The vulnerability arises from a hard‑coded API key embedded in the router configuration of KeygraphHQ's Shannon application. When the router component is enabled and its port is reachable, an attacker can use the publicly known key to authenticate with the upstream provider’s API. This grants the attacker the ability to proxy requests through the Shannon instance, resulting in unauthorized API usage and the possible disclosure of both request and response data.

KeygraphHQ Shannon, specifically the router component that is enabled and exposed to the network. No specific product version is listed in the CNA data; the issue applies to all releases containing the hard‑coded key until the fix commit is applied.

The CVSS score of 6.9 indicates moderate severity. The EPSS score of less than 1% suggests that the likelihood of exploitation in the wild is currently very low, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Nevertheless, an attacker who can reach the router port can fully authenticate to upstream services and manipulate or exfiltrate data. Exposure requires network connectivity to the router component; no additional credentials are needed beyond the static key. The risk is therefore confined to systems where the router feature is enabled and externally accessible.