| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: Fix flipped sign in tls_err_abort() calls
sk->sk_err appears to expect a positive value, a convention that ktls
doesn't always follow and that leads to memory corruption in other code.
For instance,
[kworker]
tls_encrypt_done(..., err=<negative error from crypto request>)
tls_err_abort(.., err)
sk->sk_err = err;
[task]
splice_from_pipe_feed
...
tls_sw_do_sendpage
if (sk->sk_err) {
ret = -sk->sk_err; // ret is positive
splice_from_pipe_feed (continued)
ret = actor(...) // ret is still positive and interpreted as bytes
// written, resulting in underflow of buf->len and
// sd->len, leading to huge buf->offset and bogus
// addresses computed in later calls to actor()
Fix all tls_err_abort() callers to pass a negative error code
consistently and centralize the error-prone sign flip there, throwing in
a warning to catch future misuse and uninlining the function so it
really does only warn once. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isofs: Fix out of bound access for corrupted isofs image
When isofs image is suitably corrupted isofs_read_inode() can read data
beyond the end of buffer. Sanity-check the directory entry length before
using it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: iscsi: Fix iscsi_task use after free
Commit d39df158518c ("scsi: iscsi: Have abort handler get ref to conn")
added iscsi_get_conn()/iscsi_put_conn() calls during abort handling but
then also changed the handling of the case where we detect an already
completed task where we now end up doing a goto to the common put/cleanup
code. This results in a iscsi_task use after free, because the common
cleanup code will do a put on the iscsi_task.
This reverts the goto and moves the iscsi_get_conn() to after we've checked
if the iscsi_task is valid. |
| A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit a Path Traversal vulnerability found in the UniFi Network Application to access files on the underlying system that could be manipulated to access an underlying account. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: iscsi: Fix conn use after free during resets
If we haven't done a unbind target call we can race where
iscsi_conn_teardown wakes up the EH thread and then frees the conn while
those threads are still accessing the conn ehwait.
We can only do one TMF per session so this just moves the TMF fields from
the conn to the session. We can then rely on the
iscsi_session_teardown->iscsi_remove_session->__iscsi_unbind_session call
to remove the target and it's devices, and know after that point there is
no device or scsi-ml callout trying to access the session. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: j1939: fix Use-after-Free, hold skb ref while in use
This patch fixes a Use-after-Free found by the syzbot.
The problem is that a skb is taken from the per-session skb queue,
without incrementing the ref count. This leads to a Use-after-Free if
the skb is taken concurrently from the session queue due to a CTS. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: kTLS, Fix crash in RX resync flow
For the TLS RX resync flow, we maintain a list of TLS contexts
that require some attention, to communicate their resync information
to the HW.
Here we fix list corruptions, by protecting the entries against
movements coming from resync_handle_seq_match(), until their resync
handling in napi is fully completed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: fix an incorrect limit in filelayout_decode_layout()
The "sizeof(struct nfs_fh)" is two bytes too large and could lead to
memory corruption. It should be NFS_MAXFHSIZE because that's the size
of the ->data[] buffer.
I reversed the size of the arguments to put the variable on the left. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: skb_linearize the head skb when reassembling msgs
It's not a good idea to append the frag skb to a skb's frag_list if
the frag_list already has skbs from elsewhere, such as this skb was
created by pskb_copy() where the frag_list was cloned (all the skbs
in it were skb_get'ed) and shared by multiple skbs.
However, the new appended frag skb should have been only seen by the
current skb. Otherwise, it will cause use after free crashes as this
appended frag skb are seen by multiple skbs but it only got skb_get
called once.
The same thing happens with a skb updated by pskb_may_pull() with a
skb_cloned skb. Li Shuang has reported quite a few crashes caused
by this when doing testing over macvlan devices:
[] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:1970!
[] Call Trace:
[] skb_clone+0x4d/0xb0
[] macvlan_broadcast+0xd8/0x160 [macvlan]
[] macvlan_process_broadcast+0x148/0x150 [macvlan]
[] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
[] worker_thread+0x30/0x390
[] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
[] Call Trace:
[] __check_heap_object+0xd3/0x100
[] __check_object_size+0xff/0x16b
[] simple_copy_to_iter+0x1c/0x30
[] __skb_datagram_iter+0x7d/0x310
[] __skb_datagram_iter+0x2a5/0x310
[] skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x3b/0x90
[] tipc_recvmsg+0x14a/0x3a0 [tipc]
[] ____sys_recvmsg+0x91/0x150
[] ___sys_recvmsg+0x7b/0xc0
[] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:305!
