked from commit f8ad62c0a93e5dd94243e10f1b742232e4d6411e) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soundwire: revisit driver bind/unbind and callbacks
In the SoundWire probe, we store a pointer from the driver ops into
the 'slave' structure. This can lead to kernel oopses when unbinding
codec drivers, e.g. with the following sequence to remove machine
driver and codec driver.
/sbin/modprobe -r snd_soc_sof_sdw
/sbin/modprobe -r snd_soc_rt711
The full details can be found in the BugLink below, for reference the
two following examples show different cases of driver ops/callbacks
being invoked after the driver .remove().
kernel: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000150
kernel: Workqueue: events cdns_update_slave_status_work [soundwire_cadence]
kernel: RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x19/0x30
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: ? sdw_handle_slave_status+0x426/0xe00 [soundwire_bus 94ff184bf398570c3f8ff7efe9e32529f532e4ae]
kernel: ? newidle_balance+0x26a/0x400
kernel: ? cdns_update_slave_status_work+0x1e9/0x200 [soundwire_cadence 1bcf98eebe5ba9833cd433323769ac923c9c6f82]
kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc07654c8
kernel: Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work
kernel: RIP: 0010:sdw_bus_prep_clk_stop+0x6f/0x160 [soundwire_bus]
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: <TASK>
kernel: sdw_cdns_clock_stop+0xb5/0x1b0 [soundwire_cadence 1bcf98eebe5ba9833cd433323769ac923c9c6f82]
kernel: intel_suspend_runtime+0x5f/0x120 [soundwire_intel aca858f7c87048d3152a4a41bb68abb9b663a1dd]
kernel: ? dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x60
This was not detected earlier in Intel tests since the tests first
remove the parent PCI device and shut down the bus. The sequence
above is a corner case which keeps the bus operational but without a
driver bound.
While trying to solve this kernel oopses, it became clear that the
existing SoundWire bus does not deal well with the unbind case.
Commit 528be501b7d4a ("soundwire: sdw_slave: add probe_complete structure and new fields")
added a 'probed' status variable and a 'probe_complete'
struct completion. This status is however not reset on remove and
likewise the 'probe complete' is not re-initialized, so the
bind/unbind/bind test cases would fail. The timeout used before the
'update_status' callback was also a bad idea in hindsight, there
should really be no timing assumption as to if and when a driver is
bound to a device.
An initial draft was based on device_lock() and device_unlock() was
tested. This proved too complicated, with deadlocks created during the
suspend-resume sequences, which also use the same device_lock/unlock()
as the bind/unbind sequences. On a CometLake device, a bad DSDT/BIOS
caused spurious resumes and the use of device_lock() caused hangs
during suspend. After multiple weeks or testing and painful
reverse-engineering of deadlocks on different devices, we looked for
alternatives that did not interfere with the device core.
A bus notifier was used successfully to keep track of DRIVER_BOUND and
DRIVER_UNBIND events. This solved the bind-unbind-bind case in tests,
but it can still be defeated with a theoretical corner case where the
memory is freed by a .remove while the callback is in use. The
notifier only helps make sure the driver callbacks are valid, but not
that the memory allocated in probe remains valid while the callbacks
are invoked.
This patch suggests the introduction of a new 'sdw_dev_lock' mutex
protecting probe/remove and all driver callbacks. Since this mutex is
'local' to SoundWire only, it does not interfere with existing locks
and does not create deadlocks. In addition, this patch removes the
'probe_complete' completion, instead we directly invoke the
'update_status' from the probe routine. That removes any sort of
timing dependency and a much better support for the device/driver
model, the driver could be bound before the bus started, or eons after
the bus started and the hardware would be properly initialized in all
cases.
BugLink: https://github.com/thesofproject/linux/is
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: save the SR_SUM status over switches
When threads/tasks are switched we need to ensure the old execution's
SR_SUM state is saved and the new thread has the old SR_SUM state
restored.
The issue was seen under heavy load especially with the syz-stress tool
running, with crashes as follows in schedule_tail:
Unable to handle kernel access to user memory without uaccess routines
at virtual address 000000002749f0d0
Oops [#1]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 4875 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
5.12.0-rc2-syzkaller-00467-g0d7588ab9ef9 #0
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
epc : schedule_tail+0x72/0xb2 kernel/sched/core.c:4264
ra : task_pid_vnr include/linux/sched.h:1421 [inline]
ra : schedule_tail+0x70/0xb2 kernel/sched/core.c:4264
epc : ffffffe00008c8b0 ra : ffffffe00008c8ae sp : ffffffe025d17ec0
gp : ffffffe005d25378 tp : ffffffe00f0d0000 t0 : 0000000000000000
t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 00000000000f4240 s0 : ffffffe025d17ee0
s1 : 000000002749f0d0 a0 : 000000000000002a a1 : 0000000000000003
a2 : 1ffffffc0cfac500 a3 : ffffffe0000c80cc a4 : 5ae9db91c19bbe00
a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000f00000 a7 : ffffffe000082eba
s2 : 0000000000040000 s3 : ffffffe00eef96c0 s4 : ffffffe022c77fe0
s5 : 0000000000004000 s6 : ffffffe067d74e00 s7 : ffffffe067d74850
s8 : ffffffe067d73e18 s9 : ffffffe067d74e00 s10: ffffffe00eef96e8
s11: 000000ae6cdf8368 t3 : 5ae9db91c19bbe00 t4 : ffffffc4043cafb2
t5 : ffffffc4043cafba t6 : 0000000000040000
status: 0000000000000120 badaddr: 000000002749f0d0 cause:
000000000000000f
Call Trace:
[<ffffffe00008c8b0>] schedule_tail+0x72/0xb2 kernel/sched/core.c:4264
[<ffffffe000005570>] ret_from_exception+0x0/0x14
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace b5f8f9231dc87dda ]---
The issue comes from the put_user() in schedule_tail
(kernel/sched/core.c) doing the following:
asmlinkage __visible void schedule_tail(struct task_struct *prev)
{
...
if (current->set_child_tid)
put_user(task_pid_vnr(current), current->set_child_tid);
...
}
the put_user() macro causes the code sequence to come out as follows:
1: __enable_user_access()
2: reg = task_pid_vnr(current);
3: *current->set_child_tid = reg;
4: __disable_user_access()
The problem is that we may have a sleeping function as argument which
could clear SR_SUM causing the panic above. This was fixed by
evaluating the argument of the put_user() macro outside the user-enabled
section in commit 285a76bb2cf5 ("riscv: evaluate put_user() arg before
enabling user access")"
In order for riscv to take advantage of unsafe_get/put_XXX() macros and
to avoid the same issue we had with put_user() and sleeping functions we
must ensure code flow can go through switch_to() from within a region of
code with SR_SUM enabled and come back with SR_SUM still enabled. This
patch addresses the problem allowing future work to enable full use of
unsafe_get/put_XXX() macros without needing to take a CSR bit flip cost
on every access. Make switch_to() save and restore SR_SUM. |
