The vulnerability is located in PraisonAI's recipe registry extraction routine. The _safe_extractall function validates archive members against path traversal attacks but does not check individual member sizes, cumulative extracted size, or member count before calling tar.extractall. An attacker can craft a recipe bundle containing highly compressible data that expands to tens of gigabytes during extraction, exhausting the victim’s disk space when pulled via LocalRegistry.pull or HttpRegistry.pull, and thereby causing a denial of service for the application and the host.

MervinPraison PraisonAI releases prior to version 4.5.128 are affected. All versions before this release contain the flaw; the defect is corrected in 4.5.128, which removes the size‑limit oversight.

The CVSS score of 6.5 indicates moderate severity. No EPSS score is available and the issue is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Exploitation requires an authorized pull of a malicious recipe bundle from a registry that the user trusts, either local or via HTTP. The attack is straightforward: an attacker needs only to host or provide such a bundle and have it pulled; no authentication bypass or privilege escalation is required.