| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/code-patching: Disable KASAN report during patching via temporary mm
Erhard reports the following KASAN hit on Talos II (power9) with kernel 6.13:
[ 12.028126] ==================================================================
[ 12.028198] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0
[ 12.028260] Write of size 8 at addr 0000187e458f2000 by task systemd/1
[ 12.028346] CPU: 87 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G T 6.13.0-P9-dirty #3
[ 12.028408] Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT
[ 12.028446] Hardware name: T2P9D01 REV 1.01 POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-bc106a0 PowerNV
[ 12.028500] Call Trace:
[ 12.028536] [c000000008dbf3b0] [c000000001656a48] dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x110 (unreliable)
[ 12.028609] [c000000008dbf3f0] [c0000000006e2fc8] print_report+0x6b0/0x708
[ 12.028666] [c000000008dbf4e0] [c0000000006e2454] kasan_report+0x164/0x300
[ 12.028725] [c000000008dbf600] [c0000000006e54d4] kasan_check_range+0x314/0x370
[ 12.028784] [c000000008dbf640] [c0000000006e6310] __kasan_check_write+0x20/0x40
[ 12.028842] [c000000008dbf660] [c000000000578e8c] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0
[ 12.028902] [c000000008dbf6a0] [c0000000000acfe4] __patch_instructions+0x194/0x210
[ 12.028965] [c000000008dbf6e0] [c0000000000ade80] patch_instructions+0x150/0x590
[ 12.029026] [c000000008dbf7c0] [c0000000001159bc] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x6c/0xe0
[ 12.029085] [c000000008dbf800] [c000000000424250] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x40/0xc0
[ 12.029147] [c000000008dbf830] [c000000000115dec] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x3bc/0x930
[ 12.029206] [c000000008dbf990] [c000000000423720] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x1f0/0x280
[ 12.029266] [c000000008dbfa00] [c000000000434b18] bpf_prog_load+0xbb8/0x1370
[ 12.029324] [c000000008dbfb70] [c000000000436ebc] __sys_bpf+0x5ac/0x2e00
[ 12.029379] [c000000008dbfd00] [c00000000043a228] sys_bpf+0x28/0x40
[ 12.029435] [c000000008dbfd20] [c000000000038eb4] system_call_exception+0x334/0x610
[ 12.029497] [c000000008dbfe50] [c00000000000c270] system_call_vectored_common+0xf0/0x280
[ 12.029561] --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.029608] NIP: 00003fff82f5cfa8 LR: 00003fff82f5cfa8 CTR: 0000000000000000
[ 12.029660] REGS: c000000008dbfe80 TRAP: 3000 Tainted: G T (6.13.0-P9-dirty)
[ 12.029735] MSR: 900000000280f032 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 42004848 XER: 00000000
[ 12.029855] IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000169 00003fffdcf789a0 00003fff83067100 0000000000000005
GPR04: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000090 0000000000000000 0000000000000008
GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR12: 0000000000000000 00003fff836ff7e0 c000000000010678 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f28 00003fffdcf78f90
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f80
GPR24: 00003fffdcf78f70 00003fffdcf78d10 00003fff835c7239 00003fffdcf78bd8
GPR28: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000011f547580
[ 12.030316] NIP [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.030361] LR [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.030405] --- interrupt: 3000
[ 12.030444] ==================================================================
Commit c28c15b6d28a ("powerpc/code-patching: Use temporary mm for
Radix MMU") is inspired from x86 but unlike x86 is doesn't disable
KASAN reports during patching. This wasn't a problem at the begining
because __patch_mem() is not instrumented.
Commit 465cabc97b42 ("powerpc/code-patching: introduce
patch_instructions()") use copy_to_kernel_nofault() to copy several
instructions at once. But when using temporary mm the destination is
not regular kernel memory but a kind of kernel-like memory located
in user address space.
