{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-48076", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-05-20T18:25:25.708Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-06T20:43:59.953Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-06T20:43:59.953Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "OpenReception's bootstrap booking flow allows unauthenticated booking on isPublic=false channels", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-863", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "LOW", "baseScore": 6.5, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L", "version": "3.1"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-3658-3j75-p5j3", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-3658-3j75-p5j3"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "open-reception", "product": "appointment-booking-software", "versions": [{"version": "<= 1.0.1", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-06T20:43:59.953Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. The new-client booking flow in versions 1.0.1 and prior consists of three calls: `bootstrap-challenge` (returns a 16-bit PoW challenge with `difficulty=4` leading hex zeroes), `bootstrap-verify` (validates the PoW and issues a Bearer booking access token), and `create-new-client` (consumes the token and creates the tunnel and first appointment). The token correctly binds to `tenantId`, `tunnelId`, `clientPublicKey`, and `emailHash`, but never to `channelId`. The `bootstrap-challenge` request schema does not even accept a `channelId`, and the issued token's payload contains no channel information. Independently, the service function `createNewClientWithAppointment` checks only `channel.archived = false`. The `channel.isPublic` check that protects `addAppointmentToTunnel` is missing in the new-client path. The combination means: an attacker completes the bootstrap flow normally (16-bit PoW, completes in well under one second on commodity hardware, no rate limiting beyond the throttle store), receives a valid booking access token, and then submits the `create-new-client` payload with `channelId` pointing to a private (`isPublic = false`) channel. The booking lands as `CONFIRMED` if the target channel has `requiresConfirmation = false` (the default), otherwise as `NEW`. The patient-facing UI does not list private channels in its picker (`/api/public/channels` correctly filters `isPublic = true`), so the channel ID must be obtained out of band. The companion finding V-10 (schedule endpoint discloses private channels) provides exactly that: a single unauthenticated GET reveals every private channel ID for any tenant. V-10 plus V-11 together make private channels fully reachable to anonymous attackers. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-3658-3j75-p5j3", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}}

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