Blueprint Studio generated a shell-based Git credential helper that incorporated the configured Git username and token directly into the helper script without sanitization. Consequently, a user able to set Git credentials could embed newline characters or arbitrary shell syntax in the username or token field. When Git invoked the generated helper, the embedded commands were executed with the operating‑system privileges of the Home Assistant instance, enabling modification or disclosure of Home Assistant configuration data. This flaw is a classic command injection (CWE‑78) that compromises confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system.

The vulnerability exists in Ha‑China Blueprint Studio versions preceding 2.5.2. Any installation running 2.5.1 or earlier is susceptible; the issue is resolved in version 2.5.2 and later.

The CVSS score of 8.6 indicates a high severity, and the EPSS score is < 1%, indicating a very low but non‑zero exploitation probability, but the potential impact is significant. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, but because the injection relies on locally set credentials, an attacker who can influence Git configuration—such as a malicious Home Assistant user—can craft the exploit with relative ease. The attack vector is local or application‑level rather than remote, yet the execution performed with full Home Assistant privileges makes it highly dangerous.