Description
shell-quote's `quote()` function emits a `{ comment }` token as `#` followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029) in that later string therefore ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input: `quote(['echo', 'ok', { comment: 'x' }, 'a\nid;#'])` runs `id` in sh, bash, dash, ksh and zsh. `parse()` emits a comment token for a `#` in the middle of a word (for example `http://example.com/#frag`), so callers that combine `parse()` output with another untrusted string, such as `quote(parse(untrustedCommand).concat(untrustedArg))`, are affected. The fix for CVE-2026-9277 rejected line terminators in the comment's own text, but not in the tokens after it. Fixed in 1.11.0: `quote()` throws a `TypeError` when a string after a `{ comment }` token contains a line terminator.
Published: 2026-09-29
Score: 9.2 Critical
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: Remote Code Execution
Action: Immediate Patch
AI Analysis

Impact

The shell-quote library’s quote() function generates a comment token (#) that comments out the remainder of the shell line. If a line terminator (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029) appears in a subsequent string token, the comment ends at that point, causing the remainder of the string to be parsed as active shell input. Malicious callers that supply untrusted data to quote() or combine parse() output with untrusted arguments can therefore inject arbitrary shell commands such as id, resulting in full command execution in the context of the running process. This vulnerability is a classic command injection flaw, represented by CWE‑78.

Affected Systems

This issue affects the npm package shell-quote for all Node.js applications that use the quote() or parse() functions to construct shell commands. Versions prior to 1.11.0 are vulnerable; version 1.11.0 and later contain a guard that throws a TypeError when a string following a { comment } token contains a line terminator.

Risk and Exploitability

The vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 9.2, indicating high severity. The EPSS score is not available, and it is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog, suggesting no widespread exploitation reports yet. Nevertheless, the flaw is exploitable in any context where untrusted user input is passed to quote() or parse() and concatenated with other command components, without additional validation. Attackers could exploit this remotely if the application accepts user-controlled input that eventually flows to shell-quote; no privileged access is required beyond the execution context of the vulnerable process.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 29, 2026 at 05:21 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade shell-quote to version 1.11.0 or later, which rejects injected line terminators in strings following comment tokens.
  • Validate or sanitize any untrusted strings before passing them to quote() or parse(), removing line terminators, comment tokens, and other shell meta-characters.
  • Refactor code to avoid concatenating parse() output with untrusted data; use safer APIs or libraries that escape all shell arguments automatically.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 29, 2026 at 05:21 UTC.

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Tue, 29 Sep 2026 04:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description shell-quote's `quote()` function emits a `{ comment }` token as `#` followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029) in that later string therefore ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input: `quote(['echo', 'ok', { comment: 'x' }, 'a\nid;#'])` runs `id` in sh, bash, dash, ksh and zsh. `parse()` emits a comment token for a `#` in the middle of a word (for example `http://example.com/#frag`), so callers that combine `parse()` output with another untrusted string, such as `quote(parse(untrustedCommand).concat(untrustedArg))`, are affected. The fix for CVE-2026-9277 rejected line terminators in the comment's own text, but not in the tokens after it. Fixed in 1.11.0: `quote()` throws a `TypeError` when a string after a `{ comment }` token contains a line terminator.
Title shell-quote `quote()` command injection via a line terminator in a token after a `{ comment }` token
Weaknesses CWE-78
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

cvssV4_0

{'score': 9.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


Subscriptions

No data.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: harborist

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-29T03:47:36.376Z

Reserved: 2026-09-29T03:43:27.967Z

Link: CVE-2026-102422

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-29T04:17:55.707

Modified: 2026-09-29T04:17:55.707

Link: CVE-2026-102422

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-29T05:30:12Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-78

    Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')