| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: pn533: allocate rx skb before consuming bytes
pn532_receive_buf() reports the number of accepted bytes to the serdev
core. The current code consumes bytes into recv_skb and may already hand
a complete frame to pn533_recv_frame() before allocating a fresh receive
buffer.
If that alloc_skb() fails, the callback returns 0 even though it has
already consumed bytes, and it leaves recv_skb as NULL for the next
receive callback. That breaks the receive_buf() accounting contract and
can also lead to a NULL dereference on the next skb_put_u8().
Allocate the receive skb lazily before consuming the next byte instead.
If allocation fails, return the number of bytes already accepted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size
dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is
saved in alloced.
Change the free size to match the allocation size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate GRP_ACK_MSG
The GRP_ACK_MSG handler in tipc_group_proto_rcv() currently decrements
bc_ackers on every inbound group ACK, even when the same member has
already acknowledged the current broadcast round.
Because bc_ackers is a u16, a duplicate ACK received after the last
legitimate ACK wraps the counter to 65535. Once wrapped,
tipc_group_bc_cong() keeps reporting congestion and later group
broadcasts on the affected socket stay blocked until the group is
recreated.
Fix this by ignoring duplicate or stale ACKs before touching bc_acked or
bc_ackers. This makes repeated GRP_ACK_MSG handling idempotent and
prevents the underflow path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK
After async crypto completes, xfrm_input_resume() calls dev_put()
immediately on re-entry before the skb reaches transport_finish.
The skb->dev pointer is then used inside NF_HOOK and its okfn,
which can race with device teardown.
Remove the dev_put from the async resumption entry and instead
drop the reference after the NF_HOOK call in transport_finish,
using a saved device pointer since NF_HOOK may consume the skb.
This covers NF_DROP, NF_QUEUE and NF_STOLEN paths that skip
the okfn.
For non-transport exits (decaps, gro, drop) and secondary
async return points, release the reference inline when
async is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: clear trailing padding in build_polexpire()
build_expire() clears the trailing padding bytes of struct
xfrm_user_expire after setting the hard field via memset_after(),
but the analogous function build_polexpire() does not do this for
struct xfrm_user_polexpire.
The padding bytes after the __u8 hard field are left
uninitialized from the heap allocation, and are then sent to
userspace via netlink multicast to XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE listeners,
leaking kernel heap memory contents.
Add the missing memset_after() call, matching build_expire(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: fix use-after-free in timeout object destroy
nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy() frees the timeout object with kfree()
immediately after nf_ct_untimeout(), without waiting for an RCU grace
period. Concurrent packet processing on other CPUs may still hold
RCU-protected references to the timeout object obtained via
rcu_dereference() in nf_ct_timeout_data().
Add an rcu_head to struct nf_ct_timeout and use kfree_rcu() to defer
freeing until after an RCU grace period, matching the approach already
used in nfnetlink_cttimeout.c.
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881035fe19c by task exploit/80
Call Trace:
nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
nf_conntrack_in+0x612/0x8b0
nf_hook_slow+0x70/0x100
__ip_local_out+0x1b2/0x210
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x722/0x1580
__sys_sendto+0x2d8/0x320
Allocated by task 75:
nft_ct_timeout_obj_init+0xf6/0x290
nft_obj_init+0x107/0x1b0
nf_tables_newobj+0x680/0x9c0
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xc29/0xe00
Freed by task 26:
nft_obj_destroy+0x3f/0xa0
nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x51c/0x5c0
process_one_work+0x2c4/0x5a0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix incorrect return value after changing leaf in lookup_extent_data_ref()
After commit 1618aa3c2e01 ("btrfs: simplify return variables in
lookup_extent_data_ref()"), the err and ret variables were merged into
a single ret variable. However, when btrfs_next_leaf() returns 0
(success), ret is overwritten from -ENOENT to 0. If the first key in
the next leaf does not match (different objectid or type), the function
returns 0 instead of -ENOENT, making the caller believe the lookup
succeeded when it did not. This can lead to operations on the wrong
extent tree item, potentially causing extent tree corruption.
Fix this by returning -ENOENT directly when the key does not match,
instead of relying on the ret variable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel
The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared
between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths
can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts
(e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table
separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the
other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.
Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output,
so each path maintains its own cached dst independently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: uinput - fix circular locking dependency with ff-core
A lockdep circular locking dependency warning can be triggered
reproducibly when using a force-feedback gamepad with uinput (for
example, playing ELDEN RING under Wine with a Flydigi Vader 5
controller):
ff->mutex -> udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex
The cycle is caused by four lock acquisition paths:
1. ff upload: input_ff_upload() holds ff->mutex and calls
uinput_dev_upload_effect() -> uinput_request_submit() ->
uinput_request_send(), which acquires udev->mutex.
2. device create: uinput_ioctl_handler() holds udev->mutex and calls
uinput_create_device() -> input_register_device(), which acquires
input_mutex.
3. device register: input_register_device() holds input_mutex and
calls kbd_connect() -> input_register_handle(), which acquires
dev->mutex.
4. evdev release: evdev_release() calls input_flush_device() under
dev->mutex, which calls input_ff_flush() acquiring ff->mutex.
Fix this by introducing a new state_lock spinlock to protect
udev->state and udev->dev access in uinput_request_send() instead of
acquiring udev->mutex. The function only needs to atomically check
device state and queue an input event into the ring buffer via
uinput_dev_event() -- both operations are safe under a spinlock
(ktime_get_ts64() and wake_up_interruptible() do not sleep). This
breaks the ff->mutex -> udev->mutex link since a spinlock is a leaf in
the lock ordering and cannot form cycles with mutexes.
To keep state transitions visible to uinput_request_send(), protect
writes to udev->state in uinput_create_device() and
uinput_destroy_device() with the same state_lock spinlock.
Additionally, move init_completion(&request->done) from
uinput_request_send() to uinput_request_submit() before
uinput_request_reserve_slot(). Once the slot is allocated,
uinput_flush_requests() may call complete() on it at any time from
the destroy path, so the completion must be initialised before the
request becomes visible.
Lock ordering after the fix:
ff->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
udev->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex (no back-edge) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established
The ehash table lookups are lockless and rely on
SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to guarantee socket memory stability
during RCU read-side critical sections. Both tcp_prot and
tcpv6_prot have their slab caches created with this flag
via proto_register().
However, MPTCP's mptcp_subflow_init() copies tcpv6_prot into
tcpv6_prot_override during inet_init() (fs_initcall, level 5),
before inet6_init() (module_init/device_initcall, level 6) has
called proto_register(&tcpv6_prot). At that point,
tcpv6_prot.slab is still NULL, so tcpv6_prot_override.slab
remains NULL permanently.
This causes MPTCP v6 subflow child sockets to be allocated via
kmalloc (falling into kmalloc-4k) instead of the TCPv6 slab
cache. The kmalloc-4k cache lacks SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so
when these sockets are freed without SOCK_RCU_FREE (which is
cleared for child sockets by design), the memory can be
immediately reused. Concurrent ehash lookups under
rcu_read_lock can then access freed memory, triggering a
slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established.
Fix this by splitting the IPv6-specific initialization out of
mptcp_subflow_init() into a new mptcp_subflow_v6_init(), called
from mptcp_proto_v6_init() before protocol registration. This
ensures tcpv6_prot_override.slab correctly inherits the
SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU slab cache. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rfkill: prevent unlimited numbers of rfkill events from being created
Userspace can create an unlimited number of rfkill events if the system
is so configured, while not consuming them from the rfkill file
descriptor, causing a potential out of memory situation. Prevent this
from bounding the number of pending rfkill events at a "large" number
(i.e. 1000) to prevent abuses like this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_report()
struct xfrm_user_report is a __u8 proto field followed by a struct
xfrm_selector which means there is three "empty" bytes of padding, but
the padding is never zeroed before copying to userspace. Fix that up by
zeroing the structure before setting individual member variables. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rt2x00usb: fix devres lifetime
USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources
should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB
device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound
without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe
deferral or configuration changes).
Fix the USB anchor lifetime so that it is released on driver unbind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: make use of smbdirect_socket.recv_io.credits.available
The logic off managing recv credits by counting posted recv_io and
granted credits is racy.
That's because the peer might already consumed a credit,
but between receiving the incoming recv at the hardware
and processing the completion in the 'recv_done' functions
we likely have a window where we grant credits, which
don't really exist.
