Description
The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single "front door" route per tool. Every other backend route and Socket.IO handler in that tool's workflow relied solely on pga_login_required/socket_login_required, which check authentication but not the tool permission.

The reporter verified three cases against a test build: (1) a user without tools_query_tool permission received 403 on the protected sqleditor initialization route, but the same session went on to connect the server, initialize the viewdata backend chain, and retrieve real table row content; (2) a user without tools_grant_wizard received 403 on the protected acl route, but the same session still enumerated grantable objects, generated GRANT SQL, and successfully applied it -- confirmed database-side via has_table_privilege(); (3) a user without tools_schema_diff received 403 on the protected panel route, but the same session initialized schema diff, enumerated and connected databases, and obtained real DDL differences via the compare_database Socket.IO handler. The reporter also confirmed a related but distinct issue: a non-owner triggering /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against an administrator-owned shared server caused pgAdmin to persist a new server row still owned by the administrator (user_id/shared unchanged from the source), even though the connection attempt itself reported failure.

During remediation, the same front-door-only permission gap was found to also affect the ERD, PSQL, and Debugger tools, and the Backup, Restore, Maintenance, and Import/Export blueprints, none of which were part of the original report; these were fixed using the same pattern as an extension of the reported defect class.

An authenticated user who had valid pgAdmin login and a stored, working database connection, but had been explicitly denied a specific tool's permission by an administrator, could therefore still drive that tool end-to-end through its other routes and sockets, including obtaining an interactive psql session over the /pty Socket.IO namespace and invoking backup/restore/maintenance/import-export jobs.

Because the bypass only restores access to tools operating over the user's own already-authenticated database connection, it does not grant the user any database privilege they did not already hold; it circumvents pgAdmin's own tool-level access-control policy (an organisational segregation-of-duties control, separate from database-level authorization), letting a user reach a pgAdmin feature an administrator intended to withhold from them, using capabilities their existing database role already permits through other means.

Socket.IO event handlers had no permission-aware equivalent of permissions_required; only socket_login_required existed, checking authentication but not the tool permission.

Fix adds a socket_permissions_required decorator (mirroring permissions_required, honouring the Administrator bypass, reading permissions via has_permission()) and applies it, alongside permissions_required, as the outermost decorator on every backend route and Socket.IO handler for the affected tools. Regression tests assert 403 on every gated route and socket handler for a permission-less user.

This issue affects pgAdmin 4 in SERVER mode: from 9.3 before 9.17.
Published: 2026-07-31
Score: 5.3 Medium
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

pgAdmin 4 introduced a per‑tool permission system (custom roles / role‑based tool permissions) in version 9.3, meant to enforce fine‑grained access control for features such as the Query Tool, Grant Wizard, Schema Diff, ERD, PSQL, and Debugger. The vulnerability lies in the inconsistent application of the permissions_required decorator: only a single front‑door route for each tool was protected, while all additional backend routes and Socket.IO handlers were guarded solely by authentication checks. An authenticated user who has been explicitly denied a specific tool’s permission can therefore use other routes or socket event handlers to drive that tool end‑to‑end, retrieve data, generate and execute SQL, initiate backups, and even obtain a psql session. Because the attacker already holds the database privileges required to execute the actions, the flaw does not grant new database rights but circumvents pgAdmin’s separations‑of‑duty policy. The flaw is classified as CWE‑862 (Missing Authorization) and CWE‑425 (Access Termination Without Security Checks).

Affected Systems

The issue affects pgAdmin 4 when running in SERVER mode. Versions 9.3 through 9.16 (inclusive) are vulnerable; the problem was fixed in the 9.17 release. The affected products are distributed by pgadmin.org under the pgAdmin 4 name.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 5.3 indicates moderate severity: the flaw is limited to authenticated users with an existing valid pgAdmin session and does not lead to database‑level privilege escalation. The EPSS score being less than 1% suggests a low likelihood of exploitation in the wild. It is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Attackers would need to first authenticate to pgAdmin and then attempt to access the unauthorized tool; once the flaw is exploited the attacker can retrieve or modify data they would normally be able to via other channels. Overall risk is moderate but exploitation probability low.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 15, 2026 at 21:25 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade pgAdmin 4 to version 9.17 or later where the missing permission checks have been added and applied to all backend routes and Socket.IO handlers.
  • Verify that the server is running in SERVER mode and that custom tool permissions have been correctly assigned; users lacking a tool’s permission should no longer have access to the tool’s interface.
  • After the upgrade, confirm that accessing any tool‑specific route or socket handler without the appropriate permission returns a 403 status code.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 15, 2026 at 21:25 UTC.

