| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Check NULL before accessing
[WHAT]
IGT kms_cursor_legacy's long-nonblocking-modeset-vs-cursor-atomic
fails with NULL pointer dereference. This can be reproduced with
both an eDP panel and a DP monitors connected.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 2960 Comm: kms_cursor_lega Not tainted
6.16.0-99-custom #8 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: AMD ........
RIP: 0010:dc_stream_get_scanoutpos+0x34/0x130 [amdgpu]
Code: 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 49 89 ce 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49
89 fc 53 48 83 ec 18 48 8b 87 a0 64 00 00 48 89 75 d0 48 c7 c6 e0 41 30
c2 <48> 8b 38 48 8b 9f 68 06 00 00 e8 8d d7 fd ff 31 c0 48 81 c3 e0 02
RSP: 0018:ffffd0f3c2bd7608 EFLAGS: 00010292
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffd0f3c2bd7668
RDX: ffffd0f3c2bd7664 RSI: ffffffffc23041e0 RDI: ffff8b32494b8000
RBP: ffffd0f3c2bd7648 R08: ffffd0f3c2bd766c R09: ffffd0f3c2bd7760
R10: ffffd0f3c2bd7820 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8b32494b8000
R13: ffffd0f3c2bd7664 R14: ffffd0f3c2bd7668 R15: ffffd0f3c2bd766c
FS: 000071f631b68700(0000) GS:ffff8b399f114000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000001b8105000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dm_crtc_get_scanoutpos+0xd7/0x180 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_display_get_crtc_scanoutpos+0x86/0x1c0 [amdgpu]
? __pfx_amdgpu_crtc_get_scanout_position+0x10/0x10[amdgpu]
amdgpu_crtc_get_scanout_position+0x27/0x50 [amdgpu]
drm_crtc_vblank_helper_get_vblank_timestamp_internal+0xf7/0x400
drm_crtc_vblank_helper_get_vblank_timestamp+0x1c/0x30
drm_crtc_get_last_vbltimestamp+0x55/0x90
drm_crtc_next_vblank_start+0x45/0xa0
drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_fences+0x81/0x1f0
...
(cherry picked from commit 621e55f1919640acab25383362b96e65f2baea3c) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: increase max link count and fix link->enc NULL pointer access
[why]
1.) dc->links[MAX_LINKS] array size smaller than actual requested.
max_connector + max_dpia + 4 virtual = 14.
increase from 12 to 14.
2.) hw_init() access null LINK_ENC for dpia non display_endpoint.
(cherry picked from commit d7f5a61e1b04ed87b008c8d327649d184dc5bb45) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: Fix pgtable prealloc error path
The following splat was reported:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000008d0fd8000
[0000000000000010] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
CPU: 5 UID: 1000 PID: 149076 Comm: Xwayland Tainted: G S 6.16.0-rc2-00809-g0b6974bb4134-dirty #367 PREEMPT
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8650 HDK (DT)
pstate: 83400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : build_detached_freelist+0x28/0x224
lr : kmem_cache_free_bulk.part.0+0x38/0x244
sp : ffff000a508c7a20
x29: ffff000a508c7a20 x28: ffff000a508c7d50 x27: ffffc4e49d16f350
x26: 0000000000000058 x25: 00000000fffffffc x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff00098c4e1450 x22: 00000000fffffffc x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffff000a508c7af8 x19: 0000000000000002 x18: 00000000000003e8
x17: ffff000809523850 x16: ffff000809523820 x15: 0000000000401640
x14: ffff000809371140 x13: 0000000000000130 x12: ffff0008b5711e30
x11: 00000000001058fa x10: 0000000000000a80 x9 : ffff000a508c7940
x8 : ffff000809371ba0 x7 : 781fffe033087fff x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffff0008003cd000 x4 : 781fffe033083fff x3 : ffff000a508c7af8
x2 : fffffdffc0000000 x1 : 0001000000000000 x0 : ffff0008001a6a00
Call trace:
build_detached_freelist+0x28/0x224 (P)
kmem_cache_free_bulk.part.0+0x38/0x244
kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x10/0x1c
msm_iommu_pagetable_prealloc_cleanup+0x3c/0xd0
msm_vma_job_free+0x30/0x240
msm_ioctl_vm_bind+0x1d0/0x9a0
drm_ioctl_kernel+0x84/0x104
drm_ioctl+0x358/0x4d4
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x8c/0xe0
invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x3c/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x18/0x20
el0_svc+0x30/0x100
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130
el0t_64_sync+0x170/0x174
Code: aa0203f5 b26287e2 f2dfbfe2 aa0303f4 (f8737ab6)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Since msm_vma_job_free() is called directly from the ioctl, this looks
like an error path cleanup issue. Which I think results from
prealloc_cleanup() called without a preceding successful
prealloc_allocate() call. So handle that case better.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/678677/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: flush inode if atomic file is aborted
Let's flush the inode being aborted atomic operation to avoid stale dirty
inode during eviction in this call stack:
f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync+0x22/0x40 [f2fs]
f2fs_abort_atomic_write+0xc4/0xf0 [f2fs]
f2fs_evict_inode+0x3f/0x690 [f2fs]
? sugov_start+0x140/0x140
evict+0xc3/0x1c0
evict_inodes+0x17b/0x210
generic_shutdown_super+0x32/0x120
kill_block_super+0x21/0x50
deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x90
cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160
task_work_run+0x59/0x90
do_exit+0x33b/0xa50
do_group_exit+0x2d/0x80
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x14/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
This triggers f2fs_bug_on() in f2fs_evict_inode:
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE));
This fixes the syzbot report:
loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072
F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:869!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 5014 Comm: syz-executor220 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-11479-g6cd06ab12d1a #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd <0f> 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8880273b8000 RSI: ffffffff83a2bd0d RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: ffff888077db91b0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888029a3c000
R13: ffff888077db9660 R14: ffff888029a3c0b8 R15: ffff888077db9c50
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1909bb9000 CR3: 00000000276a9000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
evict+0x2ed/0x6b0 fs/inode.c:665
dispose_list+0x117/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:698
evict_inodes+0x345/0x440 fs/inode.c:748
generic_shutdown_super+0xaf/0x480 fs/super.c:478
kill_block_super+0x64/0xb0 fs/super.c:1417
kill_f2fs_super+0x2af/0x3c0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4704
deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x160 fs/super.c:330
deactivate_super+0xb1/0xd0 fs/super.c:361
cleanup_mnt+0x2ae/0x3d0 fs/namespace.c:1254
task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
do_exit+0xa9a/0x29a0 kernel/exit.c:874
do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1024
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1033 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1033
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f309be71a09
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f309be719df.
