Description
Zephyr's native TCP stack iterates the global connection list in net_tcp_foreach() (subsys/net/ip/tcp.c) using the SYS_SLIST_FOR_EACH_CONTAINER_SAFE macro, which caches a pointer to the next list node. Prior to this fix the function released tcp_lock while invoking the per-connection callback and re-acquired it afterwards.

During that window a concurrent tcp_conn_release(), running on the dedicated TCP work-queue thread when a connection's reference count drops to zero (e.g. a remote peer closing or resetting the connection), can remove and k_mem_slab_free() the cached next connection. When the iterator advances it dereferences the freed (and possibly reallocated) slab memory — a use-after-free that can crash the system (denial of service) and, if the slot has been reused, cause the callback to operate on an attacker-influenced object (potential information disclosure or further fault).

net_tcp_foreach() is reached in production via the net conn network shell command and via net_tcp_close_all_for_iface() on interface-down; the freeing side is driven by ordinary TCP traffic.

The fix moves the connection/context teardown in tcp_conn_release() inside the tcp_lock critical section and keeps tcp_lock held across the callback in net_tcp_foreach(). The defect was introduced with the modern (TCP2) stack in 2020 and affects releases up to and including v4.4.0.
Published: 2026-06-15
Score: 4.8 Medium
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

Zephyr’s native TCP stack contains a use‑after‑free vulnerability in net_tcp_foreach(). The function iterates the global TCP connection list and temporarily releases tcp_lock while invoking a per‑connection callback. In this window a concurrent tcp_conn_release() can free the next connection in the list, causing the iterator to dereference freed memory. When that occurs the system crashes, leading to a denial of service. If the freed slab is later reallocated, the callback may act on attacker‑controlled data, raising the possibility of information disclosure or additional faults. The flaw, classified as CWE‑416, was introduced with the modern TCP2 stack in 2020 and affects all Zephyr releases through v4.4.0.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability is present in Zephyr RTOS versions up to and including 4.4.0, including all releases that use the modern TCP2 stack introduced in 2020. Devices built with zephyrproject:zephyr and exposing the 'net conn' network shell command or that perform net_tcp_close_all_for_iface() on interface‑down are affected.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 4.8 indicates moderate severity, while an EPSS score of less than 1% suggests a low probability of current exploitation. Attack is likely local or through accepted TCP traffic, requiring a timing window the iteration. Based on the description, that the attacker needs to iteration, which could be facilitated by crafted packets to increase the race condition probability. The flaw is not listed in CISA KEV.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on July 26, 2026 at 00:18 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Apply the Zephyr kernel 4.4.1 or later, which fixes the CWE‑416 Use‑ the the lock‑release during iteration, mitigating the CWE‑416 use‑after‑free risk.
  • Isolate the device from untrusted networks that could cause concurrent TCP cleanup, for example by blocking or rate‑limiting external TCP traffic, thereby reducing the chance of the race condition identified as CWE‑416.
  • In development environments, use memory sanitizers or static analysis tools to detect and eliminate use‑after‑free patterns, directly addressing the CWE‑416 weakness.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on July 26, 2026 at 00:18 UTC.

