Description
net_if_ipv6_calc_reachable_time() in subsys/net/ip/net_if.c derives a randomized ND reachable time from ipv6->base_reachable_time as min_reachable + sys_rand32_get() % (max_reachable - min_reachable), where min_reachable = base/2 and max_reachable = 3*base/2 using integer division. When base_reachable_time is 1, both min_reachable and the modulus collapse so the function returns 0, and net_if_ipv6_set_reachable_time() stores that 0 into ipv6->reachable_time.

The base_reachable_time is attacker-controlled: handle_ra_input() in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c accepts the Reachable Time field of an incoming Router Advertisement whenever it is nonzero and <= MAX_REACHABLE_TIME, so a single unauthenticated, link-local RA carrying a Reachable Time of 1 drives the computed reachable time to 0. Router Advertisements are unauthenticated by default and require only adjacency to the target link.

When a neighbor is subsequently confirmed reachable, net_ipv6_nbr_set_reachable_timer() reads the value and executes NET_ASSERT(time, "Zero reachable timeout!"). On builds with CONFIG_ASSERT enabled this triggers a fatal kernel assertion — a remote denial of service; on builds without assertions the reachable timer is armed with K_MSEC(0) and fires immediately, forcing reachable neighbors into perpetual re-solicitation (STALE), degrading Neighbor Discovery. The impact is limited to availability; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity consequence.
Published: 2026-09-14
Score: 6.5 Medium
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
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History

Mon, 14 Sep 2026 21:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description net_if_ipv6_calc_reachable_time() in subsys/net/ip/net_if.c derives a randomized ND reachable time from ipv6->base_reachable_time as min_reachable + sys_rand32_get() % (max_reachable - min_reachable), where min_reachable = base/2 and max_reachable = 3*base/2 using integer division. When base_reachable_time is 1, both min_reachable and the modulus collapse so the function returns 0, and net_if_ipv6_set_reachable_time() stores that 0 into ipv6->reachable_time. The base_reachable_time is attacker-controlled: handle_ra_input() in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c accepts the Reachable Time field of an incoming Router Advertisement whenever it is nonzero and <= MAX_REACHABLE_TIME, so a single unauthenticated, link-local RA carrying a Reachable Time of 1 drives the computed reachable time to 0. Router Advertisements are unauthenticated by default and require only adjacency to the target link. When a neighbor is subsequently confirmed reachable, net_ipv6_nbr_set_reachable_timer() reads the value and executes NET_ASSERT(time, "Zero reachable timeout!"). On builds with CONFIG_ASSERT enabled this triggers a fatal kernel assertion — a remote denial of service; on builds without assertions the reachable timer is armed with K_MSEC(0) and fires immediately, forcing reachable neighbors into perpetual re-solicitation (STALE), degrading Neighbor Discovery. The impact is limited to availability; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity consequence.
Title Zephyr IPv6 Neighbor Discovery zero reachable time from crafted Router Advertisement causes assertion/DoS
Weaknesses CWE-617
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 6.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: zephyr

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-14T19:02:46.400Z

Reserved: 2026-07-15T17:38:09.892Z

Link: CVE-2026-15893

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-09-14T19:02:41.847Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2026-09-14T19:17:14.627

Modified: 2026-09-14T21:10:41.650

Link: CVE-2026-15893

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

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Weaknesses