Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state

The legacy responder path in smp_random() currently labels the stored
STK as authenticated whenever pending_sec_level is BT_SECURITY_HIGH.
That reflects what the local service requested, not what the pairing
flow actually achieved.

For Just Works/Confirm legacy pairing, SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH stays clear
and the resulting STK should remain unauthenticated even if the local
side requested HIGH security. Use the established MITM state when
storing the responder STK so the key metadata matches the pairing result.

This also keeps the legacy path aligned with the Secure Connections code,
which already treats JUST_WORKS/JUST_CFM as unauthenticated.
Published: 2026-05-01
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

The vulnerability exposes that the legacy responder path in the Bluetooth SMP stack incorrectly labels a Session Temporary Key as authenticated whenever the connection requests high security, regardless of whether Man‑in‑the‑Middle authentication was actually performed. This mislabeling can allow an attacker who performs a Just Works or Just Confirm pairing to be treated as if vigorous authentication had occurred, potentially granting unauthorized access to privileged Bluetooth operations or data. The weakness reflects improper handling of authentication state and could be exploited to elevate a connection’s security level without genuine proof of MITM protection.

Affected Systems

Vendors: Linux. Product: Linux kernel. Exact affected kernel releases are not listed in the entry, so administrators should refer to the latest kernel release notes for any mentions of the SMP/STK authentication fix.

Risk and Exploitability

This flaw mislabels a Session Temporary Key as authenticated even when no MITM has been performed. The impact is that an attacker who carries out a Just Works pairing could be treated as if a high security level had been achieved. The CVSS score is not specified and EPSS is unavailable, and the vulnerability is not in KEV, so no public severity metrics are provided. Because the flaw involves authentication state misclassification rather than a direct control‑flow escape, exploitability depends on the ability to carry out a pairing transaction. No evidence of known exploits is reported in the references, so it is unclear how often this can be abused. It is inferred from the limited data that the risk may not be severe, but the potential for privilege escalation via incorrect authentication suggests it remains a concern.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on May 2, 2026 at 07:22 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Update the Linux kernel to a version that incorporates the SMP/STK authentication fix, ensuring the pairing flow correctly records the MITM state.
  • Configure the Bluetooth stack to disable legacy SMP pairing and enforce Secure Connections only, preventing the deprecated pairing method from being used.
  • Continuously audit and monitor Bluetooth sessions for unexpected high‑security levels without corresponding MITM authentication, and alert on such anomalies.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on May 2, 2026 at 07:22 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Debian DLA Debian DLA DLA-4561-1 linux-6.1 security update
Debian DSA Debian DSA DSA-6243-1 linux security update
History

Sat, 02 May 2026 07:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-287

Fri, 01 May 2026 14:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state The legacy responder path in smp_random() currently labels the stored STK as authenticated whenever pending_sec_level is BT_SECURITY_HIGH. That reflects what the local service requested, not what the pairing flow actually achieved. For Just Works/Confirm legacy pairing, SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH stays clear and the resulting STK should remain unauthenticated even if the local side requested HIGH security. Use the established MITM state when storing the responder STK so the key metadata matches the pairing result. This also keeps the legacy path aligned with the Secure Connections code, which already treats JUST_WORKS/JUST_CFM as unauthenticated.
Title Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-05-01T14:15:01.277Z

Reserved: 2026-03-09T15:48:24.140Z

Link: CVE-2026-31773

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2026-05-01T15:16:40.587

Modified: 2026-05-01T15:24:14.893

Link: CVE-2026-31773

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-05-02T07:30:36Z

Weaknesses