RSP: 002b:00007fff171df518 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f309bef7330 RCX: 00007f309be71a09
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 00007f309bef1e40
R10: 0000000000010600 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f309bef7330
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd <0f> 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: mt7921: don't assume adequate headroom for SDIO headers
mt7921_usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb() calls mt7921_usb_sdio_write_txwi() and
mt7921_skb_add_usb_sdio_hdr(), both of which blindly assume that
adequate headroom will be available in the passed skb. This assumption
typically is satisfied when the skb was allocated in the net core for
transmission via the mt7921 netdev (although even that is only an
optimization and is not strictly guaranteed), but the assumption is
sometimes not satisfied when the skb originated in the receive path of
another netdev and was passed through to the mt7921, such as by the
bridge layer. Blindly prepending bytes to an skb is always wrong.
This commit introduces a call to skb_cow_head() before the call to
mt7921_usb_sdio_write_txwi() in mt7921_usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb() to
ensure that at least MT_SDIO_TXD_SIZE + MT_SDIO_HDR_SIZE bytes can be
pushed onto the skb.
Without this fix, I can trivially cause kernel panics by bridging an
MT7921AU-based USB 802.11ax interface with an Ethernet interface on an
Intel Atom-based x86 system using its onboard RTL8169 PCI Ethernet
adapter and also on an ARM-based Raspberry Pi 1 using its onboard
SMSC9512 USB Ethernet adapter. Note that the panics do not occur in
every system configuration, as they occur only if the receiving netdev
leaves less headroom in its received skbs than the mt7921 needs for its
SDIO headers.
Here is an example stack trace of this panic on Raspberry Pi OS Lite
2023-02-21 running kernel 6.1.24+ [1]:
skb_panic from skb_push+0x44/0x48
skb_push from mt7921_usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb+0xd4/0x190 [mt7921_common]
mt7921_usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb [mt7921_common] from mt76u_tx_queue_skb+0x94/0x1d0 [mt76_usb]
mt76u_tx_queue_skb [mt76_usb] from __mt76_tx_queue_skb+0x4c/0xc8 [mt76]
__mt76_tx_queue_skb [mt76] from mt76_txq_schedule.part.0+0x13c/0x398 [mt76]
mt76_txq_schedule.part.0 [mt76] from mt76_txq_schedule_all+0x24/0x30 [mt76]
mt76_txq_schedule_all [mt76] from mt7921_tx_worker+0x58/0xf4 [mt7921_common]
mt7921_tx_worker [mt7921_common] from __mt76_worker_fn+0x9c/0xec [mt76]
__mt76_worker_fn [mt76] from kthread+0xbc/0xe0
kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x34
After this fix, bridging the mt7921 interface works fine on both of my
previously problematic systems.