[] Call Trace:
[] <IRQ>
[] kmem_cache_free+0x3ff/0x400
[] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x12c/0xc40
[] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x270
[] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x3d/0xb0
[] ? get_rx_page_info+0x8e/0xa0 [be2net]
[] be_poll+0x6ef/0xd00 [be2net]
[] ? irq_exit+0x4f/0x100
[] net_rx_action+0x149/0x3b0
...
This patch is to fix it by linearizing the head skb if it has frag_list
set in tipc_buf_append(). Note that we choose to do this before calling
skb_unshare(), as __skb_linearize() will avoid skb_copy(). Also, we can
not just drop the frag_list either as the early time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lantiq: fix memory corruption in RX ring
In a situation where memory allocation or dma mapping fails, an
invalid address is programmed into the descriptor. This can lead
to memory corruption. If the memory allocation fails, DMA should
reuse the previous skb and mapping and drop the packet. This patch
also increments rx drop counter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Fix READDIR buffer overflow
If a client sends a READDIR count argument that is too small (say,
zero), then the buffer size calculation in the new init_dirlist
helper functions results in an underflow, allowing the XDR stream
functions to write beyond the actual buffer.
This calculation has always been suspect. NFSD has never sanity-
checked the READDIR count argument, but the old entry encoders
managed the problem correctly.
With the commits below, entry encoding changed, exposing the
underflow to the pointer arithmetic in xdr_reserve_space().
Modern NFS clients attempt to retrieve as much data as possible
for each READDIR request. Also, we have no unit tests that
exercise the behavior of READDIR at the lower bound of @count
values. Thus this case was missed during testing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: fully convert sk->sk_rx_dst to RCU rules
syzbot reported various issues around early demux,
one being included in this changelog [1]
sk->sk_rx_dst is using RCU protection without clearly
documenting it.
And following sequences in tcp_v4_do_rcv()/tcp_v6_do_rcv()
are not following standard RCU rules.
[a] dst_release(dst);
[b] sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL;
They look wrong because a delete operation of RCU protected
pointer is supposed to clear the pointer before
the call_rcu()/synchronize_rcu() guarding actual memory freeing.
In some cases indeed, dst could be freed before [b] is done.
We could cheat by clearing sk_rx_dst before calling
dst_release(), but this seems the right time to stick
to standard RCU annotations and debugging facilities.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dst_check include/net/dst.h:470 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_v4_early_demux+0x95b/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1792
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88807f1cb73a by task syz-executor.5/9204
CPU: 0 PID: 9204 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x320 mm/kasan/report.c:247
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:433 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:450
dst_check include/net/dst.h:470 [inline]
tcp_v4_early_demux+0x95b/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1792
ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0x15de/0x1e80 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:340
ip_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0+0x1b2/0x6e0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:583
ip_sublist_rcv net/ipv4/ip_input.c:609 [inline]
ip_list_rcv+0x34e/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:644
__netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5508 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x549/0x8e0 net/core/dev.c:5556
__netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5608 [inline]
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x75e/0xd80 net/core/dev.c:5699
gro_normal_list net/core/dev.c:5853 [inline]
gro_normal_list net/core/dev.c:5849 [inline]
napi_complete_done+0x1f1/0x880 net/core/dev.c:6590
virtqueue_napi_complete drivers/net/virtio_net.c:339 [inline]
virtnet_poll+0xca2/0x11b0 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1557
__napi_poll+0xaf/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7023
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7090 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x801/0xb40 net/core/dev.c:7177
__do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:432 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0x123/0x180 kernel/softirq.c:637
irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:649
common_interrupt+0x52/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:240
asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:629
RIP: 0033:0x7f5e972bfd57
Code: 39 d1 73 14 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 50 f8 48 83 e8 08 48 39 ca 77 f3 48 39 c3 73 3e 48 89 13 48 8b 50 f8 48 89 38 49 8b 0e <48> 8b 3e 48 83 c3 08 48 83 c6 08 eb bc 48 39 d1 72 9e 48 39 d0 73
RSP: 002b:00007fff8a413210 EFLAGS: 00000283
RAX: 00007f5e97108990 RBX: 00007f5e97108338 RCX: ffffffff81d3aa45
RDX: ffffffff81d3aa45 RSI: 00007f5e97108340 RDI: ffffffff81d3aa45
RBP: 00007f5e97107eb8 R08: 00007f5e97108d88 R09: 0000000093c2e8d9
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f5e97107eb0
R13: 00007f5e97108338 R14: 00007f5e97107ea8 R15: 0000000000000019
</TASK>
Allocated by task 13:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:434 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x90/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:467
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:259 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:519 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3234 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3242 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x202/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:3247
dst_alloc+0x146/0x1f0 net/core/dst.c:92
rt_dst_alloc+0x73/0x430 net/ipv4/route.c:1613
ip_route_input_slow+0x1817/0x3a20 net/ipv4/route.c:234
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udp: skip L4 aggregation for UDP tunnel packets
If NETIF_F_GRO_FRAGLIST or NETIF_F_GRO_UDP_FWD are enabled, and there
are UDP tunnels available in the system, udp_gro_receive() could end-up
doing L4 aggregation (either SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 or SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST) at
the outer UDP tunnel level for packets effectively carrying and UDP
tunnel header.
