Technical impact
The russh library accepts a peer‑declared maximum packet size of zero during channel‑open, which is then used to calculate the writable size in the asynchronous write path. Because window adjustments can never satisfy a zero packet maximum, every write operation blocks forever, causing tasks, channels, and connections to hang without reporting an error. This unbounded blocking is a form of uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE‑400) and an infinite loop (CWE‑835), enabling an authenticated client or a malicious server to stall writes and accumulate stalled connections, ultimately exhausting system resources and denying service.
Affected Systems
The vulnerable component is the russh library from Eugeny. Versions 0.60.0 through 0.65.0, inclusive, contain the flaw. The issue was resolved in release 0.65.0, which removes the zero packet size handling path.
Risk and Exploitability
The CVSS score of 4.3 classifies this as a low to moderate severity vulnerability. No EPSS score is available and the flaw is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. An attacker must control either the SSH client or the server that uses the russh library in order to declare a zero maximum packet size. The silent hang makes detection difficult, but an accumulation of stalled connections can lead to resource exhaustion and a denial of service.
Github GHSA