CVE-2026-48082

OpenReception's bootstrap challenge proof-of-work difficulty hardcoded to 16 bits, which enables abuse rate amplification

Published Aug 6, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 Low EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, the bootstrap challenge endpoint at `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/bootstrap-challenge` issues a SHA-256 proof-of-work with `difficulty=4` hex zeros, equivalent to 16 bits of work. Modern hardware solves this in under 200 milliseconds, providing essentially no friction against automated abuse of the patient booking flow. Proof-of-work is used in the booking flow as a rate-limiter for unauthenticated clients establishing tunnels and submitting appointments. At 16 bits of difficulty, the construct is decorative rather than effective. An attacker can solve PoW challenges as fast as the server can issue them, defeating the rate-limiting purpose. The handler also calls `challengeThrottleService.checkThrottle(binding, "passkey")`, but the binding includes attacker-controlled values (`tunnelId`, `clientPublicKey`, and optional `emailHash`). For each fresh attempt, the attacker can supply new values, producing a new throttle key and bypassing the per-binding accumulation. Practical abuse friction is therefore the PoW difficulty itself, not a stable per-IP or per-email server-side throttle. Version 1.0.6 fixes the issue.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The vulnerability stems from an intentionally low proof‑of‑work difficulty set at four hexadecimal zeros (16 bits) for the bootstrap challenge endpoint. This low difficulty allows an attacker to solve challenges in a few hundred milliseconds, effectively removing the friction meant to throttle unauthenticated users. The PoW function intersects with a binder that includes attacker‑controlled values, so each new request can generate a new throttle key, further neutralizing the intended per‑binding accumulation. The result is a de‑emphasized rate‑limit that permits large‑scale automated booking or tunnel creation without meaningful cost to the client.

Affected Systems

OpenReception appointment‑booking software, version prior to 1.0.6. The software delivers a fully encrypted booking experience and relies on the bootstrap challenge for rate limiting. Versions 1.0.6 and later contain a fix that increases the PoW difficulty; older releases remain vulnerable.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 3.7 indicates moderate severity, reflecting that the main risk is operational abuse rather than critical compromise. Because the PoW challenge solves in milliseconds on modern hardware, an attacker can issue requests virtually as fast as the server can produce them, dramatically thinning out the rate‑limiting effect. The vulnerability is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog and no EPSS score is available, suggesting limited evidence of exploitation but the mechanics allow abuse at scale when an organization depends on this endpoint for throttling. The recommended mitigation is to move to the patched version or provide a stronger PoW difficulty to restore client‑side friction.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the software to version 1.0.6 or later where the PoW difficulty has been increased.
  • If an upgrade is infeasible, reconfigure the bootstrap challenge to require a significantly higher PoW difficulty, or implement additional server‑side throttling such as per‑IP or per‑email rate limits that cannot be bypassed by altering request parameters.
  • Disable or restrict access to the bootstrap challenge endpoint for unauthenticated users and monitor booking traffic for unusually high request rates to detect abuse.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 7, 2026 at 00:21 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Open-reception
Open-reception appointment-booking-software
Vendors & Products Open-reception
Open-reception appointment-booking-software
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, the bootstrap challenge endpoint at `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/bootstrap-challenge` issues a SHA-256 proof-of-work with `difficulty=4` hex zeros, equivalent to 16 bits of work. Modern hardware solves this in under 200 milliseconds, providing essentially no friction against automated abuse of the patient booking flow. Proof-of-work is used in the booking flow as a rate-limiter for unauthenticated clients establishing tunnels and submitting appointments. At 16 bits of difficulty, the construct is decorative rather than effective. An attacker can solve PoW challenges as fast as the server can issue them, defeating the rate-limiting purpose. The handler also calls `challengeThrottleService.checkThrottle(binding, "passkey")`, but the binding includes attacker-controlled values (`tunnelId`, `clientPublicKey`, and optional `emailHash`). For each fresh attempt, the attacker can supply new values, producing a new throttle key and bypassing the per-binding accumulation. Practical abuse friction is therefore the PoW difficulty itself, not a stable per-IP or per-email server-side throttle. Version 1.0.6 fixes the issue.
Title OpenReception's bootstrap challenge proof-of-work difficulty hardcoded to 16 bits, which enables abuse rate amplification
Weaknesses CWE-770
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 3.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-770

    Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Aug 7, 2026, 5:08 PM
Reserved
May 20, 2026, 6:40 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Aug 6, 2026, 10:17 PM
Modified
Oct 23, 2026, 9:10 PM