Description
Zephyr's OpenThread integration defined CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD with default "J01NME" in modules/openthread/Kconfig.thread (previously subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig, then subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig.thread). J01NME is the example Joining Device Credential used throughout the public OpenThread and Thread commissioning documentation, including Zephyr's own samples/net/sockets/echo_client/README.rst, so it is not a secret. A firmware image built with CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART=y that never overrode the PSKd therefore shipped with a publicly known joining credential compiled in, with no build-time or run-time warning.

The PSKd is the only value that authenticates Thread commissioning: joiner and commissioner run a DTLS-PSK handshake keyed on it, after which the commissioner supplies the full operational dataset. In ot_configure_instance() (modules/openthread/openthread.c), a device with no stored dataset calls otJoinerStart() with the configured PSKd, and ot_joiner_start_handler() calls otThreadSetEnabled() on success. An unauthenticated attacker within 802.15.4 radio range of an uncommissioned device (factory-fresh, after a factory reset, or after a settings erase) can run any stock Thread commissioner registered with J01NME, complete the handshake, and hand the device an attacker-controlled operational dataset.

The device then joins and enables Thread on the attacker's mesh. The attacker becomes its router, seeing, dropping, injecting and spoofing all of the device's IPv6 traffic and impersonating the peers the application expects, while the device is cut off from the network it was meant to join and stays mis-provisioned until it is reset. Only application-layer security with independently provisioned credentials survives. Exposure is limited to builds that enable joiner autostart and leave the PSKd unset; the option is not enabled by default and no in-tree sample uses the vulnerable combination.

The fix removes the default from CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD and adds a BUILD_ASSERT() in modules/openthread/openthread.c, active only under CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART, that fails the build unless a 6-to-32-character PSKd is configured. Products should provision a per-device PSKd from factory data and call otJoinerStart() from the application rather than relying on a credential compiled identically into every unit.
Published: 2026-10-23
Score: 7.5 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: Unauthorized Thread network takeover
Action: Patch Immediately
AI Analysis

Impact

Zephyr's OpenThread integration defines a default Joining Device Credential (PSKd) that is publicly documented. A firmware image compiled with CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART enabled and no explicit PSKd compiled into the binary therefore ships with the known credential J01NME. An attacker within 802.15.4 radio range can act as a Thread commissioner, perform a DTLS‑PSK handshake, and provision the device with an attacker‑controlled operational dataset. The compromised device then joins the attacker’s mesh, exposing all of its IPv6 traffic and allowing the attacker to impersonate peers and disrupt the device’s intended network.

Affected Systems

Zephyr RTOS systems that enable OpenThread joiner autostart without configuring a unique PSKd. This includes any build of Zephyr whose configuration includes CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART and leaves CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD set to the default value J01NME. The vulnerability is present regardless of the specific Zephyr version, but is limited to builds that enable the vulnerable combination of settings. No specific product release is listed; all affected products fall under the zephyrproject:zephyr vendor.

Risk and Exploitability

The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 7.5, indicating a high severity. The EPSS score is not available, but the lack of a KEV listing does not diminish the risk for production devices that ship with the default credential. Exploitation requires the attacker to have physical or near‑physical proximity to the victim device within 802.15.4 range, and the device must be factory fresh or reset so that it has no stored operational dataset. Once those conditions are met, an unauthenticated attacker can complete the DTLS‑PSK handshake with the known credential, obtain commissioning rights, and supply a malicious operational dataset. The attacker then controls the device’s Thread network participation, with the ability to intercept, drop, inject, and spoof traffic. This represents a significant loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for any application running on the compromised device.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 23, 2026 at 21:36 UTC.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Update to the Zephyr release that removes the default PSKd and enforces a build assertion for CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD when CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART is enabled.
  • Configure a unique 6‑32 character PSKd in the build configuration (CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD) before compiling each device, and verify that the PSKd is no longer the default "J01NME".
  • Disable CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART in the device configuration or invoke otJoinerStart() explicitly from the application after ensuring that the per‑device PSKd is set, to avoid automatic use of a compile‑time default credential.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 23, 2026 at 21:36 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Fri, 23 Oct 2026 20:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Zephyr's OpenThread integration defined CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD with default "J01NME" in modules/openthread/Kconfig.thread (previously subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig, then subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig.thread). J01NME is the example Joining Device Credential used throughout the public OpenThread and Thread commissioning documentation, including Zephyr's own samples/net/sockets/echo_client/README.rst, so it is not a secret. A firmware image built with CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART=y that never overrode the PSKd therefore shipped with a publicly known joining credential compiled in, with no build-time or run-time warning. The PSKd is the only value that authenticates Thread commissioning: joiner and commissioner run a DTLS-PSK handshake keyed on it, after which the commissioner supplies the full operational dataset. In ot_configure_instance() (modules/openthread/openthread.c), a device with no stored dataset calls otJoinerStart() with the configured PSKd, and ot_joiner_start_handler() calls otThreadSetEnabled() on success. An unauthenticated attacker within 802.15.4 radio range of an uncommissioned device (factory-fresh, after a factory reset, or after a settings erase) can run any stock Thread commissioner registered with J01NME, complete the handshake, and hand the device an attacker-controlled operational dataset. The device then joins and enables Thread on the attacker's mesh. The attacker becomes its router, seeing, dropping, injecting and spoofing all of the device's IPv6 traffic and impersonating the peers the application expects, while the device is cut off from the network it was meant to join and stays mis-provisioned until it is reset. Only application-layer security with independently provisioned credentials survives. Exposure is limited to builds that enable joiner autostart and leave the PSKd unset; the option is not enabled by default and no in-tree sample uses the vulnerable combination. The fix removes the default from CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD and adds a BUILD_ASSERT() in modules/openthread/openthread.c, active only under CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART, that fails the build unless a 6-to-32-character PSKd is configured. Products should provision a per-device PSKd from factory data and call otJoinerStart() from the application rather than relying on a credential compiled identically into every unit.
Title OpenThread joiner autostart uses a publicly documented default Joining Device Credential (PSKd)
Weaknesses CWE-1392
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Subscriptions

No data.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: zephyr

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-23T19:56:12.805Z

Reserved: 2026-08-13T13:46:35.935Z

Link: CVE-2026-19741

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-10-23T20:17:21.867

Modified: 2026-10-23T20:17:21.867

Link: CVE-2026-19741

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-23T21:45:14Z

Weaknesses