That could cause inner protocol corruption. If e.g. the relevant
packets carry a vxlan header, different vxlan ids will be ignored/
aggregated to the same GSO packet. Inner headers will be ignored, too,
so that e.g. TCP over vxlan push packets will be held in the GRO
engine till the next flush, etc.
Just skip the SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 and SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST code path if the
current packet could land in a UDP tunnel, and let udp_gro_receive()
do GRO via udp_sk(sk)->gro_receive.
The check implemented in this patch is broader than what is strictly
needed, as the existing UDP tunnel could be e.g. configured on top of
a different device: we could end-up skipping GRO at-all for some packets.
Anyhow, that is a very thin corner case and covering it will add quite
a bit of complexity.
v1 -> v2:
- hopefully clarify the commit message |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net:emac/emac-mac: Fix a use after free in emac_mac_tx_buf_send
In emac_mac_tx_buf_send, it calls emac_tx_fill_tpd(..,skb,..).
If some error happens in emac_tx_fill_tpd(), the skb will be freed via
dev_kfree_skb(skb) in error branch of emac_tx_fill_tpd().
But the freed skb is still used via skb->len by netdev_sent_queue(,skb->len).
As i observed that emac_tx_fill_tpd() haven't modified the value of skb->len,
thus my patch assigns skb->len to 'len' before the possible free and
use 'len' instead of skb->len later. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: do asoc update earlier in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a
There's a panic that occurs in a few of envs, the call trace is as below:
[] general protection fault, ... 0x29acd70f1000a: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[] RIP: 0010:sctp_ulpevent_notify_peer_addr_change+0x4b/0x1fa [sctp]
[] sctp_assoc_control_transport+0x1b9/0x210 [sctp]
[] sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike.isra.16+0x15c/0x220 [sctp]
[] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.21+0x1231/0x1a10 [sctp]
[] sctp_do_sm+0xc3/0x2a0 [sctp]
[] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x81/0xf0 [sctp]
This is caused by a transport use-after-free issue. When processing a
duplicate COOKIE-ECHO chunk in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(), both COOKIE-ACK
and SHUTDOWN chunks are allocated with the transort from the new asoc.
However, later in the sideeffect machine, the old asoc is used to send
them out and old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to is set to the transport
that SHUTDOWN chunk attached to in sctp_cmd_setup_t2(), which actually
belongs to the new asoc. After the new_asoc is freed and the old asoc
T2 timeout, the old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to that is already freed
would be accessed in sctp_sf_t2_timer_expire().
Thanks Alexander and Jere for helping dig into this issue.
To fix it, this patch is to do the asoc update first, then allocate
the COOKIE-ACK and SHUTDOWN chunks with the 'updated' old asoc. This
would make more sense, as a chunk from an asoc shouldn't be sent out
with another asoc. We had fixed quite a few issues caused by this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ch_ktls: Fix kernel panic
Taking page refcount is not ideal and causes kernel panic
sometimes. It's better to take tx_ctx lock for the complete
skb transmit, to avoid page cleanup if ACK received in middle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlabel: fix out-of-bounds memory accesses
There are two array out-of-bounds memory accesses, one in
cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(), the other in netlbl_bitmap_walk(). Both
errors are embarassingly simple, and the fixes are straightforward.
As a FYI for anyone backporting this patch to kernels prior to v4.8,
you'll want to apply the netlbl_bitmap_walk() patch to
cipso_v4_bitmap_walk() as netlbl_bitmap_walk() doesn't exist before
Linux v4.8. |
| A path traversal: '../filedir' vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSandbox 5.0.0 through 5.0.5, FortiSandbox 4.4.0 through 4.4.8 may allow attacker to escalation of privilege via specially crafted HTTP requests. |
| A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Improper Input Validation vulnerability found in UniFi OS devices to execute a Command Injection. |
| A improper neutralization of special elements used in an os command ('os command injection') vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSandbox 5.0.0 through 5.0.5, FortiSandbox 4.4.0 through 4.4.8, FortiSandbox 4.2 all versions, FortiSandbox Cloud 5.0.4 through 5.0.5, FortiSandbox PaaS 5.0.4 through 5.0.5 may allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute unauthorized commands via specifically crafted HTTP requests |