So we better have a decicated counter for the
available credits, which will be incremented
when we posted new recv buffers and drained when
we grant the credits to the peer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: make use of smbdirect_socket.recv_io.credits.available
The logic off managing recv credits by counting posted recv_io and
granted credits is racy.
That's because the peer might already consumed a credit,
but between receiving the incoming recv at the hardware
and processing the completion in the 'recv_done' functions
we likely have a window where we grant credits, which
don't really exist.
So we better have a decicated counter for the
available credits, which will be incremented
when we posted new recv buffers and drained when
we grant the credits to the peer.
This fixes regression Namjae reported with
the 6.18 release. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: cp2615: fix serial string NULL-deref at probe
The cp2615 driver uses the USB device serial string as the i2c adapter
name but does not make sure that the string exists.
Verify that the device has a serial number before accessing it to avoid
triggering a NULL-pointer dereference (e.g. with malicious devices). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Fix the descriptor address in __kvm_at_swap_desc()
Using "(u64 __user *)hva + offset" to get the virtual addresses of S1/S2
descriptors looks really wrong, if offset is not zero. What we want to get
for swapping is hva + offset, not hva + offset*8. ;-)
Fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: scrub: unlock dquot before early return in quota scrub
xchk_quota_item can return early after calling xchk_fblock_process_error.
When that helper returns false, the function returned immediately without
dropping dq->q_qlock, which can leave the dquot lock held and risk lock
leaks or deadlocks in later quota operations.
Fix this by unlocking dq->q_qlock before the early return. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Use scratch field in MMIO fragment to hold small write values
When exiting to userspace to service an emulated MMIO write, copy the
to-be-written value to a scratch field in the MMIO fragment if the size
of the data payload is 8 bytes or less, i.e. can fit in a single chunk,
instead of pointing the fragment directly at the source value.
This fixes a class of use-after-free bugs that occur when the emulator
initiates a write using an on-stack, local variable as the source, the
write splits a page boundary, *and* both pages are MMIO pages. Because
KVM's ABI only allows for physically contiguous MMIO requests, accesses
that split MMIO pages are separated into two fragments, and are sent to
userspace one at a time. When KVM attempts to complete userspace MMIO in
response to KVM_RUN after the first fragment, KVM will detect the second
fragment and generate a second userspace exit, and reference the on-stack
variable.
The issue is most visible if the second KVM_RUN is performed by a separate
task, in which case the stack of the initiating task can show up as truly
freed data.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888009c378d1 by task syz-executor417/984
CPU: 1 PID: 984 Comm: syz-executor417 Not tainted 5.10.0-182.0.0.95.h2627.eulerosv2r13.x86_64 #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170
__kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84
kasan_report+0x3a/0x50
check_memory_region+0xfd/0x1f0
memcpy+0x20/0x60
complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x63f/0x6d0
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20
__se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
RIP: 0033:0x42477d
Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007faa8e6890e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004d7338 RCX: 000000000042477d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00000000004d7330 R08: 00007fff28d546df R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004d733c
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000040a200 R15: 00007fff28d54720
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:0000000029f6a428 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9c37
flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000270dc8 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888009c37780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888009c37800: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff888009c37880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff888009c37900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888009c37980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
==================================================================
The bug can also be reproduced with a targeted KVM-Unit-Test by hacking
KVM to fill a large on-stack variable in complete_emulated_mmio(), i.e. by
overwrite the data value with garbage.
Limit the use of the scratch fields to 8-byte or smaller accesses, and to
just writes, as larger accesses and reads are not affected thanks to
implementation details in the emulator, but add a sanity check to ensure
those details don't change in the future. Specifically, KVM never uses
on-stack variables for accesses larger that 8 bytes, e.g. uses an operand
in the emulator context, and *al
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: call ->free_folio() directly in folio_unmap_invalidate()
We can only call filemap_free_folio() if we have a reference to (or hold a
lock on) the mapping. Otherwise, we've already removed the folio from the
mapping so it no longer pins the mapping and the mapping can be removed,
causing a use-after-free when accessing mapping->a_ops.
Follow the same pattern as __remove_mapping() and load the free_folio
function pointer before dropping the lock on the mapping. That lets us
make filemap_free_folio() static as this was the only caller outside
filemap.c. |