[1] https://github.com/raspberrypi/firmware/tree/5c276f55a4b21345cd4d6200a504ee991851ff7a |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: hisi_sas: Grab sas_dev lock when traversing the members of sas_dev.list
When freeing slots in function slot_complete_v3_hw(), it is possible that
sas_dev.list is being traversed elsewhere, and it may trigger a NULL
pointer exception, such as follows:
==>cq thread ==>scsi_eh_6
==>scsi_error_handler()
==>sas_eh_handle_sas_errors()
==>sas_scsi_find_task()
==>lldd_abort_task()
==>slot_complete_v3_hw() ==>hisi_sas_abort_task()
==>hisi_sas_slot_task_free() ==>dereg_device_v3_hw()
==>list_del_init() ==>list_for_each_entry_safe()
[ 7165.434918] sas: Enter sas_scsi_recover_host busy: 32 failed: 32
[ 7165.434926] sas: trying to find task 0x00000000769b5ba5
[ 7165.434927] sas: sas_scsi_find_task: aborting task 0x00000000769b5ba5
[ 7165.434940] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(00000000769b5ba5) aborted
[ 7165.434964] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(00000000c9f7aa07) ignored
[ 7165.434965] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(00000000e2a1cf01) ignored
[ 7165.434968] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 7165.434972] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(0000000022d52d93) ignored
[ 7165.434975] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(0000000066a7516c) ignored
[ 7165.434976] Mem abort info:
[ 7165.434982] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 7165.434991] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 7165.434992] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 7165.434993] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 7165.434994] Data abort info:
[ 7165.434994] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 7165.434995] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 7165.434997] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000f29543f2
[ 7165.434998] [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 7165.435003] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 7165.439863] Process scsi_eh_6 (pid: 4109, stack limit = 0x00000000c43818d5)
[ 7165.468862] pstate: 00c00009 (nzcv daif +PAN +UAO)
[ 7165.473637] pc : dereg_device_v3_hw+0x68/0xa8 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[ 7165.479443] lr : dereg_device_v3_hw+0x2c/0xa8 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[ 7165.485247] sp : ffff00001d623bc0
[ 7165.488546] x29: ffff00001d623bc0 x28: ffffa027d03b9508
[ 7165.493835] x27: ffff80278ed50af0 x26: ffffa027dd31e0a8
[ 7165.499123] x25: ffffa027d9b27f88 x24: ffffa027d9b209f8
[ 7165.504411] x23: ffffa027c45b0d60 x22: ffff80278ec07c00
[ 7165.509700] x21: 0000000000000008 x20: ffffa027d9b209f8
[ 7165.514988] x19: ffffa027d9b27f88 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 7165.520276] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 7165.525564] x15: ffff0000091d9708 x14: ffff0000093b7dc8
[ 7165.530852] x13: ffff0000093b7a23 x12: 6e7265746e692067
[ 7165.536140] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000bb0
[ 7165.541429] x9 : ffff00001d6238f0 x8 : ffffa027d877af00
[ 7165.546718] x7 : ffffa027d6329600 x6 : ffff7e809f58ca00
[ 7165.552006] x5 : 0000000000001f8a x4 : 000000000000088e
[ 7165.557295] x3 : ffffa027d9b27fa8 x2 : 0000000000000000
[ 7165.562583] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 000000003000188e
[ 7165.567872] Call trace:
[ 7165.570309] dereg_device_v3_hw+0x68/0xa8 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[ 7165.575775] hisi_sas_abort_task+0x248/0x358 [hisi_sas_main]
[ 7165.581415] sas_eh_handle_sas_errors+0x258/0x8e0 [libsas]
[ 7165.586876] sas_scsi_recover_host+0x134/0x458 [libsas]
[ 7165.592082] scsi_error_handler+0xb4/0x488
[ 7165.596163] kthread+0x134/0x138
[ 7165.599380] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[ 7165.602940] Code: d5033e9f b9000040 aa0103e2 eb03003f (f9400021)
[ 7165.609004] kernel fault(0x1) notification starting on CPU 75
[ 7165.700728] ---[ end trace fc042cbbea224efc ]---
[ 7165.705326] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
To fix the issue, grab sas_dev lock when traversing the members of
sas_dev.list in dereg_device_v3_hw() and hisi_sas_release_tasks() to avoid
concurrency of adding and deleting member. When
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix monitor mode bringup crash
When the interface is brought up in monitor mode, it leads
to NULL pointer dereference crash. This crash happens when
the packet type is extracted for a SKB. This extraction
which is present in the received msdu delivery path,is
not needed for the monitor ring packets since they are
all RAW packets. Hence appending the flags with
"RX_FLAG_ONLY_MONITOR" to skip that extraction.
Observed calltrace:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
0000000000000064
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
CM = 0, WnR = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000048517000
[0000000000000064] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: ath11k_pci ath11k qmi_helpers
CPU: 2 PID: 1781 Comm: napi/-271 Not tainted
6.1.0-rc5-wt-ath-656295-gef907406320c-dirty #6
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. IPQ8074/AP-HK10-C2 (DT)
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : ath11k_hw_qcn9074_rx_desc_get_decap_type+0x34/0x60 [ath11k]
lr : ath11k_hw_qcn9074_rx_desc_get_decap_type+0x5c/0x60 [ath11k]
sp : ffff80000ef5bb10
x29: ffff80000ef5bb10 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff000007baafa0
x26: ffff000014a91ed0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff800002b77378 x22: ffff000014a91ec0 x21: ffff000006c8d600
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800002b77740 x18: 0000000000000006
x17: 736564203634343a x16: 656e694c20657079 x15: 0000000000000143
x14: 00000000ffffffea x13: ffff80000ef5b8b8 x12: ffff80000ef5b8c8
x11: ffff80000a591d30 x10: ffff80000a579d40 x9 : c0000000ffffefff
x8 : 0000000000000003 x7 : 0000000000017fe8 x6 : ffff80000a579ce8
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 3a35ec12ed7f8900 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000052
Call trace:
ath11k_hw_qcn9074_rx_desc_get_decap_type+0x34/0x60 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_rx_deliver_msdu.isra.42+0xa4/0x3d0 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_rx_mon_deliver.isra.43+0x2f8/0x458 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x310/0x4c0 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x234/0x338 [ath11k]
ath11k_pcic_ext_grp_napi_poll+0x30/0xb8 [ath11k]
__napi_poll+0x5c/0x190
napi_threaded_poll+0xf0/0x118
kthread+0xf4/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Tested-on: QCN9074 hw1.0 PCI WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: fix use-after-free caused by uec->work
The delayed work uec->work is scheduled in gaokun_ucsi_probe()
but never properly canceled in gaokun_ucsi_remove(). This creates
use-after-free scenarios where the ucsi and gaokun_ucsi structure
are freed after ucsi_destroy() completes execution, while the
gaokun_ucsi_register_worker() might be either currently executing
or still pending in the work queue. The already-freed gaokun_ucsi
or ucsi structure may then be accessed.
Furthermore, the race window is 3 seconds, which is sufficiently
long to make this bug easily reproducible. The following is the
trace captured by KASAN:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x5ec/0x630
Write of size 8 at addr ffff00000ec28cc8 by task swapper/0/0
...
Call trace:
show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C)
dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0x90
print_report+0x114/0x580
kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x20/0x2c
__run_timers+0x5ec/0x630
run_timer_softirq+0xe8/0x1cc
handle_softirqs+0x294/0x720
__do_softirq+0x14/0x20
____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c
call_on_irq_stack+0x30/0x48
do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x28
__irq_exit_rcu+0x27c/0x364
irq_exit_rcu+0x10/0x1c
el1_interrupt+0x40/0x60
el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8 (P)
do_idle+0x334/0x458
cpu_startup_entry+0x60/0x70
rest_init+0x158/0x174
start_kernel+0x2f8/0x394
__primary_switched+0x8c/0x94
Allocated by task 72 on cpu 0 at 27.510341s:
kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54
kasan_save_track+0x24/0x5c
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x40/0x54
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb8
__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1c0/0x588
devm_kmalloc+0x7c/0x1c8
gaokun_ucsi_probe+0xa0/0x840 auxiliary_bus_probe+0x94/0xf8
really_probe+0x17c/0x5b8
__driver_probe_device+0x158/0x2c4
driver_probe_device+0x10c/0x264
__device_attach_driver+0x168/0x2d0
bus_for_each_drv+0x100/0x188
__device_attach+0x174/0x368
device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
bus_probe_device+0x120/0x150
device_add+0xb3c/0x10fc
__auxiliary_device_add+0x88/0x130
...
Freed by task 73 on cpu 1 at 28.910627s:
kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54
kasan_save_track+0x24/0x5c
__kasan_save_free_info+0x4c/0x74
__kasan_slab_free+0x60/0x8c
kfree+0xd4/0x410
devres_release_all+0x140/0x1f0
device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x190
device_release_driver_internal+0x344/0x460
device_release_driver+0x18/0x24
bus_remove_device+0x198/0x274
device_del+0x310/0xa84
...
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff00000ec28c00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 200 bytes inside of
freed 512-byte region
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x4ec28
head: order:2 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x3fffe0000000040(head|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 03fffe0000000040 ffff000008801c80 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 03fffe0000000040 ffff000008801c80 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 03fffe0000000002 fffffdffc03b0a01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000004
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff00000ec28b80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff00000ec28c00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff00000ec28c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff00000ec28d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff00000ec28d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
================================================================
---truncated--- |
| A vulnerability was determined in WebAssembly Binaryen up to 125. Affected by this issue is the function WasmBinaryReader::readExport of the file src/wasm/wasm-binary.cpp. This manipulation causes heap-based buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack on the local host. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. Patch name: 4f52bff8c4075b5630422f902dd92a0af2c9f398. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mpls: Use rcu_dereference_rtnl() in mpls_route_input_rcu().
As syzbot reported [0], mpls_route_input_rcu() can be called
from mpls_getroute(), where is under RTNL.
net->mpls.platform_label is only updated under RTNL.
Let's use rcu_dereference_rtnl() in mpls_route_input_rcu() to
silence the splat.
[0]:
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.15.0-rc7-syzkaller-00082-g5cdb2c77c4c3 #0 Not tainted
----------------------------
net/mpls/af_mpls.c:84 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by syz.2.4451/17730:
#0: ffffffff9012a3e8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_lock net/core/rtnetlink.c:80 [inline]
#0: ffffffff9012a3e8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x371/0xe90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6961
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 17730 Comm: syz.2.4451 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-syzkaller-00082-g5cdb2c77c4c3 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x16c/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x166/0x260 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6865
mpls_route_input_rcu+0x1d4/0x200 net/mpls/af_mpls.c:84
mpls_getroute+0x621/0x1ea0 net/mpls/af_mpls.c:2381
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3c9/0xe90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6964
netlink_rcv_skb+0x16d/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x53a/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339
netlink_sendmsg+0x8d1/0xdd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:727 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0xa98/0xc70 net/socket.c:2566
___sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2620
__sys_sendmmsg+0x200/0x420 net/socket.c:2709
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2736 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2733 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9c/0x100 net/socket.c:2733
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x230 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f0a2818e969
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f0a28f52038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f0a283b5fa0 RCX: 00007f0a2818e969
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000200000000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f0a28210ab1 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f0a283b5fa0 R15: 00007ffce5e9f268
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atm: add lec_mutex
syzbot found its way in net/atm/lec.c, and found an error path
in lecd_attach() could leave a dangling pointer in dev_lec[].
Add a mutex to protect dev_lecp[] uses from lecd_attach(),
lec_vcc_attach() and lec_mcast_attach().
