Technical impact
Kafka brokers validate JWT signatures but, by default, do not check the issuer (iss) or audience (aud) claims unless explicitly configured. This weakness is identified as CWE-1188 and CWE-345. A token that is correctly signed but originates from a different issuer, or that omits the aud claim, will be accepted as authenticated. This allows a malicious actor to authenticate as an unauthorized principal, potentially with higher privileges, and gain access to protected Kafka resources.
Affected Systems
Based on the description, it is inferred that the vulnerability affects all Apache Kafka releases up to and including 4.3.x that use SASL/OAUTHBEARER authentication. Releases prior to 4.4.0 default to no enforcement of issuer or audience validation even though the verification of the JWT signature remains intact. The flaw is relevant for deployments where a single JWKS endpoint serves keys for multiple issuers, such as multi‑tenant identity providers or shared signing keys.
Risk and Exploitability
Based on the description, it is inferred that the attack vector is an attacker presenting a validly signed JWT in a SASL/OAUTHBEARER connection. The CVSS score of 5.9 indicates moderate severity. The EPSS score is below 1%, suggesting a low exploitation probability, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog, indicating no publicly known exploit so far. The ability to authenticate with a validly signed token from an untrusted issuer poses a risk to confidentiality and integrity of the Kafka cluster, especially in multi‑issuer JWKS deployments.