Flowise up to version 3.1.4 fails to enforce authorization on its BullMQ admin dashboard. When the application runs in queue mode with the dashboard enabled and not in cloud mode, the /admin/queues mount relies only on JWT verification and performs no role, permission, or workspace/organization scoping checks. This permits any authenticated user, even a tenant’s lowest‑privileged member, to access the full Bull‑Board user interface and read or modify all queues, job payloads, chat inputs, override configurations, graph definitions, credential identifiers, system prompts, chat identifiers, files and the originating organization or workspace identifiers. The dashboard also allows write operations such as retry, remove, promote, and clean across tenants, potentially enabling data tampering or deletion. The consequence is a high‑impact confidentiality breach and integrity violation for all tenants shared on the instance.

Flowise AI’s Flowise product, versions up to and including 3.1.4, when deployed in queue mode with the BullMQ dashboard enabled and running in non‑cloud mode. All user accounts authenticated to the instance are vulnerable, regardless of role or tenant context.

The vulnerability scores a CVSS of 8.7, indicating a high severity level, and it is not currently tracked in the CISA KEV catalog. The EPSS score is unavailable, but the lack of an exploit check suggests the risk exists primarily for environments where the dashboard is enabled. An attacker only needs to be authenticated with the application; no special privileges are required due to the missing role check. The attack vector is most likely internal or through any authenticated session, allowing attackers to enumerate and manipulate multi‑tenant data across the entire instance.