Following patch will use this mutex for /proc/net/atm/lec.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:751 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lane_ioctl+0x2224/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807c7b8e68 by task syz.1.17/6142
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6142 Comm: syz.1.17 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-syzkaller-00239-g08215f5486ec #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
print_report+0xcd/0x680 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634
lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:751 [inline]
lane_ioctl+0x2224/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008
do_vcc_ioctl+0x12c/0x930 net/atm/ioctl.c:159
sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1190
sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1311
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6132:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4328 [inline]
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x27b/0x620 mm/slub.c:5015
alloc_netdev_mqs+0xd2/0x1570 net/core/dev.c:11711
lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:737 [inline]
lane_ioctl+0x17db/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008
do_vcc_ioctl+0x12c/0x930 net/atm/ioctl.c:159
sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1190
sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1311
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 6132:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:576
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x51/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4643 [inline]
kfree+0x2b4/0x4d0 mm/slub.c:4842
free_netdev+0x6c5/0x910 net/core/dev.c:11892
lecd_attach net/atm/lec.c:744 [inline]
lane_ioctl+0x1ce8/0x23e0 net/atm/lec.c:1008
do_vcc_ioctl+0x12c/0x930 net/atm/ioctl.c:159
sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1190
sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1311
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:893 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: Fix null-ptr-deref in jfs_ioc_trim
[ Syzkaller Report ]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000087: 0000 [#1
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000438-0x000000000000043f]
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 10614 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
6.13.0-rc6-gfbfd64d25c7a-dirty #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-30ms
RIP: 0010:jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
Code: e7 e8 59 a4 87 fe 4d 8b 24 24 4d 8d bc 24 38 04 00 00 48 8d 93
90 82 fe ff 4c 89 ff 31 f6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900055f7cd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: 00005866a9e67ff8 RCX: 000000000000000a
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff88807c180003 R09: 1ffff1100f830000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f830001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000438
FS: 00007fe520225640(0000) GS:ffff8880b7e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005593c91b2c88 CR3: 000000014927c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x61/0xb0
? die_addr+0xb1/0xe0
? exc_general_protection+0x333/0x510
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
jfs_ioctl+0x3c8/0x4f0
? __pfx_jfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_jfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10
__se_sys_ioctl+0x269/0x350
? __pfx___se_sys_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x210
do_syscall_64+0xee/0x210
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1e0/0x330
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe51f4903ad
Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d
RSP: 002b:00007fe5202250c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe51f5cbf80 RCX: 00007fe51f4903ad
RDX: 0000000020000680 RSI: 00000000c0185879 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe520225640
R13: 000000000000000e R14: 00007fe51f44fca0 R15: 00007fe52021d000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
Code: e7 e8 59 a4 87 fe 4d 8b 24 24 4d 8d bc 24 38 04 00 00 48 8d 93
90 82 fe ff 4c 89 ff 31 f6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900055f7cd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: 00005866a9e67ff8 RCX: 000000000000000a
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff88807c180003 R09: 1ffff1100f830000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f830001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000438
FS: 00007fe520225640(0000) GS:ffff8880b7e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005593c91b2c88 CR3: 000000014927c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ Analysis ]
We believe that we have found a concurrency bug in the `fs/jfs` module
that results in a null pointer dereference. There is a closely related
issue which has been fixed:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=d6c1b3599b2feb5c7291f5ac3a36e5fa7cedb234
... but, unfortunately, the accepted patch appears to still be
susceptible to a null pointer dereference under some interleavings.
To trigger the bug, we think that `JFS_SBI(ipbmap->i_sb)->bmap` is set
to NULL in `dbFreeBits` and then dereferenced in `jfs_ioc_trim`. This
bug manifests quite rarely under normal circumstances, but is
triggereable from a syz-program. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: validate AG parameters in dbMount() to prevent crashes
Validate db_agheight, db_agwidth, and db_agstart in dbMount to catch
corrupted metadata early and avoid undefined behavior in dbAllocAG.
Limits are derived from L2LPERCTL, LPERCTL/MAXAG, and CTLTREESIZE:
- agheight: 0 to L2LPERCTL/2 (0 to 5) ensures shift
(L2LPERCTL - 2*agheight) >= 0.
- agwidth: 1 to min(LPERCTL/MAXAG, 2^(L2LPERCTL - 2*agheight))
ensures agperlev >= 1.
- Ranges: 1-8 (agheight 0-3), 1-4 (agheight 4), 1 (agheight 5).
- LPERCTL/MAXAG = 1024/128 = 8 limits leaves per AG;
2^(10 - 2*agheight) prevents division to 0.
- agstart: 0 to CTLTREESIZE-1 - agwidth*(MAXAG-1) keeps ti within
stree (size 1365).
- Ranges: 0-1237 (agwidth 1), 0-348 (agwidth 8).
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1400:9
shift exponent -335544310 is negative
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5822 Comm: syz-executor130 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x3c8/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:468
dbAllocAG+0x1087/0x10b0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1400
dbDiscardAG+0x352/0xa20 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1613
jfs_ioc_trim+0x45a/0x6b0 fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c:105
jfs_ioctl+0x2cd/0x3e0 fs/jfs/ioctl.c:131
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on sbi->total_valid_block_count
syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2521!
