TypeBot, a chatbot builder platform, implements SSRF protection for its Webhook and HTTP Request blocks by validating only the raw URL string, hostname literals, and literal IP formats. It does not perform DNS resolution before forwarding requests, allowing name‑based hostnames that resolve to internal or loopback addresses to bypass the filter. A hostname such as ssrf‑repro.example, which maps to 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, or other RFC1918 spaces, passes validation and is subsequently fetched by the backend HTTP client. This enables server‑side request forgery to access loopback, cloud‑metadata, and private network targets, potentially exposing sensitive data and compromising system integrity. The issue has been resolved in version 3.16.0.

Typebot.io (baptisteArno) – the TypeBot chatbot builder tool. Versions prior to 3.16.0 are vulnerable; the problem is fixed in 3.16.0 and later.

The CVSS score of 7.6 indicates a high risk level. EPSS information is not available, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog, so the known exploitation probability is uncertain. The likely attack vector involves submitting a malicious webhook or HTTP request configuration that contains a DNS‑resolved hostname; victim servers will then reach out to internal or metadata endpoints. The absence of DNS checks during validation makes this flaw easy to exploit if the attacker has access to create or modify such requests.