CVE-2026-30834

PinchTab: SSRF with Full Response Exfiltration via Download Handler

Published Mar 7, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. Prior to version 0.7.7, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the /download endpoint allows any user with API access to induce the PinchTab server to make requests to arbitrary URLs, including internal network services and local system files, and exfiltrate the full response content. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.7.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. The /download endpoint contains a server‑side request forgery weakness that allows any user who has API access to instruct the PinchTab server to make arbitrary HTTP requests. The server then returns the full response body to the attacker, enabling extraction of internal network data, local system files, or other sensitive resources. This flaw predominantly results in accidental or intentional confidentiality violations and could be used to surface sensitive information without authentication to the server itself.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability is present in PinchTab version 0.7.6 and earlier, a range inferred from the description that the issue was patched in 0.7.7. The affected product is PinchTab as identified by the vendor pinchtab:pinchtab.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 7.5 places this flaw in the high severity range, but the EPSS value of less than 1% indicates a very low probability of exploitation at present. The flaw is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Exploitation requires only API access, meaning that any user who can reach the PinchTab instance (for example, via a network or exposed API key) can trigger SSRF requests. The attacker can direct the server to any URL, including internal addresses and local file URLs, and retrieve the full content of the response. No additional preconditions are needed beyond API access, and the attacker can exploit the issue immediately without further setup.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Update PinchTab to version 0.7.7 or later, which contains the SSRF fix.
  • Restrict API access to trusted users or network segments to limit the ability to trigger SSRF requests.
  • If the patch cannot be applied immediately, temporarily disable or remove the /download endpoint or configure it to block internal or file URLs.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on April 18, 2026 at 17:27 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-rw8p-c6hf-q3pg PinchTab has SSRF with Full Response Exfiltration via Download Handler
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:pinchtab:pinchtab:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Pinchtab
Pinchtab pinchtab
Vendors & Products Pinchtab
Pinchtab pinchtab
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. Prior to version 0.7.7, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the /download endpoint allows any user with API access to induce the PinchTab server to make requests to arbitrary URLs, including internal network services and local system files, and exfiltrate the full response content. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.7.
Title PinchTab: SSRF with Full Response Exfiltration via Download Handler
Weaknesses CWE-918
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-918

    Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Mar 10, 2026, 5:30 PM
Reserved
Mar 5, 2026, 9:06 PM
Status
Analyzed
Published
Mar 7, 2026, 4:15 PM
Modified
Jun 17, 2026, 10:32 AM