| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An issue was discovered on goTenna v1 devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 0.25.5. By default, the GID is the user's phone number unless they specifically opt out. A phone number is very sensitive information because it can be tied back to individuals. The app does not encrypt the GID in messages. |
| An issue was discovered on goTenna v1 devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 0.25.5. The app uses a custom implementation of encryption without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to an attacker that can access the message. |
| An issue was discovered on goTenna Mesh devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 1.1.12. By default, a GID is the user's phone number unless they specifically opt out. A phone number is very sensitive information because it can be tied back to individuals. The app does not encrypt the GID in messages. |
| An issue was discovered on goTenna v1 devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 0.25.5. The app there makes it possible to inject any custom message (into existing v1 networks) with any GID and Callsign via a software defined radio. This can be exploited if the device is being used in an unencrypted environment or if the cryptography has already been compromised. |
| An issue was discovered on goTenna v1 devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 0.25.5. All packets sent over RF are also sent over UART with USB Shell, allowing someone with local access to gain information about the protocol and intercept sensitive data. |
| An issue was discovered on goTenna v1 devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 0.25.5. A command channel includes the next hop. which can be intercepted and used to break frequency hopping. |
| An issue was discovered on goTenna Mesh devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 1.1.12. The verification token used for sending SMS through a goTenna server is hardcoded in the app. |
| An issue was discovered on goTenna v1 devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 0.25.5. The verification token used for sending SMS through a goTenna server is hardcoded in the app. |
| An issue was discovered on goTenna Mesh devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 1.1.12. It uses a custom implementation of encryption without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to an attacker that can access the message. |
| The goTenna Pro App uses a weak password for sharing encryption keys via
the key broadcast method. If the broadcasted encryption key is captured
over RF, and password is cracked via brute force attack, it is possible
to decrypt it and use it to decrypt all future and past messages sent
via encrypted broadcast with that particular key. This only applies when
the key is broadcasted over RF. This is an optional feature, so it is
recommended to use local QR encryption key sharing for additional
security on this and previous versions. |
| The goTenna Pro ATAK plugin uses a weak password for sharing encryption
keys via the key broadcast method. If the broadcasted encryption key is
captured over RF, and password is cracked via brute force attack, it is
possible to decrypt it and use it to decrypt all future and past
messages sent via encrypted broadcast with that particular key. This
only applies when the key is broadcasted over RF. This is an optional
feature, so it is advised to use local QR encryption key sharing for
additional security on this and previous versions. |
| The goTenna Pro App uses AES CTR type encryption for short, encrypted
messages without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This
leaves messages malleable to an attacker that can access the message. It
is recommended to continue to use encryption in the app and update to
the current release for more secure operations. |
| The goTenna Pro App allows unauthenticated attackers to remotely update
the local public keys used for P2P and group messages. It is advised to
update your app to the current release for enhanced encryption
protocols. |
| The goTenna Pro App does not inject extra characters into broadcasted
frames to obfuscate the length of messages. This makes it possible to
tell the length of the payload regardless of the encryption used. |
| The goTenna Pro App encryption key name is always sent unencrypted when
the key is shared over RF through a broadcast message. It is advised to
share the encryption key via local QR for higher security operations. |
| In the goTenna Pro App there is a vulnerability that makes it possible
to inject any custom message with any GID and Callsign using a software
defined radio in existing goTenna mesh networks. This vulnerability can
be exploited if the device is being used in an unencrypted environment
or if the cryptography has already been compromised. It is advised to
share encryption keys via QR scanning for higher security operations and
update your app to the current release for enhanced encryption
protocols. |
| The goTenna Pro App does not use SecureRandom when generating passwords
for sharing cryptographic keys. The random function in use makes it
easier for attackers to brute force this password if the broadcasted
encryption key is captured over RF. This only applies to the optional
broadcast of an encryption key, so it is advised to share the key with
local QR code for higher security operations. |
| The goTenna Pro App does not authenticate public keys which allows an
unauthenticated attacker to manipulate messages. It is advised to update
your app to the current release for enhanced encryption protocols. |
| The goTenna Pro App does not encrypt callsigns in messages. It is
recommended to not use sensitive information in callsigns when using
this and previous versions of the app and update your app to the current
app version which uses AES-256 encryption for callsigns in encrypted
operation. |
| In the goTenna Pro App, the encryption keys are stored along with a
static IV on the End User Device (EUD). This allows for complete
decryption of keys stored on the EUD if physically compromised. This
allows an attacker to decrypt all encrypted broadcast communications
based on encryption keys stored on the EUD. This requires access to and
control of the EUD, so it is recommended to use strong access control
measures and layered encryption on the EUD for more secure operation. |
