Description
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in phenixdigital phoenix_storybook allows cross-session PubSub topic injection via a URL query parameter.
'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.Story.ComponentIframeLive':handle_params/3 in lib/phoenix_storybook/live/story/component_iframe_live.ex reads a PubSub topic directly from params["topic"] and broadcasts {:component_iframe_pid, self()} on it with no check that the topic belongs to the requesting session. The shared PhoenixStorybook.PubSub is used to coordinate playground LiveViews with their iframes: a playground subscribes to a session-specific topic and uses the received iframe pid to direct subsequent control messages (variation state, theme switches, extra-assign payloads) via send/2. Because the iframe trusts the query parameter, an attacker who loads /storybook/iframe/<story>?topic=<victim_topic> causes their iframe process pid to be announced on the victim's topic. The victim's playground then addresses its private messages to the attacker's iframe process.
This issue affects phoenix_storybook from 0.4.0 before 1.1.0.
'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.Story.ComponentIframeLive':handle_params/3 in lib/phoenix_storybook/live/story/component_iframe_live.ex reads a PubSub topic directly from params["topic"] and broadcasts {:component_iframe_pid, self()} on it with no check that the topic belongs to the requesting session. The shared PhoenixStorybook.PubSub is used to coordinate playground LiveViews with their iframes: a playground subscribes to a session-specific topic and uses the received iframe pid to direct subsequent control messages (variation state, theme switches, extra-assign payloads) via send/2. Because the iframe trusts the query parameter, an attacker who loads /storybook/iframe/<story>?topic=<victim_topic> causes their iframe process pid to be announced on the victim's topic. The victim's playground then addresses its private messages to the attacker's iframe process.
This issue affects phoenix_storybook from 0.4.0 before 1.1.0.
No analysis available yet.
Remediation
No remediation available yet.
Tracking
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Advisories
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References
History
Wed, 20 May 2026 14:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in phenixdigital phoenix_storybook allows cross-session PubSub topic injection via a URL query parameter. 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.Story.ComponentIframeLive':handle_params/3 in lib/phoenix_storybook/live/story/component_iframe_live.ex reads a PubSub topic directly from params["topic"] and broadcasts {:component_iframe_pid, self()} on it with no check that the topic belongs to the requesting session. The shared PhoenixStorybook.PubSub is used to coordinate playground LiveViews with their iframes: a playground subscribes to a session-specific topic and uses the received iframe pid to direct subsequent control messages (variation state, theme switches, extra-assign payloads) via send/2. Because the iframe trusts the query parameter, an attacker who loads /storybook/iframe/<story>?topic=<victim_topic> causes their iframe process pid to be announced on the victim's topic. The victim's playground then addresses its private messages to the attacker's iframe process. This issue affects phoenix_storybook from 0.4.0 before 1.1.0. | |
| Title | Cross-session PubSub topic injection via URL parameter in phoenix_storybook | |
| First Time appeared |
Phenixdigital
Phenixdigital phoenix Storybook |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-639 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:phenixdigital:phoenix_storybook:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Phenixdigital
Phenixdigital phoenix Storybook |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-20T13:35:33.215Z
Reserved: 2026-05-18T17:28:08.321Z
Link: CVE-2026-47068
No data.
Status : Deferred
Published: 2026-05-20T14:17:01.557
Modified: 2026-05-20T14:23:14.993
Link: CVE-2026-47068
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses