Description
The DNSSEC validation in the Hickory DNS hickory-net crate 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 identifies wraparound NSEC records by comparing the next domain name to an SOA record in the response, accepting that SOA even if it fails validation. Attackers who can supply DNS responses can combine a genuine NSEC record and its RRSIG with a crafted SOA record to forge nonexistence of any RRset.
Published: 2026-11-08
Score: 8.9 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: DNS spoofing through forged non‑existence records
Action: Immediate patch
AI Analysis

Impact

The flaw allows an attacker who can supply DNS responses to combine a valid NSEC record and its RRSIG with a crafted SOA record that bypasses validation. This defeats DNSSEC checks and lets the attacker make the resolver believe that any requested resource record set does not exist, effectively forging non‑existence and allowing arbitrary denial of service or manipulation of domain resolution.

Affected Systems

Hickory DNS, version 0.26.0 up to and including 0.26.1; affected component is the hickory-net crate used for DNSSEC validation.

Risk and Exploitability

An attacker can exploit this by intercepting or forging DNS responses to a Hickory DNS resolver. The CVSS score of 8.9 indicates high severity; EPSS data is unavailable, so the likelihood of exploitation is unknown, and it is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Attackers would need to supply responses to a vulnerable resolver, either through direct control of the resolver’s network path or by compromising a server the resolver queries.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 8, 2026 at 03:01 UTC.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade Hickory DNS to version 0.26.2 or later to fix the NSEC validation logic.
  • Restrict which servers can provide DNS responses to the resolver, using access controls or firewall rules to limit potential attack vectors.
  • Enable strict DNSSEC validation on all authoritative nameservers and remove any configuration that allows bypassing SOA checks for NSEC wraparound scenarios.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 8, 2026 at 03:01 UTC.

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Sun, 08 Nov 2026 01:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The DNSSEC validation in the Hickory DNS hickory-net crate 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 identifies wraparound NSEC records by comparing the next domain name to an SOA record in the response, accepting that SOA even if it fails validation. Attackers who can supply DNS responses can combine a genuine NSEC record and its RRSIG with a crafted SOA record to forge nonexistence of any RRset.
Title Hickory-DNS 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Nonexistence Forgery via Wraparound NSEC
Weaknesses CWE-290
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 6.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N'}

cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N'}


Subscriptions

No data.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: VulnCheck

Published:

Updated: 2026-11-08T01:38:19.630Z

Reserved: 2026-11-06T00:57:31.044Z

Link: CVE-2026-123587

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-11-08T02:16:52.637

Modified: 2026-11-08T02:16:52.637

Link: CVE-2026-123587

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-11-08T03:15:08Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-290

    Authentication Bypass by Spoofing