Description
Probo is a self-hostable governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) platform built for engineering and security teams. Probo's `saferedirect` package validates redirect URLs used across authentication flows (OIDC, SAML, session transfer, OAuth connectors, and trust-center magic links). Prior to version 0.19.3.1, the validator only inspected the second character of relative paths, so a URL like `/../\evil.com` passed validation because the second character is `.`. Go's `http.Redirect` normalizes this path to `/\evil.com` before setting the `Location` header. Browsers can interpret the backslash as a host separator and redirect the user to an external domain (`https://evil.com`), bypassing the intended same-origin restriction. This enables open-redirect phishing: an attacker can craft a `continue` parameter (or embed a malicious URL in a session-transfer token) that appears to originate from a trusted Probo domain but redirects victims elsewhere. This is fixed in `go.probo.inc/probo` 0.193.1 by normalizing relative paths with `path.Clean` before validation, rejecting backslashes (including percent-encoded `%5c`) anywhere in the path, and re-checking the normalized result for protocol-relative and backslash prefixes. Self-hosted deployments should upgrade to probod v0.194.1 or later. SaaS deployments on getprobo.com are patched. No practical workaround is available for self-hosted installations.
Published: 2026-08-13
Score: 4.7 Medium
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

Probo’s saferedirect validator incorrectly inspected only the second character of relative paths, letting URLs like "/../\evil.com" pass validation. HTTP path normalization turns the backslash into a host separator, so browsers redirect users to an external domain. This flaw enables phishing by allowing attackers to embed malicious URLs in ‘continue’ parameters or session‑transfer tokens that appear to originate from a trusted Probo domain.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability exists in any self‑hosted instance of Probo whose version is older than 0.194.1. SaaS deployments on getprobo.com have been patched. Users running Probo prior to v0.194.1 should update to flash any potential exploitation vectors.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 4.7 places the flaw in the moderate range. No exploit probability data is presently available, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV. An attacker requires user interaction to trigger the redirect, typically by directing a victim to a crafted link containing a backslash sequence. Browsers that interpret the backslash as a host separator expose users to phishing where the victim believes the redirect originates from a trusted domain.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 13, 2026 at 16:55 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the self‑hosted Probo installation to version 0.194.1 or newer.
  • Verify that any custom redirect parameters no longer accept user‑supplied URLs and enforce strict path validation.
  • Test the system by attempting a payload such as "/../\evil.com" to ensure the redirect is blocked after the upgrade.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 13, 2026 at 16:55 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-x7qq-m748-8p2c Probo has an open redirect bypass via path normalization
History

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 15:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Probo is a self-hostable governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) platform built for engineering and security teams. Probo's `saferedirect` package validates redirect URLs used across authentication flows (OIDC, SAML, session transfer, OAuth connectors, and trust-center magic links). Prior to version 0.19.3.1, the validator only inspected the second character of relative paths, so a URL like `/../\evil.com` passed validation because the second character is `.`. Go's `http.Redirect` normalizes this path to `/\evil.com` before setting the `Location` header. Browsers can interpret the backslash as a host separator and redirect the user to an external domain (`https://evil.com`), bypassing the intended same-origin restriction. This enables open-redirect phishing: an attacker can craft a `continue` parameter (or embed a malicious URL in a session-transfer token) that appears to originate from a trusted Probo domain but redirects victims elsewhere. This is fixed in `go.probo.inc/probo` 0.193.1 by normalizing relative paths with `path.Clean` before validation, rejecting backslashes (including percent-encoded `%5c`) anywhere in the path, and re-checking the normalized result for protocol-relative and backslash prefixes. Self-hosted deployments should upgrade to probod v0.194.1 or later. SaaS deployments on getprobo.com are patched. No practical workaround is available for self-hosted installations.
Title Probo has an open redirect bypass via path normalization
Weaknesses CWE-601
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 4.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N'}


Subscriptions

No data.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-13T14:36:34.645Z

Reserved: 2026-06-01T18:50:36.055Z

Link: CVE-2026-49820

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-13T15:19:41.410

Modified: 2026-08-13T15:19:41.410

Link: CVE-2026-49820

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-13T17:00:04Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-601

    URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')