RIP: 0010:dec_valid_block_count+0x3b2/0x3c0 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2521
Call Trace:
f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range+0xc8c/0x11a0 fs/f2fs/file.c:695
truncate_dnode+0x417/0x740 fs/f2fs/node.c:973
truncate_nodes+0x3ec/0xf50 fs/f2fs/node.c:1014
f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x8e3/0x1370 fs/f2fs/node.c:1197
f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x840/0x12b0 fs/f2fs/file.c:810
f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10d/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:838
f2fs_truncate+0x417/0x720 fs/f2fs/file.c:888
f2fs_setattr+0xc4f/0x12f0 fs/f2fs/file.c:1112
notify_change+0xbca/0xe90 fs/attr.c:552
do_truncate+0x222/0x310 fs/open.c:65
handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3466 [inline]
do_open fs/namei.c:3849 [inline]
path_openat+0x2e4f/0x35d0 fs/namei.c:4004
do_filp_open+0x284/0x4e0 fs/namei.c:4031
do_sys_openat2+0x12b/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1429
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1444 [inline]
__do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1522 [inline]
__se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1516 [inline]
__x64_sys_creat+0x124/0x170 fs/open.c:1516
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
The reason is: in fuzzed image, sbi->total_valid_block_count is
inconsistent w/ mapped blocks indexed by inode, so, we should
not trigger panic for such case, instead, let's print log and
set fsck flag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: handle csum tree error with rescue=ibadroots correctly
[BUG]
There is syzbot based reproducer that can crash the kernel, with the
following call trace: (With some debug output added)
DEBUG: rescue=ibadroots parsed
BTRFS: device fsid 14d642db-7b15-43e4-81e6-4b8fac6a25f8 devid 1 transid 8 /dev/loop0 (7:0) scanned by repro (1010)
BTRFS info (device loop0): first mount of filesystem 14d642db-7b15-43e4-81e6-4b8fac6a25f8
BTRFS info (device loop0): using blake2b (blake2b-256-generic) checksum algorithm
BTRFS info (device loop0): using free-space-tree
BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5312512 mirror 1 wanted 0xb043382657aede36608fd3386d6b001692ff406164733d94e2d9a180412c6003 found 0x810ceb2bacb7f0f9eb2bf3b2b15c02af867cb35ad450898169f3b1f0bd818651 level 0
DEBUG: read tree root path failed for tree csum, ret=-5
BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5328896 mirror 1 wanted 0x51be4e8b303da58e6340226815b70e3a93592dac3f30dd510c7517454de8567a found 0x51be4e8b303da58e634022a315b70e3a93592dac3f30dd510c7517454de8567a level 0
BTRFS warning (device loop0): checksum verify failed on logical 5292032 mirror 1 wanted 0x1924ccd683be9efc2fa98582ef58760e3848e9043db8649ee382681e220cdee4 found 0x0cb6184f6e8799d9f8cb335dccd1d1832da1071d12290dab3b85b587ecacca6e level 0
process 'repro' launched './file2' with NULL argv: empty string added
DEBUG: no csum root, idatacsums=0 ibadroots=134217728
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000041: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000208-0x000000000000020f]
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1010 Comm: repro Tainted: G OE 6.15.0-custom+ #249 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
RIP: 0010:btrfs_lookup_csum+0x93/0x3d0 [btrfs]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_lookup_bio_sums+0x47a/0xdf0 [btrfs]
btrfs_submit_bbio+0x43e/0x1a80 [btrfs]
submit_one_bio+0xde/0x160 [btrfs]
btrfs_readahead+0x498/0x6a0 [btrfs]
read_pages+0x1c3/0xb20
page_cache_ra_order+0x4b5/0xc20
filemap_get_pages+0x2d3/0x19e0
filemap_read+0x314/0xde0
__kernel_read+0x35b/0x900
bprm_execve+0x62e/0x1140
do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x3fc/0x520
__x64_sys_execveat+0xdc/0x130
do_syscall_64+0x54/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[CAUSE]
Firstly the fs has a corrupted csum tree root, thus to mount the fs we
have to go "ro,rescue=ibadroots" mount option.
Normally with that mount option, a bad csum tree root should set
BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS flag, so that any future data read will
ignore csum search.
But in this particular case, we have the following call trace that
caused NULL csum root, but not setting BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS:
load_global_roots_objectid():
ret = btrfs_search_slot();
/* Succeeded */
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu()
found = true;
/* We found the root item for csum tree. */
root = read_tree_root_path();
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
if (!btrfs_test_opt(fs_info, IGNOREBADROOTS))
/*
* Since we have rescue=ibadroots mount option,
* @ret is still 0.
*/
break;
if (!found || ret) {
/* @found is true, @ret is 0, error handling for csum
* tree is skipped.
*/
}
This means we completely skipped to set BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS if
the csum tree is corrupted, which results unexpected later csum lookup.
[FIX]
If read_tree_root_path() failed, always populate @ret to the error
number.
As at the end of the function, we need @ret to determine if we need to
do the extra error handling for csum tree. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bcache: fix NULL pointer in cache_set_flush()
1. LINE#1794 - LINE#1887 is some codes about function of
bch_cache_set_alloc().
2. LINE#2078 - LINE#2142 is some codes about function of
register_cache_set().
3. register_cache_set() will call bch_cache_set_alloc() in LINE#2098.
1794 struct cache_set *bch_cache_set_alloc(struct cache_sb *sb)
1795 {
...
1860 if (!(c->devices = kcalloc(c->nr_uuids, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL)) ||
1861 mempool_init_slab_pool(&c->search, 32, bch_search_cache) ||
1862 mempool_init_kmalloc_pool(&c->bio_meta, 2,
1863 sizeof(struct bbio) + sizeof(struct bio_vec) *
1864 bucket_pages(c)) ||
1865 mempool_init_kmalloc_pool(&c->fill_iter, 1, iter_size) ||
1866 bioset_init(&c->bio_split, 4, offsetof(struct bbio, bio),
1867 BIOSET_NEED_BVECS|BIOSET_NEED_RESCUER) ||
1868 !(c->uuids = alloc_bucket_pages(GFP_KERNEL, c)) ||
1869 !(c->moving_gc_wq = alloc_workqueue("bcache_gc",
1870 WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 0)) ||
1871 bch_journal_alloc(c) ||
1872 bch_btree_cache_alloc(c) ||
1873 bch_open_buckets_alloc(c) ||
1874 bch_bset_sort_state_init(&c->sort, ilog2(c->btree_pages)))
1875 goto err;
^^^^^^^^
1876
...
