CVE-2026-32602

Homarr has a Race Condition in Invite Token Registration (TOCTOU)

Published Apr 6, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 4.2 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Homarr is an open-source dashboard. Prior to 1.57.0, the user registration endpoint (/api/trpc/user.register) is vulnerable to a race condition that allows an attacker to create multiple user accounts from a single-use invite token. The registration flow performs three sequential database operations without a transaction: CHECK, CREATE, and DELETE. Because these operations are not atomic, concurrent requests can all pass the validation step (1) before any of them reaches the deletion step (3). This allows multiple accounts to be registered using a single invite token that was intended to be single-use. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.57.0.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The race condition allows an attacker to create multiple user accounts using a single-use invite token by exploiting the lack of atomicity between the check, create, and delete database operations. This flaw can lead to an inflated user base, potential misuse of privileges associated with the token, and an elevated risk of unauthorized access or denial of service from an increased number of accounts.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects the Homarr dashboard from homarr-labs. Any deployment running a version earlier than 1.57.0 is susceptible. Homarr is an open-source web‑based interface for managing services; the registration endpoint in those affected versions can be abused through the race condition.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 4.2 indicates moderate severity, and the EPSS score of less than 1% suggests low likelihood of widespread exploitation. This issue is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Exploitation would require an attacker to obtain a valid invite token and submit multiple registration requests simultaneously or in rapid succession to bypass the single‑use check.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade Homarr to version 1.57.0 or newer.
  • If an upgrade is not immediately possible, disable or restrict the registration endpoint until a fix is applied.
  • Audit and monitor account creation logs for anomalous or rapid signup activity.
  • Remove any public distribution of invite tokens and enforce stricter token management policies.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on April 10, 2026 at 19:42 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Homarr
Homarr homarr
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:homarr:homarr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Homarr
Homarr homarr
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Homarr-labs
Homarr-labs homarr
Vendors & Products Homarr-labs
Homarr-labs homarr
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Homarr is an open-source dashboard. Prior to 1.57.0, the user registration endpoint (/api/trpc/user.register) is vulnerable to a race condition that allows an attacker to create multiple user accounts from a single-use invite token. The registration flow performs three sequential database operations without a transaction: CHECK, CREATE, and DELETE. Because these operations are not atomic, concurrent requests can all pass the validation step (1) before any of them reaches the deletion step (3). This allows multiple accounts to be registered using a single invite token that was intended to be single-use. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.57.0.
Title Homarr has a Race Condition in Invite Token Registration (TOCTOU)
Weaknesses CWE-367
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 4.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-367

    Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Apr 6, 2026, 3:41 PM
Reserved
Mar 12, 2026, 2:54 PM
Status
Analyzed
Published
Apr 6, 2026, 3:17 PM
Modified
Jun 17, 2026, 10:36 AM