OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.26 contain an authorization bypass in the pairing-store access control for the direct message pairing policy. The flaw allows attackers to reuse pairing approvals across multiple accounts. An attacker who has been approved as a sender in one account can be automatically accepted as a sender in another account in multi‑account deployments without explicit approval, thus bypassing intended authorization boundaries. This can lead to unauthorized cross‑account direct messaging access and the potential exposure of sensitive information.

OpenClaw by OpenClaw, affecting all deployments of OpenClaw prior to the 2026.2.26 release. Any multi‑account deployment where direct message pairing approvals can be shared across accounts is vulnerable.

The CVSS score of 2 indicates low overall severity, and the EPSS score of 0.00034 indicates a very low probability of exploitation. The vulnerability is not listed in KEV. The attack requires the attacker to have an existing sender approval in one account; from there the approval is silently accepted in another account. While the CVSS score is low, the potential for cross‑account privilege escalation could lead to data theft if sensitive DM payloads are accessed. Exploitation is likely only in environments that use shared pairing approvals across accounts rather than isolated per‑account approvals.