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd/iova_bitmap: Fix shift-out-of-bounds in iova_bitmap_offset_to_index()
Resolve a UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds issue in iova_bitmap_offset_to_index()
where shifting the constant "1" (of type int) by bitmap->mapped.pgshift
(an unsigned long value) could result in undefined behavior.
The constant "1" defaults to a 32-bit "int", and when "pgshift" exceeds
31 (e.g., pgshift = 63) the shift operation overflows, as the result
cannot be represented in a 32-bit type.
To resolve this, the constant is updated to "1UL", promoting it to an
unsigned long type to match the operand's type. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/dp_mst: Fix resetting msg rx state after topology removal
If the MST topology is removed during the reception of an MST down reply
or MST up request sideband message, the
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr::up_req_recv/down_rep_recv states could be reset
from one thread via drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst(false), racing with
the reading/parsing of the message from another thread via
drm_dp_mst_handle_down_rep() or drm_dp_mst_handle_up_req(). The race is
possible since the reader/parser doesn't hold any lock while accessing
the reception state. This in turn can lead to a memory corruption in the
reader/parser as described by commit bd2fccac61b4 ("drm/dp_mst: Fix MST
sideband message body length check").
Fix the above by resetting the message reception state if needed before
reading/parsing a message. Another solution would be to hold the
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr::lock for the whole duration of the message
reception/parsing in drm_dp_mst_handle_down_rep() and
drm_dp_mst_handle_up_req(), however this would require a bigger change.
Since the fix is also needed for stable, opting for the simpler solution
in this patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa: Add max vqp attr to vdpa_nl_policy for nlattr length check
The vdpa_nl_policy structure is used to validate the nlattr when parsing
the incoming nlmsg. It will ensure the attribute being described produces
a valid nlattr pointer in info->attrs before entering into each handler
in vdpa_nl_ops.
That is to say, the missing part in vdpa_nl_policy may lead to illegal
nlattr after parsing, which could lead to OOB read just like CVE-2023-3773.
This patch adds the missing nla_policy for vdpa max vqp attr to avoid
such bugs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macvlan: add forgotten nla_policy for IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF
The previous commit 954d1fa1ac93 ("macvlan: Add netlink attribute for
broadcast cutoff") added one additional attribute named
IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF to allow broadcast cutfoff.
However, it forgot to describe the nla_policy at macvlan_policy
(drivers/net/macvlan.c). Hence, this suppose NLA_S32 (4 bytes) integer
can be faked as empty (0 bytes) by a malicious user, which could leads
to OOB in heap just like CVE-2023-3773.
To fix it, this commit just completes the nla_policy description for
IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF. This enforces the length check and avoids the
potential OOB read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: copy last block omitted in ice_get_module_eeprom()
ice_get_module_eeprom() is broken since commit e9c9692c8a81 ("ice:
Reimplement module reads used by ethtool") In this refactor,
ice_get_module_eeprom() reads the eeprom in blocks of size 8.
But the condition that should protect the buffer overflow
ignores the last block. The last block always contains zeros.
Bug uncovered by ethtool upstream commit 9538f384b535
("netlink: eeprom: Defer page requests to individual parsers")
After this commit, ethtool reads a block with length = 1;
to read the SFF-8024 identifier value.