1883 return c;
1884 err:
1885 bch_cache_set_unregister(c);
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
1886 return NULL;
1887 }
...
2078 static const char *register_cache_set(struct cache *ca)
2079 {
...
2098 c = bch_cache_set_alloc(&ca->sb);
2099 if (!c)
2100 return err;
^^^^^^^^^^
...
2128 ca->set = c;
2129 ca->set->cache[ca->sb.nr_this_dev] = ca;
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
...
2138 return NULL;
2139 err:
2140 bch_cache_set_unregister(c);
2141 return err;
2142 }
(1) If LINE#1860 - LINE#1874 is true, then do 'goto err'(LINE#1875) and
call bch_cache_set_unregister()(LINE#1885).
(2) As (1) return NULL(LINE#1886), LINE#2098 - LINE#2100 would return.
(3) As (2) has returned, LINE#2128 - LINE#2129 would do *not* give the
value to c->cache[], it means that c->cache[] is NULL.
LINE#1624 - LINE#1665 is some codes about function of cache_set_flush().
As (1), in LINE#1885 call
bch_cache_set_unregister()
---> bch_cache_set_stop()
---> closure_queue()
-.-> cache_set_flush() (as below LINE#1624)
1624 static void cache_set_flush(struct closure *cl)
1625 {
...
1654 for_each_cache(ca, c, i)
1655 if (ca->alloc_thread)
^^
1656 kthread_stop(ca->alloc_thread);
...
1665 }
(4) In LINE#1655 ca is NULL(see (3)) in cache_set_flush() then the
kernel crash occurred as below:
[ 846.712887] bcache: register_cache() error drbd6: cannot allocate memory
[ 846.713242] bcache: register_bcache() error : failed to register device
[ 846.713336] bcache: cache_set_free() Cache set 2f84bdc1-498a-4f2f-98a7-01946bf54287 unregistered
[ 846.713768] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000009f8
[ 846.714790] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 846.715129] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 846.715472] CPU: 19 PID: 5057 Comm: kworker/19:16 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE --------- - - 4.18.0-147.5.1.el8_1.5es.3.x86_64 #1
[ 846.716082] Hardware name: ESPAN GI-25212/X11DPL-i, BIOS 2.1 06/15/2018
[ 846.716451] Workqueue: events cache_set_flush [bcache]
[ 846.716808] RIP: 0010:cache_set_flush+0xc9/0x1b0 [bcache]
[ 846.717155] Code: 00 4c 89 a5 b0 03 00 00 48 8b 85 68 f6 ff ff a8 08 0f 84 88 00 00 00 31 db 66 83 bd 3c f7 ff ff 00 48 8b 85 48 ff ff ff 74 28 <48> 8b b8 f8 09 00 0
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
calipso: Fix null-ptr-deref in calipso_req_{set,del}attr().
syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in sock_omalloc() while allocating
a CALIPSO option. [0]
The NULL is of struct sock, which was fetched by sk_to_full_sk() in
calipso_req_setattr().
Since commit a1a5344ddbe8 ("tcp: avoid two atomic ops for syncookies"),
reqsk->rsk_listener could be NULL when SYN Cookie is returned to its
client, as hinted by the leading SYN Cookie log.
Here are 3 options to fix the bug:
1) Return 0 in calipso_req_setattr()
2) Return an error in calipso_req_setattr()
3) Alaways set rsk_listener
1) is no go as it bypasses LSM, but 2) effectively disables SYN Cookie
for CALIPSO. 3) is also no go as there have been many efforts to reduce
atomic ops and make TCP robust against DDoS. See also commit 3b24d854cb35
("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood").
As of the blamed commit, SYN Cookie already did not need refcounting,
and no one has stumbled on the bug for 9 years, so no CALIPSO user will
care about SYN Cookie.
Let's return an error in calipso_req_setattr() and calipso_req_delattr()
in the SYN Cookie case.
This can be reproduced by [1] on Fedora and now connect() of nc times out.
