| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Wekan is open source kanban built with Meteor. From 8.36 until 9.74, the outgoing webhook Integration URL validator in models/integrations.js checked only the literal URL.hostname against regular expressions, so DNS names such as 169-254-169-254.nip.io passed that first-line check. The delivery path's fetchSafe guard already blocked the reported IPv4 destination, but its separate IPv4-only resolver and duplicated blocklist created inconsistent all-address-family enforcement and drift risk between input-time and connection-time validation. Version 9.74 makes server/lib/ssrfGuard.js resolve all addresses with `dns.lookup({ all: true })`, validate every result through the shared isIpBlocked logic, pin the connection, and block redirects. This issue is fixed in version 9.74. |
| Wekan is open source kanban built with Meteor. Prior to 9.75, models/fileValidation.js interpolated the uploaded fileObj.path into the administrator-configured externalCommandLine at its {file} placeholder and executed the result through asyncExec, which is promisify(exec) and invokes `/bin/sh -c`. On deployments with an external scanner configured, an authenticated user able to upload an attachment could place shell metacharacters such as command substitutions in the filename and execute commands as the Wekan server process. Version 9.75 adds shellQuote() and passes the file path as a POSIX single-quoted argument so shell metacharacters cannot escape the placeholder. This issue is fixed in version 9.75. |
| Wekan is open source kanban built with Meteor. Prior to 9.89, the second Boards.allow({ update }) rule in server/permissions/boards.js called canUpdateBoardSort in server/lib/utils.js, which authorized any board member whenever fieldNames included sort. Because Meteor combines allow rules with OR semantics and applies the complete modifier, a comment-only or read-only member could send one Boards.update with $set values for sort, members, permission, and title, make themselves the sole board administrator, expose a private board, and evict the legitimate owner; the last-admin deny rule inspected only $pull and did not block a wholesale $set of members. Version 9.89 requires sort to be the only modified field and rejects $set member arrays that remove the last active administrator. This issue is fixed in version 9.89. |
| Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Prior to 0.19.19 and 1.0.0-beta.1, actix-web ConnectionInfo::realip_remote_addr reads the first value of X-Forwarded-For as the client address used by raw_ip_key in crates/utils/src/rate_limit/mod.rs. Lemmy's bundled docker/nginx.conf uses $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for instead of $remote_addr, which appends the real client address to an X-Forwarded-For value supplied by the client. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore place a different spoofed address first on each request and receive a new rate-limit bucket, bypassing limits on POST /api/v4/account/auth/register, POST /api/v4/account/auth/login, POST /api/v4/post, POST /api/v4/comment, GET /api/v4/search, POST /api/v4/image, and POST /api/v4/account/import_settings. This permits excessive account creation, brute-force attempts, spam, scraping, uploads, and repeated imports. This issue is fixed in versions 0.19.19 and 1.0.0-beta.1. |
| A vulnerability was determined in TRENDnet TEW-821DAP 2.2.01b05. Affected is the function popen/system of the file /cgi-bin/ping.cgi of the component ssi. Executing a manipulation of the argument ipaddr can lead to command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. |
| Tina is a headless content management system. Prior to 2.5.2, the TinaCMS CLI package's Vite dev server packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/vite/cors.ts origin callback returns false for a disallowed origin but does not reject the request, and packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/vite/plugins.ts still routes POST /media/upload/* to mediaRouter.handlePost. The upload code in packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/commands/dev-command/server/media.ts writes attacker-controlled multipart contents inside the configured media root. A remote attacker can cause a developer's browser to submit this state-changing request by inducing the developer to visit an attacker-controlled page while tinacms dev is running. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.2. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, an authenticated user with restricted tenant access could use the Representational State Transfer (REST) API to view the names and identifiers of tenants that fall outside the role scope for that user. The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR does not enforce role-based tenant restrictions when it returns tenant information through the REST API in deployments with multi-tenancy turned on. For more information see REST Roles and Permissions (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-cloud/rest-api-reference/role-management-endpoints/rest-roles-and-permissions) and Configure multiple tenants on your Splunk SOAR (On-premises) instance (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/7.1.0/configure-product-settings-for-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-instance/configure-multiple-tenants-on-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-instance) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, a user who holds the OnPrem Broker role could write files outside the intended Automation Broker log directory. The vulnerability is possible because Automation Broker log uploads accept crafted filename input before writing log files. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (Cloud) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-cloud/administer-soar-cloud/manage-your-splunk-soar-cloud-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-cloud) and About Splunk SOAR Automation Broker (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/splunk-automation-broker/about-splunk-soar-automation-broker/about-splunk-soar-automation-broker) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, a user who holds a role that contains the playbooks:view permission could view metadata about a playbook repository that they are not authorized to view. The vulnerability is possible because Playbook History does not check repository permissions before returning playbook revision metadata. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (Cloud) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-cloud/administer-soar-cloud/manage-your-splunk-soar-cloud-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-cloud) and Manage settings for a playbook in Splunk SOAR (Cloud) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-cloud/build-playbooks/manage-playbooks-and-playbook-settings/manage-settings-for-a-playbook-in-splunk-soar-cloud) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, a user who holds the "Incident Commander" Splunk SOAR role could store JavaScript in a note and run it in the browser of another user when that user opens the note. The stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR can treat existing note content as Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) without sanitizing that content when the note format changes. The vulnerability requires the attacker to phish the affected user by tricking them into initiating a request within their browser. The user who holds the "Incident Commander" Splunk SOAR role should not be able to exploit the vulnerability at will. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (Cloud) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-cloud/administer-soar-cloud/manage-your-splunk-soar-cloud-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-cloud) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, a user with a valid Splunk SOAR account could use Representational State Transfer (REST) API filtering on playbook runs to recover session tokens that compromise all data available to the affected user. The information disclosure is possible because Splunk SOAR does not block REST API filters from matching values that responses otherwise hide. For more information see REST Run Playbook (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-cloud/rest-api-reference/run-playbook-endpoints/rest-run-playbook) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, a user who holds the "Automation Engineer" Splunk SOAR role could run arbitrary Structured Query Language (SQL) statements against the Splunk SOAR database through custom list retrieval in a playbook, allowing for create, read, update, and delete operations on all relevant data stored in the Splunk SOAR database. The SQL injection is possible because Splunk SOAR builds the custom list database lookup with the supplied list name instead of a bound SQL value. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-cloud/administer-soar-cloud/manage-your-splunk-soar-cloud-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-cloud) and Create custom lists for use in Splunk SOAR playbook comparisons (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-cloud/build-playbooks/manage-playbooks-and-playbook-settings/create-custom-lists-for-use-in-splunk-soar-cloud-playbook-comparisons) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, a user who holds the "Automation Engineer" Splunk SOAR role could run arbitrary Structured Query Language (SQL) statements against the Splunk SOAR database through custom function results, allowing for reading all relevant data stored in the Splunk SOAR database and affecting system integrity. The SQL injection is possible because Splunk SOAR builds the database lookup with the supplied name instead of a bound SQL value. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (Cloud) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-cloud/administer-soar-cloud/manage-your-splunk-soar-cloud-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-cloud) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, a user who holds the "Automation Engineer" role could run arbitrary Structured Query Language (SQL) statements against the Splunk SOAR database and create, read, update, or delete all data in the database. The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR playbook automation data APIs incorporate user-supplied input into database queries without proper neutralization. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR Cloud (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-cloud/administer-soar-cloud/manage-your-splunk-soar-cloud-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-cloud) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, an unauthenticated user who can observe or alter network traffic between Splunk SOAR and a configured CyberArk Representational State Transfer (REST) server could access or modify all relevant data exchanged through that credential manager. The vulnerability is possible because the CyberArk REST client does not verify server certificates by default. The attack requires the attacker to have network-path interception capability between Splunk SOAR and the configured CyberArk REST server. For more information see Manage your organization's credentials with a password vault (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-cloud/administer-soar-cloud/configure-administration-settings-in-splunk-soar-cloud/manage-your-organizations-credentials-with-a-password-vault) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, a user with the "Administrator" role could use the /rest/support/connectivity/.../check_connectivity endpoint to make Splunk SOAR initiate outbound network connections to arbitrary destinations and determine whether internal hosts and ports are reachable. The Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is possible because the connectivity check REST API does not sufficiently validate the destination before Splunk SOAR connects to it. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.5.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, an authenticated user with no role assigned could use the /rest/health endpoint to gather system and cluster telemetry that should be restricted to administrative or support users. The vulnerability is a missing authorization check, where the endpoint does not verify that the caller holds a role permitted to view system health and cluster state. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.5.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) and Monitor the health of your Splunk SOAR (On-premises) system (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.5.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-system-health-and-performance/monitor-the-health-of-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-system) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, a user who holds the Administrator role could use path traversal in the Universal Forwarder installer's archive extraction to write files outside the intended installation directory. The vulnerability is possible because the Universal Forwarder credentials-package extraction workflow does not verify that each archive member remains within the intended destination before extraction. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.5.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) and Configure forwarders to send SOAR data to your Splunk deployment (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.5.0/configure-administration-settings-in-splunk-soar-on-premises/configure-forwarders-to-send-soar-data-to-your-splunk-deployment) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, a user with app-install privileges could use path traversal during app installation to write files outside the intended temporary directory. The vulnerability is a path traversal in the archive extraction routine, which does not validate that extracted file paths stay within the intended destination directory. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.5.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) and Add and configure apps and assets to provide actions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.5.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-apps-and-assets/add-and-configure-apps-and-assets-to-provide-actions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, an authenticated user with no role assigned could submit a crafted file path to the Representational State Transfer (REST) API and execute arbitrary code. The vulnerability is possible because the REST API does not require an assigned role for the request and does not restrict the user-supplied file path to the intended temporary directory. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.5.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) and Splunk SOAR (On-premises) security information (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.5.0/introduction-to-splunk-soar-on-premises/splunk-soar-on-premises-security-information) in the Splunk documentation. |