unpatched driver:
$ ethtool -m enp65s0f0np0 offset 0x90 length 8
Offset Values
------ ------
0x0090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
$ ethtool -m enp65s0f0np0 offset 0x90 length 12
Offset Values
------ ------
0x0090: 00 00 01 a0 4d 65 6c 6c 00 00 00 00
$
$ ethtool -m enp65s0f0np0
Offset Values
------ ------
0x0000: 11 06 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 08 00
0x0070: 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
patched driver:
$ ethtool -m enp65s0f0np0 offset 0x90 length 8
Offset Values
------ ------
0x0090: 00 00 01 a0 4d 65 6c 6c
$ ethtool -m enp65s0f0np0 offset 0x90 length 12
Offset Values
------ ------
0x0090: 00 00 01 a0 4d 65 6c 6c 61 6e 6f 78
$ ethtool -m enp65s0f0np0
Identifier : 0x11 (QSFP28)
Extended identifier : 0x00
Extended identifier description : 1.5W max. Power consumption
Extended identifier description : No CDR in TX, No CDR in RX
Extended identifier description : High Power Class (> 3.5 W) not enabled
Connector : 0x23 (No separable connector)
Transceiver codes : 0x88 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
Transceiver type : 40G Ethernet: 40G Base-CR4
Transceiver type : 25G Ethernet: 25G Base-CR CA-N
Encoding : 0x05 (64B/66B)
BR, Nominal : 25500Mbps
Rate identifier : 0x00
Length (SMF,km) : 0km
Length (OM3 50um) : 0m
Length (OM2 50um) : 0m
Length (OM1 62.5um) : 0m
Length (Copper or Active cable) : 1m
Transmitter technology : 0xa0 (Copper cable unequalized)
Attenuation at 2.5GHz : 4db
Attenuation at 5.0GHz : 5db
Attenuation at 7.0GHz : 7db
Attenuation at 12.9GHz : 10db
........
.... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: fix shift-out-of-bounds in CalculateVMAndRowBytes
[WHY]
When PTEBufferSizeInRequests is zero, UBSAN reports the following
warning because dml_log2 returns an unexpected negative value:
shift exponent 4294966273 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
[HOW]
In the case PTEBufferSizeInRequests is zero, skip the dml_log2() and
assign the result directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/hist: Fix out-of-bound write on 'action_data.var_ref_idx'
When generate a synthetic event with many params and then create a trace
action for it [1], kernel panic happened [2].
It is because that in trace_action_create() 'data->n_params' is up to
SYNTH_FIELDS_MAX (current value is 64), and array 'data->var_ref_idx'
keeps indices into array 'hist_data->var_refs' for each synthetic event
param, but the length of 'data->var_ref_idx' is TRACING_MAP_VARS_MAX
(current value is 16), so out-of-bound write happened when 'data->n_params'
more than 16. In this case, 'data->match_data.event' is overwritten and
eventually cause the panic.
To solve the issue, adjust the length of 'data->var_ref_idx' to be
SYNTH_FIELDS_MAX and add sanity checks to avoid out-of-bound write.
[1]
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
# echo "my_synth_event int v1; int v2; int v3; int v4; int v5; int v6;\
int v7; int v8; int v9; int v10; int v11; int v12; int v13; int v14;\
int v15; int v16; int v17; int v18; int v19; int v20; int v21; int v22;\
int v23; int v24; int v25; int v26; int v27; int v28; int v29; int v30;\
int v31; int v32; int v33; int v34; int v35; int v36; int v37; int v38;\
int v39; int v40; int v41; int v42; int v43; int v44; int v45; int v46;\
int v47; int v48; int v49; int v50; int v51; int v52; int v53; int v54;\
int v55; int v56; int v57; int v58; int v59; int v60; int v61; int v62;\
int v63" >> synthetic_events
# echo 'hist:keys=pid:ts0=common_timestamp.usecs if comm=="bash"' >> \
events/sched/sched_waking/trigger
# echo "hist:keys=next_pid:onmatch(sched.sched_waking).my_synth_event(\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid)" >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
[2]
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff91c900000000
PGD 61001067 P4D 61001067 PUD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 2 PID: 322 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc8+ #229
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:strcmp+0xc/0x30
Code: 75 f7 31 d2 44 0f b6 04 16 44 88 04 11 48 83 c2 01 45 84 c0 75 ee
c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 00 31 c0 eb 08 48 83 c0 01 84 d2 74 13 <0f> b6 14
07 3a 14 06 74 ef 19 c0 83 c8 01 c3 cc cc cc cc 31 c3
RSP: 0018:ffff9b3b00f53c48 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffba958a68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffff91c943d33a90 RDI: ffff91c900000000
RBP: ffff91c900000000 R08: 00000018d604b529 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff91c9483eddb1 R11: ffff91ca483eddab R12: ffff91c946171580
R13: ffff91c9479f0538 R14: ffff91c9457c2848 R15: ffff91c9479f0538
FS: 00007f1d1cfbe740(0000) GS:ffff91c9bdc80000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff91c900000000 CR3: 0000000006316000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__find_event_file+0x55/0x90
action_create+0x76c/0x1060
