Trigger.dev’s replay endpoint allows a tenant to replay a run identified only by its friendlyId without constraining the lookup to the caller’s runtime environment. If an attacker has a valid API key for any tenant and knows a victim’s run friendlyId, they can replay that run into their own workspace and read the victim’s task payload, exposing sensitive data.

All versions of trigger.dev prior to 4.5.0 are affected. The issue impacts the trigger.dev project hosted under the triggerdotdev:trigger.dev vendor. No specific build numbers beyond the major release are listed, so all earlier releases should be considered vulnerable.

The CVSS score of 6 highlights moderate severity. The EPSS score of less than 1% indicates a very low chance of widespread exploitation at present, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog. The attacker requires possession of a tenant’s API key and knowledge of a run’s friendlyId, so the attack vector is an authenticated API request. If these prerequisites are met, the vulnerability can be exploited with a simple HTTP replay, allowing sensitive payload disclosure.