Description
We found a chain of combining multiple weaknesses in the product that could allow an attacker to become any user in the backend and access any data:







*


The payment integration plugins Stripe (included in the core system), pretix-mollie, pretix-oppwa, pretix-bitpay, pretix-payone, pretix-secuconnect, pretix-sofort, and pretix-saferpay
contain a code path that is intended for the transport of session
parameters from a tab with isolated cookies (e.g. in the pretix widget)
to a new tab. For this purpose, a set of session parameters is
cryptographically signed and then passed to the new tab as a URL
parameter. The plugins perform no further validation of the session
parameters, other than the cryptographic signature being valid. This is
fixed with the releases issued today by strictly validating that no
session parameters outside of the scope of the respective plugin may be
set.




*


An unrelated feature in the core system is used to generate redirect links that obfuscate any Referer
headers for outgoing links to prevent leakage of secrets in URLs. This
redirect page also requires cryptographically signed parameters.
Unfortunately, it uses the same key and salt for the signature as the
previously mentioned feature in the payment integration plugins. A
motivated attacker with access to at least one event in the backend can
trick the system into cryptographically signing arbitrary content using
specially crafted links. In combination with the previous issue, the
attacker could use this to set and modify arbitrary parameters on their
user session by injecting the signed parameters into the feature of the
payment providers. This is fixed with the releases issued today by using
different salts for the signature for each plugin and feature.




*


A third, unrelated feature in the core system is used for admin users
to act on behalf of another user, mostly for debugging purposes. With
being able to insert arbitrary parameters into a session, an attacker
can abuse this feature to change their session from their actual user to
any user in the system by guessing a valid user ID. This is fixed with
the release today by requiring unguessable information to be contained
in the session of the user to switch to.
Published: 2026-07-01
Score: 7.7 High
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

The vulnerability chain in pretix’s payment-integration plugins exploits improperly validated cryptographic signatures. Each plugin accepts session parameters parameters belong to that plugin’s namespace. An unrelated core feature that obfuscates Referer headers uses the same signing key and salt, allowing an attacker to forge signed payloads with arbitrary content. By injecting forged parameters into the payment module and using the admin impersonation endpoint, an attacker can switch a legitimate user’s session to any other user, gaining full backend access. Based on the description, it is inferred that an attacker can craft a URL embedding the forged parameters to trigger the exploit from a remote location.

Affected Systems

Affects the pretix event-management platform and all of its payment-integration plugins: pretix, pretix-bitpay, pretix-mollie, pretix-oppwa, pretix-payone, pretix-saferpay, pretix-secuconnect, pretix-sofort. No specific version list is included in the advisory, but the 2026-5-3 release addresses the weaknesses.

Risk and Exploitability

The flaw carries a CVSS score of 7.7, indicating high severity, while the EPSS score of <1% suggests a low current exploitation likelihood. It is not listed in the CISA KEV catalogue. Based on the description, it is inferred that the attack vector is remote and involves a crafted URL, requiring only access to a single event in the backend, making the exploitation path straightforward for a motivated adversary.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on July 21, 2026 at 14:31 UTC.

Remediation

Vendor Workaround

If you are unable to update quickly, we recommend to block the URL /control/users/impersonate/stop in your webserver configuration. In nginx, you can do this by inserting location /control/users/impersonate/stop { deny all; } into the correct block. However, this only remedies the most critical impact the other vulnerabilities have, and we still recommend you plan an update as soon as possible.


OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Apply the 2026-5-3 release that enforces strict session-parameter validation and unique salts for each plugin and feature.
  • If an immediate update is not possible, block access to the /control/users/impersonate/stop endpoint in your web-server configuration (for example, add a deny rule in nginx).
  • After the patch, configure the system to use distinct cryptographic salts for session signing, redirect URLs, and admin impersonation to eliminate shared key reuse.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on July 21, 2026 at 14:31 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Wed, 01 Jul 2026 17:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Wed, 01 Jul 2026 14:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description We found a chain of combining multiple weaknesses in the product that could allow an attacker to become any user in the backend and access any data: * The payment integration plugins Stripe (included in the core system), pretix-mollie, pretix-oppwa, pretix-bitpay, pretix-payone, pretix-secuconnect, pretix-sofort, and pretix-saferpay contain a code path that is intended for the transport of session parameters from a tab with isolated cookies (e.g. in the pretix widget) to a new tab. For this purpose, a set of session parameters is cryptographically signed and then passed to the new tab as a URL parameter. The plugins perform no further validation of the session parameters, other than the cryptographic signature being valid. This is fixed with the releases issued today by strictly validating that no session parameters outside of the scope of the respective plugin may be set. * An unrelated feature in the core system is used to generate redirect links that obfuscate any Referer headers for outgoing links to prevent leakage of secrets in URLs. This redirect page also requires cryptographically signed parameters. Unfortunately, it uses the same key and salt for the signature as the previously mentioned feature in the payment integration plugins. A motivated attacker with access to at least one event in the backend can trick the system into cryptographically signing arbitrary content using specially crafted links. In combination with the previous issue, the attacker could use this to set and modify arbitrary parameters on their user session by injecting the signed parameters into the feature of the payment providers. This is fixed with the releases issued today by using different salts for the signature for each plugin and feature. * A third, unrelated feature in the core system is used for admin users to act on behalf of another user, mostly for debugging purposes. With being able to insert arbitrary parameters into a session, an attacker can abuse this feature to change their session from their actual user to any user in the system by guessing a valid user ID. This is fixed with the release today by requiring unguessable information to be contained in the session of the user to switch to.
Title Session takeover vulnerability
Weaknesses CWE-20
CWE-323
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 7.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:U'}


Subscriptions

No data.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: rami.io

Published:

Updated: 2026-07-01T15:27:00.431Z

Reserved: 2026-06-29T08:26:50.725Z

Link: CVE-2026-13602

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-07-01T15:26:57.313Z

cve-icon NVD

No data.

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-07-21T14:45:02Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-20

    Improper Input Validation

  • CWE-323

    Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption