Description
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution. The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; & | $ ` ` ` ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data. Users should upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design.
No analysis available yet.
Remediation
No remediation available yet.
Tracking
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Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666 | Network-AI: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command |
References
History
Mon, 20 Jul 2026 23:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Jovancoding
Jovancoding network-ai |
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| Vendors & Products |
Jovancoding
Jovancoding network-ai |
Mon, 20 Jul 2026 16:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution. The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; & | $ ` ` ` ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data. Users should upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design. | |
| Title | Network-AI has an an OS Command Injection issue | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-78 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-20T16:24:20.791Z
Reserved: 2026-06-11T18:24:35.096Z
Link: CVE-2026-54051
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OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-07-20T23:15:04Z
Weaknesses
-
CWE-78
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Github GHSA