A flaw in Apache Airflow’s connection retrieval API allows an authenticated user with Connection‑read permission to leak secrets that are stored in a connection’s extra JSON field. The bug bypasses the redaction allowlist, so credential fields such as those used by Slack providers are returned in plain text. This is an information‑exposure weakness (CWE‑200) that can reveal confidential service credentials and other sensitive data.

Apache Airflow applications that use the default Connection‑read role and store credentials directly in the connection’s extra JSON blob are affected. The vulnerability is present in any version of Airflow prior to the fix that was shipped in release 3.2.2; users of these earlier versions should review their deployment for cut‑and‑paste credentials in connection blobs.

The attack requires an internal authenticated user who has been granted read access to the connection via the UI or API. Because the user must already have Connection‑read rights, the exploitation is restricted to roles that can query connection details. No exploitation probability score is available and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog, yet the exposure could have serious consequences if an attacker gains access to any user account with the necessary permission.