[0]:
TCP: request_sock_TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 12262 Comm: syz.1.2611 Not tainted 6.14.0 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:406 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_kmalloc+0x35/0x170 net/core/sock.c:2806
Code: 89 d5 41 54 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 25 e3 c6 fd e8 f0 91 e3 00 48 8d 7b 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 26 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b
RSP: 0018:ffff88811af89038 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888105266400
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88800c890000 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: 0000000000000050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810526640e
R10: ffffed1020a4cc81 R11: ffff88810526640f R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000820 R14: ffff888105266400 R15: 0000000000000050
FS: 00007f0653a07640(0000) GS:ffff88811af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f863ba096f4 CR3: 00000000163c0005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
ipv6_renew_options+0x279/0x950 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1288
calipso_req_setattr+0x181/0x340 net/ipv6/calipso.c:1204
calipso_req_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:597
netlbl_req_setattr+0x18a/0x440 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1249
selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request+0x1fb/0x320 security/selinux/netlabel.c:342
selinux_inet_conn_request+0x1eb/0x2c0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5551
security_inet_conn_request+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4945
tcp_v6_route_req+0x22c/0x550 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:825
tcp_conn_request+0xec8/0x2b70 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7275
tcp_v6_conn_request+0x1e3/0x440 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1328
tcp_rcv_state_process+0xafa/0x52b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6781
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x8a6/0x1a40 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1667
tcp_v6_rcv+0x505e/0x5b50 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1904
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x17c/0x1da0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:436
ip6_input_finish+0x103/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:480
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
ip6_input+0x13c/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491
dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0xb6/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netf
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix WARN() in get_bpf_raw_tp_regs
syzkaller reported an issue:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 5971 at kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861 get_bpf_raw_tp_regs+0xa4/0x100 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 5971 Comm: syz-executor205 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5-syzkaller-00038-g707df3375124 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:get_bpf_raw_tp_regs+0xa4/0x100 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003636fa8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ffffffff81c6bc4c
RDX: ffff888032efc880 RSI: ffffffff81c6bc83 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: ffff88806a730860 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc90003637008 R15: 0000000000000900
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880d6cdf000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f7baee09130 CR3: 0000000029f5a000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
____bpf_get_stack_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1934 [inline]
bpf_get_stack_raw_tp+0x24/0x160 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1931
bpf_prog_ec3b2eefa702d8d3+0x43/0x47
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1316 [inline]
__bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline]
bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline]
__bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2363 [inline]
bpf_trace_run3+0x23f/0x5a0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2405
__bpf_trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned+0xfc/0x140 include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47
__traceiter_mmap_lock_acquire_returned+0x79/0xc0 include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47
__do_trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 [inline]
trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 [inline]
__mmap_lock_do_trace_acquire_returned+0x138/0x1f0 mm/mmap_lock.c:35
__mmap_lock_trace_acquire_returned include/linux/mmap_lock.h:36 [inline]
mmap_read_trylock include/linux/mmap_lock.h:204 [inline]
stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0x535/0x6f0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:157
__bpf_get_stack+0x307/0xa10 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:483
____bpf_get_stack kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:499 [inline]
bpf_get_stack+0x32/0x40 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:496
____bpf_get_stack_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1941 [inline]
bpf_get_stack_raw_tp+0x124/0x160 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1931
bpf_prog_ec3b2eefa702d8d3+0x43/0x47
Tracepoint like trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned may cause nested call
as the corner case show above, which will be resolved with more general
method in the future. As a result, WARN_ON_ONCE will be triggered. As
Alexei suggested, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix NULL deref in debugfs odm_combine_segments
When a connector is connected but inactive (e.g., disabled by desktop
environments), pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg will be destroyed. Then, reading
odm_combine_segments causes kernel NULL pointer dereference.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 26474 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.17.0+ #2 PREEMPT(lazy) e6a17af9ee6db7c63e9d90dbe5b28ccab67520c6
Hardware name: LENOVO 21Q4/LNVNB161216, BIOS PXCN25WW 03/27/2025
RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu]
Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00>
RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8
RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0
R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08
R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
seq_read_iter+0x125/0x490
? __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18f/0x350
seq_read+0x12c/0x170
full_proxy_read+0x51/0x80
vfs_read+0xbc/0x390
? __handle_mm_fault+0xa46/0xef0
? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900
ksys_read+0x73/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900
? count_memcg_events+0xc2/0x190
? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2d0
? do_user_addr_fault+0x21a/0x690
? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
RIP: 0033:0x7f44d4031687
Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00>
RSP: 002b:00007ffdb4b5f0b0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f44d3f9f740 RCX: 00007f44d4031687
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f44d3f5e000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f44d3f5e000
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000
</TASK>
Modules linked in: tls tcp_diag inet_diag xt_mark ccm snd_hrtimer snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_midi snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device x>
snd_hda_codec_atihdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib lenovo_wmi_helpers think_lmi snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_soc_core kvm snd_compress uvcvideo sn>
platform_profile joydev amd_pmc mousedev mac_hid sch_fq_codel uinput i2c_dev parport_pc ppdev lp parport nvme_fabrics loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables dm_cryp>
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu]
Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00>
RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8
RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0
R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08
R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Fix this by checking pipe_ctx->
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/mediatek: Disable AFBC support on Mediatek DRM driver
Commit c410fa9b07c3 ("drm/mediatek: Add AFBC support to Mediatek DRM
driver") added AFBC support to Mediatek DRM and enabled the
32x8/split/sparse modifier.
However, this is currently broken on Mediatek MT8188 (Genio 700 EVK
platform); tested using upstream Kernel and Mesa (v25.2.1), AFBC is used by
default since Mesa v25.0.
Kernel trace reports vblank timeouts constantly, and the render is garbled:
```
[CRTC:62:crtc-0] vblank wait timed out
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 70 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:1835 drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c
[...]
Hardware name: MediaTek Genio-700 EVK (DT)
Workqueue: events_unbound commit_work
pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c
lr : drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c
sp : ffff80008337bca0
x29: ffff80008337bcd0 x28: 0000000000000061 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff0000c9dcc000
x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c66f2f80
x20: ffff0000c0d7d880 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 000000000000000a
x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 005000f2b5503510 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 74756f2064656d69 x12: 742074696177206b
x11: 0000000000000058 x10: 0000000000000018 x9 : ffff800082396a70
x8 : 0000000000057fa8 x7 : 0000000000000cce x6 : ffff8000823eea70
x5 : ffff0001fef5f408 x4 : ffff80017ccee000 x3 : ffff0000c12cb480
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000c12cb480
Call trace:
drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c (P)
drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail_rpm+0x64/0x80
commit_tail+0xa4/0x1a4
commit_work+0x14/0x20
process_one_work+0x150/0x290
worker_thread+0x2d0/0x3ec
kthread+0x12c/0x210
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
```
Until this gets fixed upstream, disable AFBC support on this platform, as
it's currently broken with upstream Mesa. |