event_hist_trigger_parse+0x146d/0x2060
? event_trigger_write+0x31/0xd0
trigger_process_regex+0xbb/0x110
event_trigger_write+0x6b/0xd0
vfs_write+0xc8/0x3e0
? alloc_fd+0xc0/0x160
? preempt_count_add+0x4d/0xa0
? preempt_count_add+0x70/0xa0
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f1d1d0cf077
Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e
fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00
f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74
RSP: 002b:00007ffcebb0e568 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000143 RCX: 00007f1d1d0cf077
RDX: 0000000000000143 RSI: 00005639265aa7e0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 00005639265aa7e0 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000142
R
---truncated--- |
| FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, switch_xml_ampencode() reserved only ten bytes for the widest numeric character reference produced from a four-byte UTF-8 sequence, omitting space for the terminating NUL. When remote-supplied text was serialized at the exact buffer-growth boundary, the terminator wrote one byte beyond the heap allocation. Reachable surfaces include mod_xml_cdr, conference and formatted CDR XML, XML Event Socket output, and XML API output that serializes caller-controlled values. The fixed zero-byte write can abort the process or truncate an adjacent object, while remote code execution has not been demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.2. |
| FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, ws_read_frame() decoded a WebSocket frame's 64-bit extended payload length with a 32-bit byte swap and narrowed the result into a signed length. A value whose surviving low word became negative bypassed the signed size check and was reinterpreted as an enormous unsigned count, causing client bytes to overwrite memory beyond the 64 KiB receive buffer. Any client completing a /socket WebSocket upgrade on an enabled mod_xml_rpc endpoint reached the parser before HTTP authentication; both the module and WebSocket endpoint are disabled by default. The heap overwrite can corrupt connection pointers and crash FreeSWITCH, ending every concurrent session, although remote code execution has not been demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.2. |
| FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, http_directory_auth() rebuilt an expected user@domain:password credential and base64-encoded it into an 80-byte buffer using an encoder without an output-length argument. A configured credential longer than 57 characters overflowed the stack before the supplied HTTP Basic password was compared. An unauthenticated client only needed to name an existing directory user on an exposed mod_xml_rpc HTTP listener; the module is built but not loaded by the stock configuration. The overflow can corrupt the stack and crash FreeSWITCH, ending every active call, although the overrun bytes come from the configured credential and remote code execution has not been demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.2. |
| FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, ws_read_frame() unmasked a WebSocket payload by iterating wsh->datalen, which included frame headers, while indexing from the payload pointer. A masked frame filling the 64 KiB receive buffer could therefore XOR up to 14 bytes beyond the buffer, and the exact-capacity case also wrote a terminating NUL one byte out of bounds. The flaw is reachable before authentication when mod_xml_rpc and its opt-in WebSocket endpoint are enabled, while both features are disabled in the stock configuration. The writes remain within the same connection handle's adjacent outbound buffer, so neither a process crash nor cross-session disclosure has been demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.2. |
| FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, udptl_rx_packet() used a peer-controlled FEC entry count directly to fill five-entry FEC arrays in a mod_spandsp T.38 session. A larger count wrote sender-controlled error-recovery data beyond those arrays and persisted the oversized count for a later reconstruction pass. Any peer able to deliver UDPTL to an established T.38 fax session can reach the parser, including deployments using fax applications or a T.38 gateway. The memory corruption can crash FreeSWITCH and end every active call, although remote code execution has not been demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.2. |
| In createRequest of MediaProvider.java, there is a possible way for an app to gain read/write access to non-existing files due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: tables: FPDT: Don't call acpi_os_map_memory() on invalid phys address
On a Packard Bell Dot SC (Intel Atom N2600 model) there is a FPDT table
which contains invalid physical addresses, with high bits set which fall
outside the range of the CPU-s supported physical address range.
