Description
Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.
Published: 2026-07-27
Score: 5.5 Medium
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

Kimi Code implements an SSRF hardening mechanism that relies solely on a static denylist of hostnames and IP literals. The implementation does not resolve DNS names or re‑validate hosts after HTTP redirects, so an attacker can supply a publicly resolvable hostname that points to a loopback or private address, or a URL that redirects to such a target. This bypass allows the attacker to reach internal network services that the denylist was meant to block, leading to potential compromise or data exfiltration on the internal network. The weakness is classified as CWE‑918.

Affected Systems

MoonshotAI Kimi Code versions prior to 0.27.0 are affected. All releases before the 0.27.0 release lack the proper DNS resolution and redirect validation in the FetchURL hardening logic.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 5.5 indicates moderate overall severity. Exploitation requires an attacker to influence a FetchURL invocation, such as through prompt injection or similar injection vectors that permit arbitrary URL construction. Because the vulnerability allows a bypass of internal address protection, any internal service reachable from the machine running Kimi Code could be accessed. The EPSS score is < 1%, indicating a very low exploitation probability. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, suggesting that widespread exploitation has not yet been observed. Nonetheless, the potential for internal network compromise warrants timely remediation.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 3, 2026 at 17:56 UTC.

Remediation

Vendor Solution

Upgrade to Kimi Code 0.27.0 or later. The fix resolves hostnames via DNS and rejects addresses in loopback, RFC1918, link-local, CGNAT, and ULA ranges; follows redirects manually with per-hop revalidation; and pins connections to the validated resolved addresses to reduce DNS-rebinding (TOCTOU) races.


OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade to Kimi Code 0.27.0 or later, which resolves hostnames via DNS, rejects addresses in restricted ranges, follows redirects with per‑hop revalidation, and pins connections to validated addresses.
  • If upgrading is not immediately possible, block external requests to internal IP ranges at the network perimeter to prevent the indirect reachability that the bypass enables.
  • Review code and configurations for any dynamic FetchURL usage that could be influenced by user input, and sanitize or remove such usage to eliminate the injection vector.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 3, 2026 at 17:56 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Mon, 27 Jul 2026 13:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Moonshotai
Moonshotai kimi Code
Vendors & Products Moonshotai
Moonshotai kimi Code

Mon, 27 Jul 2026 11:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Mon, 27 Jul 2026 10:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.
Title Kimi Code FetchURL SSRF protection bypass via DNS-resolving hostnames and redirects
Weaknesses CWE-918
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N'}


Subscriptions

Moonshotai Kimi Code
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: JFROG

Published:

Updated: 2026-07-27T10:24:05.709Z

Reserved: 2026-07-27T09:17:58.055Z

Link: CVE-2026-17534

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-07-27T10:24:00.330Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2026-07-27T10:16:37.747

Modified: 2026-07-27T20:37:16.927

Link: CVE-2026-17534

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-03T18:00:11Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-918

    Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)