Description
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device.
This requires:
A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.
At least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen.
An active Datadog session cached locally.
Impact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.
Published: 2026-08-07
Score: 5.5 Medium
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

The Datadog Android application before version v545‑5.9.2 exported six widget configuration activities without permission checks. Each activity accepts a widget ID supplied by a caller and, if the ID matches a widget configured on the victim’s home screen, automatically loads the user’s locally cached Datadog session and renders live infrastructure data on the device’s display. Because the data are shown only on screen, the attacker can capture them only through a visual side channel such as screen recording, video capture, or accessibility‑based screenshot tools. This vulnerability corresponds to CWE‑926, an insecure direct object reference.

Affected Systems

The issue affects the Datadog Android app on Android devices for all users who have installed a version earlier than v545‑5.9.2 and configured at least one of the six widgets: IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, or DashboardWidgetActivity. Co‑installed applications on the same device can exploit the exported activities.

Risk and Exploitability

Exploitation requires a malicious application installed on the same device, at least one of the six exposed widgets present on the victim’s home screen, and an active locally cached Datadog session. The attacker can brute‑force the small sequential widget ID values to discover a matching widget without needing network access. The CVSS score of 5.5 indicates moderate severity; EPSS is not available, and the flaw is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Detection is difficult because the exposure is purely visual, and the primary risk is a confidentiality breach: an adversary can capture and view live operational data on the victim’s screen.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 8, 2026 at 04:50 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Remove all Datadog widgets from the Android home screen or uninstall the Datadog application to eliminate the vulnerable exported activities.
  • Disable or restrict screen‑recording, video capture, and accessibility services on the device to prevent a malicious app from visually capturing the rendered infrastructure data.
  • When a vendor patch or newer version (v545‑5.9.2 or later) that adds permission checks becomes available, upgrade the Datadog application immediately.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 8, 2026 at 04:50 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Sat, 08 Aug 2026 21:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Datadog
Datadog android App
Vendors & Products Datadog
Datadog android App

Sat, 08 Aug 2026 05:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Unauthorized Access via Exported Widget Activities in Datadog Android App

Sat, 08 Aug 2026 02:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Sat, 08 Aug 2026 01:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Six Android App Widget configuration activities in the Datadog Android application are declared android:exported="true" with no permission guard: IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, and DashboardWidgetActivity. All six extend a shared base WidgetActivity that reads AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID from Intent extras and, when no resolved deep-link destination is supplied, uses that caller-controlled widget ID to look up the stored widget definition, fetch the associated user session, and perform an automatic login with source UserSessionSourceLogin.Automatic. Android App Widget IDs are small sequential integers assigned by AppWidgetManager. A zero-permission co-installed application can brute-force them by launching any of the six configuration activities with EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID set to 1..N until one matches a configured widget on the victim device. When a match occurs, the activity foregrounds with the victim's session already loaded and renders the widget configuration UI, which is backed by live data pickers (SLOs, dashboards, incident severities and types, on-call pages and shifts) fetched through the victim's authenticated HTTP client. Exfiltration is screen-visible only — programmatic return of data to the caller is not possible from these activities. Disclosure is therefore a visual side-channel: accessibility services, screen recording, or screenshot capture. Preconditions: a malicious co-installed application, at least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen, and an active Datadog session cached locally. In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device. This requires: A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device. At least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen. An active Datadog session cached locally. Impact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.

Fri, 07 Aug 2026 20:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Unauthorized Access via Exported Widget Activities in Datadog Android App

Fri, 07 Aug 2026 18:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Six Android App Widget configuration activities in the Datadog Android application are declared android:exported="true" with no permission guard: IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, and DashboardWidgetActivity. All six extend a shared base WidgetActivity that reads AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID from Intent extras and, when no resolved deep-link destination is supplied, uses that caller-controlled widget ID to look up the stored widget definition, fetch the associated user session, and perform an automatic login with source UserSessionSourceLogin.Automatic. Android App Widget IDs are small sequential integers assigned by AppWidgetManager. A zero-permission co-installed application can brute-force them by launching any of the six configuration activities with EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID set to 1..N until one matches a configured widget on the victim device. When a match occurs, the activity foregrounds with the victim's session already loaded and renders the widget configuration UI, which is backed by live data pickers (SLOs, dashboards, incident severities and types, on-call pages and shifts) fetched through the victim's authenticated HTTP client. Exfiltration is screen-visible only — programmatic return of data to the caller is not possible from these activities. Disclosure is therefore a visual side-channel: accessibility services, screen recording, or screenshot capture. Preconditions: a malicious co-installed application, at least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen, and an active Datadog session cached locally.
Weaknesses CWE-926
References

Subscriptions

Datadog Android App
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: hackerone

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-08T01:05:53.332Z

Reserved: 2026-05-08T15:00:02.447Z

Link: CVE-2026-44965

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-08-07T18:38:54.267Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-07T18:17:14.690

Modified: 2026-08-08T02:17:17.310

Link: CVE-2026-44965

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-08T20:40:47Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-926

    Improper Export of Android Application Components