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Advisories

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History

Sat, 15 Aug 2026 12:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-425
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

threat_severity

Moderate


Sun, 02 Aug 2026 19:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Pgadmin
Pgadmin pgadmin 4
Vendors & Products Pgadmin
Pgadmin pgadmin 4

Fri, 31 Jul 2026 17:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Fri, 31 Jul 2026 16:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single "front door" route per tool. Every other backend route and Socket.IO handler in that tool's workflow relied solely on pga_login_required/socket_login_required, which check authentication but not the tool permission. The reporter verified three cases against a test build: (1) a user without tools_query_tool permission received 403 on the protected sqleditor initialization route, but the same session went on to connect the server, initialize the viewdata backend chain, and retrieve real table row content; (2) a user without tools_grant_wizard received 403 on the protected acl route, but the same session still enumerated grantable objects, generated GRANT SQL, and successfully applied it -- confirmed database-side via has_table_privilege(); (3) a user without tools_schema_diff received 403 on the protected panel route, but the same session initialized schema diff, enumerated and connected databases, and obtained real DDL differences via the compare_database Socket.IO handler. The reporter also confirmed a related but distinct issue: a non-owner triggering /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against an administrator-owned shared server caused pgAdmin to persist a new server row still owned by the administrator (user_id/shared unchanged from the source), even though the connection attempt itself reported failure. During remediation, the same front-door-only permission gap was found to also affect the ERD, PSQL, and Debugger tools, and the Backup, Restore, Maintenance, and Import/Export blueprints, none of which were part of the original report; these were fixed using the same pattern as an extension of the reported defect class. An authenticated user who had valid pgAdmin login and a stored, working database connection, but had been explicitly denied a specific tool's permission by an administrator, could therefore still drive that tool end-to-end through its other routes and sockets, including obtaining an interactive psql session over the /pty Socket.IO namespace and invoking backup/restore/maintenance/import-export jobs. Because the bypass only restores access to tools operating over the user's own already-authenticated database connection, it does not grant the user any database privilege they did not already hold; it circumvents pgAdmin's own tool-level access-control policy (an organisational segregation-of-duties control, separate from database-level authorization), letting a user reach a pgAdmin feature an administrator intended to withhold from them, using capabilities their existing database role already permits through other means. Socket.IO event handlers had no permission-aware equivalent of permissions_required; only socket_login_required existed, checking authentication but not the tool permission. Fix adds a socket_permissions_required decorator (mirroring permissions_required, honouring the Administrator bypass, reading permissions via has_permission()) and applies it, alongside permissions_required, as the outermost decorator on every backend route and Socket.IO handler for the affected tools. Regression tests assert 403 on every gated route and socket handler for a permission-less user. This issue affects pgAdmin 4 in SERVER mode: from 9.3 before 9.17.
Title pgAdmin 4: Tool permission bypass via backend routes and Socket.IO handlers
Weaknesses CWE-862
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.4, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N'}

cvssV4_0

{'score': 5.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


Subscriptions

Pgadmin Pgadmin 4
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: PostgreSQL

Published:

Updated: 2026-07-31T17:05:44.535Z

Reserved: 2026-07-25T02:52:56.800Z

Link: CVE-2026-17350

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-07-31T17:01:24.861Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Analyzed

Published: 2026-07-31T16:16:59.617

Modified: 2026-08-05T20:09:45.357

Link: CVE-2026-17350

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2026-07-31T16:00:03Z

Links: CVE-2026-17350 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-15T21:30:04Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-425

    Direct Request ('Forced Browsing')

  • CWE-862

    Missing Authorization