Calling acpi_os_map_memory() on such an invalid phys address leads to
the below WARN_ON in ioremap triggering resulting in an oops/stacktrace.
Add code to verify the physical address before calling acpi_os_map_memory()
to fix / avoid the oops.
[ 1.226900] ioremap: invalid physical address 3001000000000000
[ 1.226949] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1.226962] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:200 __ioremap_caller.cold+0x43/0x5f
[ 1.226996] Modules linked in:
[ 1.227016] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3+ #490
[ 1.227029] Hardware name: Packard Bell dot s/SJE01_CT, BIOS V1.10 07/23/2013
[ 1.227038] RIP: 0010:__ioremap_caller.cold+0x43/0x5f
[ 1.227054] Code: 96 00 00 e9 f8 af 24 ff 89 c6 48 c7 c7 d8 0c 84 99 e8 6a 96 00 00 e9 76 af 24 ff 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 a8 0c 84 99 e8 56 96 00 00 <0f> 0b e9 60 af 24 ff 48 8b 34 24 48 c7 c7 40 0d 84 99 e8 3f 96 00
[ 1.227067] RSP: 0000:ffffb18c40033d60 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 1.227084] RAX: 0000000000000032 RBX: 3001000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1.227095] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 1.227105] RBP: 3001000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb18c40033c18
[ 1.227115] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff99d62fe8 R12: 0000000000000008
[ 1.227124] R13: 0003001000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 3001000000000000
[ 1.227135] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff913a3c080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1.227146] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1.227156] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000018c26000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1.227167] Call Trace:
[ 1.227176] <TASK>
[ 1.227185] ? acpi_os_map_iomem+0x1c9/0x1e0
[ 1.227215] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x187/0x370
[ 1.227254] acpi_os_map_iomem+0x1c9/0x1e0
[ 1.227288] acpi_init_fpdt+0xa8/0x253
[ 1.227308] ? acpi_debugfs_init+0x1f/0x1f
[ 1.227339] do_one_initcall+0x5a/0x300
[ 1.227406] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80
[ 1.227442] kernel_init_freeable+0x28b/0x2cc
[ 1.227512] ? rest_init+0x170/0x170
[ 1.227538] kernel_init+0x16/0x140
[ 1.227552] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 1.227639] </TASK>
[ 1.227647] irq event stamp: 186819
[ 1.227656] hardirqs last enabled at (186825): [<ffffffff98184a6e>] __up_console_sem+0x5e/0x70
[ 1.227672] hardirqs last disabled at (186830): [<ffffffff98184a53>] __up_console_sem+0x43/0x70
[ 1.227686] softirqs last enabled at (186576): [<ffffffff980fbc9d>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xed/0x160
[ 1.227701] softirqs last disabled at (186569): [<ffffffff980fbc9d>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xed/0x160
[ 1.227715] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential stack-out-of-bounds in brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds()
This patch fixes a stack-out-of-bounds read in brcmfmac that occurs
when 'buf' that is not null-terminated is passed as an argument of
strsep() in brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds(). This buffer is filled with a firmware
version string by memcpy() in brcmf_fil_iovar_data_get().
The patch ensures buf is null-terminated.
Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
[ 47.569679][ T1897] brcmfmac: brcmf_fw_alloc_request: using brcm/brcmfmac43236b for chip BCM43236/3
[ 47.582839][ T1897] brcmfmac: brcmf_c_process_clm_blob: no clm_blob available (err=-2), device may have limited channels available
[ 47.601565][ T1897] ==================================================================
[ 47.602574][ T1897] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0
[ 47.603447][ T1897] Read of size 1 at addr ffffc90001f6f000 by task kworker/0:2/1897
[ 47.604336][ T1897]
[ 47.604621][ T1897] CPU: 0 PID: 1897 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G O 5.14.0+ #131
[ 47.605617][ T1897] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 47.606907][ T1897] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
[ 47.607453][ T1897] Call Trace:
[ 47.607801][ T1897] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd1
[ 47.608295][ T1897] print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x334
[ 47.609009][ T1897] ? strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0
[ 47.609434][ T1897] ? strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0
[ 47.609863][ T1897] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
[ 47.610366][ T1897] ? strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0
[ 47.610882][ T1897] strsep+0x1b2/0x1f0
[ 47.611300][ T1897] ? brcmf_fil_iovar_data_get+0x3a/0xf0
[ 47.611883][ T1897] brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds+0x995/0xc40
[ 47.612434][ T1897] ? brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default+0x100/0x100
[ 47.613078][ T1897] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
[ 47.613662][ T1897] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
[ 47.614208][ T1897] ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4e0
[ 47.614704][ T1897] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
[ 47.615236][ T1897] ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1a7/0x260
[ 47.615741][ T1897] ? brcmf_usb_rx_fill_all+0x5a/0xf0
[ 47.616288][ T1897] brcmf_attach+0x246/0xd40
[ 47.616758][ T1897] ? wiphy_new_nm+0x1703/0x1dd0
[ 47.617280][ T1897] ? kmemdup+0x43/0x50
[ 47.617720][ T1897] brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690
[ 47.618244][ T1897] ? brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x470/0x470
[ 47.618901][ T1897] usb_probe_interface+0x2aa/0x760
[ 47.619429][ T1897] ? usb_probe_device+0x250/0x250
[ 47.619950][ T1897] really_probe+0x205/0xb70
[ 47.620435][ T1897] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130
[ 47.621048][ T1897] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0
[ 47.621595][ T1897] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130
[ 47.622209][ T1897] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x150
[ 47.622739][ T1897] __device_attach_driver+0x1cc/0x2a0
[ 47.623287][ T1897] bus_for_each_drv+0x156/0x1d0
[ 47.623796][ T1897] ? bus_rescan_devices+0x30/0x30
[ 47.624309][ T1897] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
[ 47.624907][ T1897] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x46/0x160
[ 47.625437][ T1897] __device_attach+0x23f/0x3a0
[ 47.625924][ T1897] ? device_bind_driver+0xd0/0xd0
[ 47.626433][ T1897] ? kobject_uevent_env+0x287/0x14b0
[ 47.627057][ T1897] bus_probe_device+0x1da/0x290
[ 47.627557][ T1897] device_add+0xb7b/0x1eb0
[ 47.628027][ T1897] ? wait_for_completion+0x290/0x290
[ 47.628593][ T1897] ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x5a0/0x5a0
[ 47.629249][ T1897] usb_set_configuration+0xf59/0x16f0
[ 47.629829][ T1897] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x82/0xa0
[ 47.630385][ T1897] usb_probe_device+0xbb/0x250
[ 47.630927][ T1897] ? usb_suspend+0x590/0x590
[ 47.631397][ T1897] really_probe+0x205/0xb70
[ 47.631855][ T1897] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130
[ 47.632469][ T1897] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0
[ 47.633002][
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
intel_th: msu: Fix vmalloced buffers
After commit f5ff79fddf0e ("dma-mapping: remove CONFIG_DMA_REMAP") there's
a chance of DMA buffer getting allocated via vmalloc(), which messes up
the mmapping code:
> RIP: msc_mmap_fault [intel_th_msu]
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> __do_fault
> do_fault
...
Fix this by accounting for vmalloc possibility. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: debug: Fix potential buffer overflow by snprintf()
snprintf() returns the would-be-filled size when the string overflows
the given buffer size, hence using this value may result in the buffer
overflow (although it's unrealistic).
