Description
Gardens v2 is a modular governance framework that enables communities to create and manage multiple governance pools with customizable parameters and voting mechanisms. Prior to 0xc9d4e0dacd937364793278180551e59d93cd43f9, StreamingEscrow.claim() correctly rejects withdrawals while an escrow is disputed, but the permissionless syncOutflow() path performs the same excess-balance transfer without checking disputed. After a streaming proposal is challenged, anyone can call syncOutflow() to transfer escrowed SuperTokens to the proposal beneficiary while the dispute is pending. If the proposal is later rejected, those tokens cannot be recovered by drainToStrategy(). This issue has been patched in 0xc9d4e0dacd937364793278180551e59d93cd43f9.
Published: 2026-09-03
Score: 8.7 High
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Impact

The vulnerability arises in the Gardens v2 governance framework where the syncOutflow() function allows anyone to transfer escrowed tokens to a proposal beneficiary without verifying if a streaming proposal is in dispute. This bypasses the intended check in StreamingEscrow.claim() that blocks withdrawals while a dispute is pending. The result is that tokens can be moved out of escrow and potentially liquidated before a dispute decision is reached, leading to financial loss for the community and undermining the fairness of the governance process. The weakness is identified as an improper authorization check (CWE-284).

Affected Systems

The affected product is 1Hive Gardens v2 before the commit 0xc9d4e0dacd937364793278180551e59d93cd43f9. Users deploying the older contract versions are vulnerable because the syncOutflow path remains unprotected against disputes. The patch address alters the function to include the same dispute check that claim() applies.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 8.7 reflects a high severity of this flaw, indicating significant potential damage. The EPSS score is not available, so the exact likelihood of exploitation cannot be quantified, but the flaw is exploitable via a normal smart‑contract call from any address. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, suggesting no publicly known exploit yet, though the nature of the bug makes it attractive for malicious actors. Attackers could trigger the flaw once a streaming proposal has been contested, moving tokens to the proposal beneficiary and preventing recovery if the proposal is eventually rejected.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 3, 2026 at 16:51 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Deploy the patched Gardens v2 version that includes the dispute check in syncOutflow() (commit 0xc9d4e0dacd937364793278180551e59d93cd43f9).
  • If an upgrade is not immediately possible, restrict access to syncOutflow() by applying additional role‑based restrictions or temporarily disabling proposals that invoke the function until an upgrade can be carried out.
  • Implement transaction monitoring to alert on syncOutflow() calls that occur while a streaming proposal is in dispute.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 3, 2026 at 16:51 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Fri, 04 Sep 2026 09:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Thu, 03 Sep 2026 16:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared 1hive
1hive gardens-v2
Vendors & Products 1hive
1hive gardens-v2

Thu, 03 Sep 2026 15:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Gardens v2 is a modular governance framework that enables communities to create and manage multiple governance pools with customizable parameters and voting mechanisms. Prior to 0xc9d4e0dacd937364793278180551e59d93cd43f9, StreamingEscrow.claim() correctly rejects withdrawals while an escrow is disputed, but the permissionless syncOutflow() path performs the same excess-balance transfer without checking disputed. After a streaming proposal is challenged, anyone can call syncOutflow() to transfer escrowed SuperTokens to the proposal beneficiary while the dispute is pending. If the proposal is later rejected, those tokens cannot be recovered by drainToStrategy(). This issue has been patched in 0xc9d4e0dacd937364793278180551e59d93cd43f9.
Title Gardens v2: Permissionless syncOutflow bypasses streaming proposal disputes
Weaknesses CWE-284
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


Subscriptions

1hive Gardens-v2
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-03T15:40:42.784Z

Reserved: 2026-06-11T15:46:12.316Z

Link: CVE-2026-53924

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-09-03T15:40:34.769Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-03T16:17:25.520

Modified: 2026-09-03T16:17:25.520

Link: CVE-2026-53924

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-03T17:00:06Z

Weaknesses