Description
obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.
Published: 2026-10-23
Score: 7.1 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: Destructive operations via approval bypass
Action: Immediate Patch
AI Analysis

Impact

obsidian-tc, a server for managing Obsidian vaults, had a flaw from version 1.13.0 through 1.31.4 that allowed a client to perform destructive requests after a user declined or omitted a required confirmation. The system mistrusted a previously minted requestState as evidence of approval, even when the confirmation step had been bypassed. As a result, harmful actions such as note overwrites or moves could be executed without the human’s consent, though the caller still needed normal tool permissions. This weakness is classified as an authorization error and a missing authorization check in the handling of destructive tools.

Affected Systems

The-40-Thieves obsidian-tc deployments that use a streamable HTTP interface auth.jwtSecret enabled and a compatible client that supports elicitation.forms, specifically versions from 1.13.0 up to 1.31.4, are impacted. Deployments that use stdio or leave the JWT secret unset are not affected.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 7.1 indicates a high severity. The exploit requires network access to the HTTP API and a client capable of forging requestState, so the attack vector is likely remote over the network. The probability of exploitation is unclear due to lack of EPSS data, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, suggesting no known widespread use. However, the flaw allows an attacker with access to the API to perform destructive operations without legitimate approval, leading to data corruption or loss.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 23, 2026 at 15:57 UTC.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade obsidian-tc to version 1.31.4 or later.
  • Restrict HTTP API access to trusted hosts and enforce proper authorization policies, ensuring that destructive tools are isolated or disabled for untrusted users.
  • Require active human confirmation before allowing destructive operations and audit tool usage logs for unusual activity.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 23, 2026 at 15:57 UTC.

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History

Fri, 23 Oct 2026 14:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.
Title obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP
Weaknesses CWE-285
CWE-863
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 7.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


Subscriptions

No data.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z

Reserved: 2026-10-22T15:06:52.738Z

Link: CVE-2026-115477

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Deferred

Published: 2026-10-23T15:17:29.840

Modified: 2026-10-23T15:17:29.967

Link: CVE-2026-115477

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-23T16:00:18Z

Weaknesses