This patch replaces with a safer version, scnprintf() for papering
over such a potential issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: entry: avoid kprobe recursion
The cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() function is called when
handling debug exceptions (and synchronous exceptions from BRK
instructions), and so is called when a probed function executes. If the
compiler does not inline cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler(), it
can be probed.
If cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() is probed, any debug
exception or software breakpoint exception will result in recursive
exceptions leading to a stack overflow. This can be triggered with the
ftrace multiple_probes selftest, and as per the example splat below.
This is a regression caused by commit:
6459b8469753e9fe ("arm64: entry: consolidate Cortex-A76 erratum 1463225 workaround")
... which removed the NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() annotation associated with the
function.
My intent was that cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() would be
inlined into its caller, el1_dbg(), which is marked noinstr and cannot
be probed. Mark cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() as
__always_inline to ensure this.
Example splat prior to this patch (with recursive entries elided):
| # echo p cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
| # echo p do_el0_svc >> /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/enable
| Insufficient stack space to handle exception!
| ESR: 0x0000000096000047 -- DABT (current EL)
| FAR: 0xffff800009cefff0
| Task stack: [0xffff800009cf0000..0xffff800009cf4000]
| IRQ stack: [0xffff800008000000..0xffff800008004000]
| Overflow stack: [0xffff00007fbc00f0..0xffff00007fbc10f0]
| CPU: 0 PID: 145 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.0.0 #2
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 604003c5 (nZCv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : arm64_enter_el1_dbg+0x4/0x20
| lr : el1_dbg+0x24/0x5c
| sp : ffff800009cf0000
| x29: ffff800009cf0000 x28: ffff000002c74740 x27: 0000000000000000
| x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
| x23: 00000000604003c5 x22: ffff80000801745c x21: 0000aaaac95ac068
| x20: 00000000f2000004 x19: ffff800009cf0040 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
| x11: 0000000000000010 x10: ffff800008c87190 x9 : ffff800008ca00d0
| x8 : 000000000000003c x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
| x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00000000000043a4
| x2 : 00000000f2000004 x1 : 00000000f2000004 x0 : ffff800009cf0040
| Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow
| CPU: 0 PID: 145 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.0.0 #2
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0xe4/0x104
| show_stack+0x18/0x4c
| dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c
| dump_stack+0x18/0x38
| panic+0x14c/0x338
| test_taint+0x0/0x2c
| panic_bad_stack+0x104/0x118
| handle_bad_stack+0x34/0x48
| __bad_stack+0x78/0x7c
| arm64_enter_el1_dbg+0x4/0x20
| el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
| el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
| cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34
...
| el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
| el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
| cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34
...
| el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
| el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
| cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34
| el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
| el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
| do_el0_svc+0x0/0x28
| el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0
| el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190
| Kernel Offset: disabled
| CPU features: 0x0080,00005021,19001080
| Memory Limit: none
| ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow ]---
With this patch, cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() is inlined
into el1_dbg(), and el1_dbg() cannot be probed:
| # echo p cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
| sh: write error: No such file or directory
| # grep -w cortex_a76_errat
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: core: Fix boundary conditions in interpolation
The functions power_supply_temp2resist_simple and power_supply_ocv2cap_simple
handle boundary conditions incorrectly.
The change was introduced in a4585ba2050f460f749bbaf2b67bd56c41e30283
("power: supply: core: Use library interpolation").
There are two issues: First, the lines "high = i - 1" and "high = i" in ocv2cap
have the wrong order compared to temp2resist. As a consequence, ocv2cap
sets high=-1 if ocv>table[0].ocv, which causes an out-of-bounds read.
Second, the logic of temp2resist is also not correct.
Consider the case table[] = {{20, 100}, {10, 80}, {0, 60}}.
For temp=5, we expect a resistance of 70% by interpolation.
However, temp2resist sets high=low=2 and returns 60. |
