Ridvay Code implements an automatic command approval feature that uses fragile regular expressions to filter potentially dangerous commands. The filter fails to detect standard shell command‑substitution syntax such as $(…) or backticks, allowing an attacker to craft a benign-looking command like `git log --grep="$(malicious_command)"`. The system then incorrectly treats the command as safe, executes it through the underlying shell, and grants the attacker arbitrary code execution on the host without any user interaction.

The flaw affects any installation of Ridvay Code that employs its auto‑approval module. No specific product version is identified in the advisory, so all current deployments of the module are potentially vulnerable.

The advisory does not disclose a CVSS score or EPSS value, and the issue has not been catalogued by CISA as a known exploited vulnerability. The attack vector is inferred to be the command submission interface of the auto‑approval module, which may be reachable by remote users or authorized administrators. An attacker only needs the ability to submit a command through this interface; the injected code is then executed directly by the shell, resulting in full compromise of the system, including loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.