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Tue, 14 Jul 2026 19:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Zephyr's native TCP stack iterates the global connection list in net_tcp_foreach() (subsys/net/ip/tcp.c) using the SYS_SLIST_FOR_EACH_CONTAINER_SAFE macro, which caches a pointer to the next list node. Prior to this fix the function released tcp_lock while invoking the per-connection callback and re-acquired it afterwards. During that window a concurrent tcp_conn_release(), running on the dedicated TCP work-queue thread when a connection's reference count drops to zero (e.g. a remote peer closing or resetting the connection), can remove and k_mem_slab_free() the cached next connection. When the iterator advances it dereferences the freed (and possibly reallocated) slab memory — a use-after-free that can crash the system (denial of service) and, if the slot has been reused, cause the callback to operate on an attacker-influenced object (potential information disclosure or further fault). net_tcp_foreach() is reached in production via the 'net conn' network shell command and via net_tcp_close_all_for_iface() on interface-down; the freeing side is driven by ordinary TCP traffic. The fix moves the connection/context teardown in tcp_conn_release() inside the tcp_lock critical section and keeps tcp_lock held across the callback in net_tcp_foreach(). The defect was introduced with the modern (TCP2) stack in 2020 and affects releases up to and including v4.4.0. Zephyr's native TCP stack iterates the global connection list in net_tcp_foreach() (subsys/net/ip/tcp.c) using the SYS_SLIST_FOR_EACH_CONTAINER_SAFE macro, which caches a pointer to the next list node. Prior to this fix the function released tcp_lock while invoking the per-connection callback and re-acquired it afterwards. During that window a concurrent tcp_conn_release(), running on the dedicated TCP work-queue thread when a connection's reference count drops to zero (e.g. a remote peer closing or resetting the connection), can remove and k_mem_slab_free() the cached next connection. When the iterator advances it dereferences the freed (and possibly reallocated) slab memory — a use-after-free that can crash the system (denial of service) and, if the slot has been reused, cause the callback to operate on an attacker-influenced object (potential information disclosure or further fault). net_tcp_foreach() is reached in production via the net conn network shell command and via net_tcp_close_all_for_iface() on interface-down; the freeing side is driven by ordinary TCP traffic. The fix moves the connection/context teardown in tcp_conn_release() inside the tcp_lock critical section and keeps tcp_lock held across the callback in net_tcp_foreach(). The defect was introduced with the modern (TCP2) stack in 2020 and affects releases up to and including v4.4.0.
Title Use-after-free in Zephyr native TCP net_tcp_foreach() due to dropping tcp_lock during the callback Use-after-free in Zephyr native TCP `net_tcp_foreach()` due to dropping `tcp_lock` during the callback

Tue, 16 Jun 2026 08:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Zephyrproject
Zephyrproject zephyr
Vendors & Products Zephyrproject
Zephyrproject zephyr

Mon, 15 Jun 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Mon, 15 Jun 2026 16:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Zephyr's native TCP stack iterates the global connection list in net_tcp_foreach() (subsys/net/ip/tcp.c) using the SYS_SLIST_FOR_EACH_CONTAINER_SAFE macro, which caches a pointer to the next list node. Prior to this fix the function released tcp_lock while invoking the per-connection callback and re-acquired it afterwards. During that window a concurrent tcp_conn_release(), running on the dedicated TCP work-queue thread when a connection's reference count drops to zero (e.g. a remote peer closing or resetting the connection), can remove and k_mem_slab_free() the cached next connection. When the iterator advances it dereferences the freed (and possibly reallocated) slab memory — a use-after-free that can crash the system (denial of service) and, if the slot has been reused, cause the callback to operate on an attacker-influenced object (potential information disclosure or further fault). net_tcp_foreach() is reached in production via the 'net conn' network shell command and via net_tcp_close_all_for_iface() on interface-down; the freeing side is driven by ordinary TCP traffic. The fix moves the connection/context teardown in tcp_conn_release() inside the tcp_lock critical section and keeps tcp_lock held across the callback in net_tcp_foreach(). The defect was introduced with the modern (TCP2) stack in 2020 and affects releases up to and including v4.4.0.
Title Use-after-free in Zephyr native TCP net_tcp_foreach() due to dropping tcp_lock during the callback
Weaknesses CWE-416
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 4.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}


Subscriptions

Zephyrproject Zephyr
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: zephyr

Published:

Updated: 2026-07-14T18:38:28.252Z

Reserved: 2026-06-02T15:10:50.607Z

Link: CVE-2026-10634

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-06-15T16:06:45.460Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2026-06-15T16:16:32.223

Modified: 2026-06-15T20:52:58.193

Link: CVE-2026-10634

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-07-26T00:30:04Z

Weaknesses