Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race
sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access()
to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task's
robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the
target process.
During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a
privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings
may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before
this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information
after the target becomes privileged.
A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which
ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a
privileged state via exec().
For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a
setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T
is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions
based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec
immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory
mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T->robust_list
without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a
now-privileged process.
This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could
expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger
exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized
disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a
potential security risk.
Take a read lock on signal->exec_update_lock prior to invoking
ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list.
This ensures that the target task's exec state remains stable during the
check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of
credentials.
futex: Don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race
sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access()
to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task's
robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the
target process.
During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a
privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings
may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before
this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information
after the target becomes privileged.
A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which
ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a
privileged state via exec().
For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a
setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T
is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions
based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec
immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory
mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T->robust_list
without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a
now-privileged process.
This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could
expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger
exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized
disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a
potential security risk.
Take a read lock on signal->exec_update_lock prior to invoking
ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list.
This ensures that the target task's exec state remains stable during the
check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of
credentials.
Analysis
No analysis available yet.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | unaffected |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Linux | Linux | affected |
|
No data.
No data.
No data available yet.
Remediation
No remediation available yet.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
 Debian DLA |
DLA-4436-1 | linux-6.1 security update |
 Ubuntu USN |
USN-8029-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-8030-1 | Linux kernel (GCP) vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-8029-2 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-8048-1 | Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-8029-3 | Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-8095-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-8095-2 | Linux kernel (FIPS) vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-8100-1 | Linux kernel (NVIDIA) vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-8095-3 | Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-8095-4 | Linux kernel (AWS) vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-8125-1 | Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities |
| Ubuntu USN |
USN-8126-1 | Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities |
References
History
Wed, 10 Dec 2025 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Tue, 09 Dec 2025 04:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex: Don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access() to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task's robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the target process. During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information after the target becomes privileged. A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a privileged state via exec(). For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T->robust_list without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a now-privileged process. This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a potential security risk. Take a read lock on signal->exec_update_lock prior to invoking ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list. This ensures that the target task's exec state remains stable during the check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of credentials. | |
| Title | futex: Don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-01-02T15:33:41.800Z
Reserved: 2025-04-16T07:20:57.187Z
Link: CVE-2025-40341
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2025-12-09T16:17:44.387
Modified: 2025-12-09T18:36:53.557
Link: CVE-2025-40341
Redhat
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.